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THE IMMOVABLE OBJECT VERSUS THE 
IRRESISTIBLE FORCE: RETIDNKING 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
SECURED CREDIT AND 
BANKRUPTCY POLICY 
Lawrence Ponoroff* 
and F. Stephen Knippenberg** 
And then, with the coming of the night the north wind was again 
loosed, while the rain still beat against the windows and pattered down 
from the low Dutch eaves. 
When it was light enough Johnsy, the merciless, commanded that 
the shade be raised. 
The ivy leaf was still there. 
- 0. Henry1 
INTRODUCTION 
The last leaf in 0. Henry's classic short story was hanging by a 
delicate thread, but it never fell. It never fell, of course, because it 
wasn't real; Old Behrman had painted it (and caught pneumonia 
for his trouble) in order to give Johnsy the will to live. The 
Supreme Court's decision in Dewsnup v. Timm2 is also hanging by a 
thread, following a barrage of scholarly criticism and more than 
four years of limiting case law and legislative incursions on the 
case's core conceptual rationale. But the holding in Dewsnup, 
unlike the last leaf, is very real. It has had, and continues to have, a 
deleterious effect on the ability of many individual debtors to 
obtain meaningful relief and a truly "fresh start" in bankruptcy. 
* Professor of Law, Tulane University Law School. J.D. 1978, Standford. - Ed. 
** Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma Law Center. J.D. 1980, University of 
Tulsa; LL.M 1987, Temple. - Ed. We would like to thank Professor Margaret Howard for 
her thoughtful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this article. Professor How­
ard has been the most vocal and certainly the most articulate critic of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992). Therefore, while we do not by any means 
intend to imply her concurrence with either the approach taken or all of the ideas expressed 
by us in this article, her input was particularly welcome and appropriate. 
1. 0. HENRY, The Last Leaf, in THE BEST SHORT STORIES OF 0. HENRY 308, 313-14 
(1994). 
2. 502 U.S. 410 (1992). 
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This article urges Congress, as it considers the recommendations 
of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission,3 to sever the last 
thread and consign the Supreme Court's 1992 decision to its rightful 
role as a historical anomaly. In taking this action, Congress could 
clarify once and for all the nature and status of security and secured 
claims in bankruptcy.4 The advantages to be attained from doing so 
are considerable, not the least of which includes establishing the 
contours of the fresh start for individual debtors in chapter 7 in a 
manner that raises fresh-start policy to a level of dignity commensu­
rate with the policy of efficient debt collection.5 
The treatment of secured claims in bankruptcy, and, in particu­
lar, partially secured claims, has been a controversial subject6 since 
3. The National Bankruptcy Review Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 103·394, tit. VI, 
§§ 601-610, 108 Stat. 4147 (1994), established the National Bankruptcy Review Commission 
to "investigate and study issues and problems relating to title 11 [of the] United States 
Code." National Bankruptcy Review Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 103-394, tit. VI,§ 603(1), 
108 Stat. 4147, 4147-48 (1994). The Commission is also directed to prepare and submit a 
report not later than two years after the date of its first meeting containing a detailed state­
ment of its findings and conclusions, and to make recommendations to Congress, the Chief 
Justice, and the President for appropriate legislative or administrative action. See National 
Bankruptcy Review Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 103-394, tit. VI, §§ 603(3), 608, 108 Stat. 
4147, 4147, 4149 (1994). The Commission, whose final report is due in October, 1997, has 
recommended that debtors in chapter 13 cases be permitted to strip down undersecured sec­
ond mortgage residential loans, but has taken no action to repeal Dewsnup. See Bankruptcy 
Review Commn., Summary of Consumer Bankruptcy Framework Proposals #11-12 (June 10, 
1997 draft) (forthcoming October, 1997, on file with authors). The National Bankruptcy 
Review Commission Act is part of the larger Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., 18 
U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C., which we will refer to in the remainder of this article as the "1994 
Amendments." The current law of bankruptcy is found in title 11 of the United States Code. 
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994). Its foundation is the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. 
L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (effective Oct. l, 1979) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-
1330 (1994)). The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, as amended, is commonly referred to as 
the "Bankruptcy Code" or the "Code," a convention that is followed in this work, such that 
references to the "Bankruptcy Code" or the "Code" are to title 11 of the United States Code 
as amended through October 22, 1994, the effective date of the 1994 Amendments. See 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 702, 108 Stat. 4106, 4150 (establish­
ing the effective date of the 1994 Amendments). 
4. Defining the rights of secured creditors in bankruptcy has proved to be an ongoing 
challenge for bankruptcy theorists. See generally Margaret Howard, Secured Claims in 
Bankruptcy: An Essay on Missing the Point, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 313, 313 (1994) (noting that 
despite the passage of 16 years, we are still "groping for answers to a basic question that 
should have been laid to rest long ago - what, exactly, are the rights of secured creditors in 
bankruptcy?"); Mary Josephine Newborn, Undersecured Creditors in Bankruptcy: Dewsnup, 
Nobelman, and the Decline of Priority, 25 Aruz. ST. L.J. 547, 573-81 (1993) (comparing the 
treatment of secured claims under the former Bankruptcy Act and the Code). 
5. Parting company with early Anglo-American law, which regarded bankruptcy solely as 
a creditors' collection remedy, the Code identified collective distribution as only one of its 
two major functions, the other being to ensure a generous fresh start for the bankrupt debtor. 
See Charles G. Hallinan, The 'Fresh Start' Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Historical 
Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REv. 49, 85-86 (1986) (describing the 
Code's assurance of a fresh start). 
6. See generally David Gray Carlson, Secured Creditors and the Eely Character of 
Bankruptcy Valuations, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 63 (1991) [hereinafter Carlson, Eely Character]; 
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the enactment of the current Bankruptcy Code in 1979.7 For exam­
ple, a fundamental tension has always existed between the state-law 
rules - which facilitate a single creditor's ability to fence off all of 
the debtor's existing and after-acquired property - and bank­
ruptcy's fresh-start and rehabilitative policies.s Nevertheless, the 
combination of contemporary scholarship examining the purposes 
of secured credit9 and nearly ten years of case law devoted to work­
ing through the Code's approach to secured and unsecured claims10 
demonstrate that Dewsnup was more than just another manifesta­
tion of that traditional tension. As we argue in this article, Dew­
snup was not only a historical anomaly in terms of the Supreme 
Court's established methodology in its approach to bankruptcy 
David Gray Carlson, Undersecured Claims Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 506(a) and 
llll(b): Second Looks at Judicial Valuations of Collateral, 6 BANKR. DEVS. J. 253 (1989); 
[hereinafter Carlson, Undersecured Claims]; Theodore Eisenberg, The Undersecured Creditor 
in Reorganizations and the Nature of Security, 38 V AND. L. REv. 931 {1985). The question 
that lies at the bottom of the controversy about treatment of partially secured claims in bank­
ruptcy may be stated as follows: What rights, if any, beyond those of a general unsecured 
creditor, does a partially secured creditor enjoy with respect to the judicially established 
unsecured portion of its claim {that portion in excess of the judicially determined value of the 
collateral securing the claim)? Resolution of that issue implicates certain unresolved ten­
sions between the state-law rules and policies governing asset-based financing, on the one 
hand, and the fresh start and rehabilitative policies that animate, respectively, the consumer 
and business provisions of the Federal Bankruptcy Code, on the other. 
7. As discussed supra note 3, the foundation of the current law of bankruptcy is the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 {effective Oct. 1, 1979) 
{codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 {1994)). 
8. See infra text accompanying notes 107-23. See generally Steve H. Nickles, Consider 
Process Before Substance, Commercial Law Consequences of the Bankruptcy System: Urging 
the Merger of the Article 9 Drafting Committee and the Bankruptcy Commission, 69 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 589 (1995) {discussing the inherent tension between bankruptcy policy and state 
commercial law). 
9. While there is a long history to academic attempts at normative justification of secured 
financing, going back in the legal literature to Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, 
Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, SS YALE L.J. 1143 (1979), the most recent 
collection of work on the subject is the Virginia Law Review's Symposium, Revision of Article 
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 80 VA. L. REv. 1783 {1994). See infra Part III. 
10. The first major crucible in this respect was the Supreme Court's decision holding that 
undersecured creditors are not, as part of the adequate protection of their interests, entitled 
to postpetition interest. See United Sav. Assn. v. Tnnbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. (In re 
Tnnbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.), 484 U.S. 365 {1988); David Gray Carlson, Bifurcation of 
Undersecured Claims in Bankruptcy, 10 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 7-9 {1996); infra note 136. 
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cases,11 but also an untenable exception in the ever-more-clearly 
emerging course of bankruptcy jurisprudence under the Code.12 
11. With the exception of its decision in Dewsnup, and to a lesser extent its recent deci­
sion in Field v. Mans, 116 S. Ct. 437 (1995) (concerning the reliance element of 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a)(2)(A) (1994)), the Rehnquist Court has followed a strict statutory-construction 
approach in deciding bankruptcy issues. Several good articles exist exploring the Supreme 
Court's contemporary bankruptcy jurisprudence. See, e.g., Carlos J. Cuevas, The Rehnquist 
Court, Strict Statutory Construction and the Bankruptcy Code, 42 Cr.Ev. ST. L. REv. 435 
(1994); Walter A. Effross, Grammarians at the Gate: The Rehnquist Court's Evolving "Plain 
Meaning" Approach to Bankruptcy Jurisprudence, 23 SETON HALL L. REv. 1636 (1993); 
Thomas G. Kelch, An Apology for Plain-Meaning Interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code, 10 
BANKR. DEV. J. 289 (1994); Robert M. Lawless, Legisprudence Through a Bankruptcy Lens: 
A Study of the Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 47 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1 {1996); Robert K. 
Rasmussen, A Study of the Costs and Benefits of Textualism: The Supreme Court's 
Bankruptcy Cases, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 535 {1993); Charles Jordan Tabb & Robert M. Lawless, 
Of Commas, Gerunds, and Conjunctions: The Bankruptcy Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist 
Court, 42 SYRACUSE L. REv. 823 (1991); see also Adam J. Wiensch, Note, The Supreme 
Court, Textualism, and the Treatment of Pre-Bankruptcy Code Law, 19 GEO. L.J. 1831 {1991) 
(arguing that the Court's consistent textualist approach to bankruptcy law under the Code is 
best explained as a product of the comprehensiveness of the Code as compared with earlier 
bankruptcy law, the importance of commercial certainty, and the Court's general hostility 
toward the equitable powers of bankruptcy courts). 
12. The, Supreme Court in Dewsnup narrowly limited the precedential value of its holding 
to the facts of the case, including, specifically, the fact that the matter involved a liquidation 
proceeding under chapter 7. See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 416-17. After a period of some 
uncertainty, there is now a growing consensus accepting the logic of the position that Dew­
snup has no applicability in reorganization proceedings under chapter 11 or 13. See Wade v. 
Bradford, 39 F.3d 1126 {10th Cir. 1994) (asserting that Dewsnup could not be imported into 
chapter 11 without eviscerating other key provisions and the principles of the reorganization 
chapter). Compare Taffi v. United States (In re Taffi), 144 B.R. 105, 113-15 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
1992) (prohibiting avoidance of undersecured tax lien in a chapter 11 case), revd. on other 
grounds, Nos. CV 92-6665 MRP, CV 93-1800 MRP, 1993 WL 558844 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 1993), 
modified, 68 F.3d 306 (9th Cir. 1995), affd. on rehg., 96 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 1996), petition for 
cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3433 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1996) (No. 96-881) with Dever v. IRS (In re 
Dever), 164 B.R. 132, 137-39 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1994) (arguing that Dewsnup makes no sense 
in the reorganization context). While residential lenders are given special protection against 
bifurcation of their claims by virtue of 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1994), lien stripping is also 
permissible in chapter 13 cases. See, e.g., Bank One, Chicago, N.A. v. Flowers, 183 B.R. 509 
{N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding that Dewsnup does not extend to chapter 13 cases). In Nobe/man v. 
American Savings Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993), the Supreme Court prohibited strip down of a 
mortgage on the debtor's principal residence, but its holding was based solely on 
§ 1322(b)(2), implicitly suggesting that strip down is otherwise permitted in chapter 13. Sev­
eral decisions since Nobe/man have made the implication explicit. See, e.g., Howard v. 
National Westminster Bank (In re Howard), 184 B.R. 644 {Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) (allowing 
strip down of a wholly unsecured judicial lien against the debtor's residence in a chapter 7 
case, and concluding that Dewsnup did not apply because the lien was nonconsensual and 
therefore the parties had never bargained to secure the debt with a lien on the property). In 
In re Barrett, 188 B.R. 285 (Bankr. D. Or. 1995), the court, in permitting bifurcation of the 
creditor's claim into secured and unsecured portions, acknowledged that Nobe/man's prohi­
bition against strip down rested solely on the special rule in § 1322(b )(2) for creditors secured 
only by property that was the debtor's personal residence. Moreover, § 1322(c)(2), which 
was enacted as part of the 1994 Amendments, overrules Nobe/man to the extent the mort­
gage falls due during the life of the plan. See In re Young, 199 B.R. 643 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 
1996); see also Harmon v. United States, 101 F.3d 574 {8th Cir. 1996) {holding that neither 
Dewsnup nor Nobe/man operate to limit interpretation of the term "allowed secured claim" 
in§ 1225(a)(5) to the lesser of the amount of the debt or the value of the collateral). Fmally, 
some courts have taken the view that Nobe/man does not prohibit "strip off' of a claim 
served by a mortgage that is entirely, as opposed to only partially, unsecured. Compare In re 
Geyer, 203 B.R. 726, 728-29 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996) {holding that wholly unsecured lien may 
2238 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 95:2234 
We begin in Part I by examining the Dewsnup holding in the 
context of contemporaneous legislative and judicial developments 
relating to the treatment of undersecured claims in bankruptcy. In 
Part II, we evaluate, and find unconvincing, the most recent apolo­
gia for the outcome in Dewsnup. We conclude from this that 
Dewsnup must to a considerable degree be understood as the prod­
uct of certain imaginative conceptions about the nature of secured 
credit. This leads us in Part III to review the most recent positions 
advanced in the now nearly twenty-year-old debate over the effi­
ciency of secured financing. Our examination reveals that scholars, 
whether writing from an economics-driven perspective on the law 
or not, are increasingly reaching the conclusion that secured credit 
as an institution, and its derivative rule of full priority for secured 
claims upon insolvency, does not in fact promote systemic effi­
ciency. Nevertheless, the law in this area continues to be guided by 
the precepts of freedom of contract and free alienability of property 
rights.13 It is that normative justification for secured credit - pre­
mised on the same principles of party autonomy that form the phil­
osophical underpinnings of both contract and property law - that 
presents the most serious challenge for the position we advance in 
this paper. 
In Part IV, therefore, we examine this "conveyance model" of 
the security interest in the bankruptcy setting and find that it fails to 
account adequately for certain unique but fundamental bankruptcy 
policies, including, in consumer cases, the fresh-start policy. This 
leads us to the conclusion that, notwithstanding the utility of a 
property-based understanding of security interests in a variety of 
other contexts, what is called for in the bankruptcy context is an 
alternative to the conceptualization of the secured claim as "prop­
erty." Part V examines recent work in the cognitive sciences on 
which such an alternative conceptualization might be built. That 
work has revealed that abstract concepts, such as legal concepts, are 
understood metaphorically. The principal insight of that learning, 
that concepts are not direct reflections of some external reality 
independent of the reasoner, has important ramifications for legal 
analysis and legal reform. The significance of that insight is 
nowhere better demonstrated than in the context of the topic at 
be "stripped off'') with Barnes v. American Gen. Fin. (In re Barnes), 207 B.R. 588, 592-93 
(Banlcr. N.D. Ill. 1997) (ruling that "strip off'' is precluded under § 1322(b)(2) and 
Nobe/man). 
13. See generally Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory 
of Security Interests: Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, BOVA. L. REV. 2021, 2047-53 (1994). 
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hand, the way in which we have come to conceptualize secured 
credit. 
Finally, having unpacked the metaphors by which our thinking 
about security has been both advanced and constrained, in Part VI 
we critique the metaphor that implicitly dictated the result in 
Dewsnup. We then offer, and consider the practical applications of, 
an alternative characterization of security interests in bankruptcy 
that conceptualizes the security interest as a claim to property, 
rather than as an indefeasible right in the property itself. 
!. AVOIDANCE OF UNDERSECURED CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY 
Consider as a starting point for discussion a chapter 7 debtor 
with a homestead exemption of $15,000 and a residence valued at 
$120,000. Assume this property is subject to, in order of priority, a 
$100,000 nonavoidable first mortgage, a $15,000 judicial lien, and a 
$20,000 nonavoidable second mortgage. Section 522(f)(l)(A) of 
the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the debtor to avoid the fixing of 
the lien on the debtor's property to the extent that such lien impairs 
an exemption to which the debtor would otherwise have been enti­
tled.14 Section 522(f)(2)(A), added to the Code by the 1994 
Amendments, now defines impairment15 to make it clear that the 
entire judicial lien impairs the exemption and, therefore, may be set 
aside in toto.16 By focusing on the dollar amount of liens against 
14. See, e.g., Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291 (1991); Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305 
(1991). 
15. Section 303 of the 1994 Amendments adopts a simple mathematical calculation for 
determining the extent to which a lien impairs an exemption. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 303, 108 Stat. 4106, 4132 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. 
§ 522(f)(2) (1994)). Specifically, a lien is deemed to impair to the extent that the sum of (i) 
the lien, (ii) all other liens against the property, and (iii) the amount of the exemption that 
the debtor could claim if there were no liens against the property, exceeds the value that the 
debtor's interest in the property would have in the absence of any liens - i.e., the fair market 
value of the debtor's interest. Under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(B) (1994), in the case of property 
subject to more than one lien, a lien previously avoided is to be excluded from the calculation 
under subparagraph (A). The effect of this formulation is to permit avoidance of the 
"unsecured" portion of a judicial lien, regardless of whether the debtor has any equity in the 
property over and above the sum of the nonavoidable consensual liens. 
16. On the facts of the hypothetical, the calculation would go as follows: (i) $15,000 plus 
(ii) $120,000 plus (iii) 15,000 = $150,000 minus $120,000 = $30,000. Since the lien is less than 
the amount of the impairment, it would be avoidable in its entirety. See Jones v. Mellon 
Bank, N.A. (In re Jones), 183 B.R. 93 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1995) (avoiding entire judicial lien in 
the amount of $10,954.29, even though debtor's equity in her personal residence was equal to 
exactly the amount of the applicable homestead exemption, $7,500.00); In re Thomsen, 181 
B.R. 1013 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1995) (avoiding $60,000 judgment lien where it was stipulated 
that property had a value of either less than the first mortgage, or less than the sum of the 
first mortgage and the debtor's $10,800 statutory homestead claim). But see In re Seltzer, 185 
B.R. 116 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that because, under New York law, a debtor is not 
entitled to a homestead exemption unless there is equity in the property, where consensual 
liens exceed the value of the property any subsequent judicial liens do not impair an exemp-
2240 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 95:2234 
the property and the value of the exemption, the new statutory 
formula for measuring impairment effectively overrules those cases 
that refused to permit avoidance unless there was an execution 
pending on the lien at the time the bankruptcy was :filed.17 It also 
negates the continuing viability of those decisions holding that 
there can be no impairment where state law requires a minimum 
bid equal to the amount of the homestead exemption in order for a 
forced sale to be valid. ls 
Because of the existence of the unavoidable second mortgage, 
however, the above scenario presents another interpretational issue 
that is not resolved by the text of the 1994 Amendments to the 
Code.19 Unless the benefit of the avoidance is preserved for the 
debtor, it inures entirely to the junior mortgagee.20 This raises the 
tion and, thus, are not voidable under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)). The legislative history to the 1994 
Amendments indicates that in adopting the new definition of impairment, Congress essen­
tially intended to adopt the formula set forth in In re Brantz, 106 B.R. 62, 68 (Banl<r. E.D. Pa. 
1989), in which the court concluded that a debtor could avoid all judicial liens in excess of the 
amount produced by subtracting from the fair market value of the property the sum of all 
nonavoidable liens and the debtor's allowable exemption. See H.R. REP. No. 103·835, at 52· 
54 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3361-63. Codification of the Brantz interpre­
tation of§ 522(f) represents a rejection of the pre-1994 Amendment approach, which several 
courts of appeals had taken, of avoiding a judicial lien only to the extent that the lien 
"impaired" the exemption, as measured by the debtor's equity in the property or the amount 
of the exemption, whichever was less. See authorities cited infra note 22. For further elabo­
ration of this view and its application, see 2 DA vm G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 8-28, 
at 560-67 (1992). 
17. See In re Lynch, 187 B.R. 536 (Banl<r. E.D. Ky.) (exposing the fallacy, in light of the 
1994 Amendments, in the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Resolution Trust Corp. v. Moreland (In 
re Moreland), 21 F.3d 102 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that no homestead exemption exists unless 
execution sale is pending), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 956 (1995)). For additional discussion of the 
operation of the new definition of "impairment," see David Gray Carlson, Security Interests 
on Exempt Property After the 1994 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 4 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REv. 57, 64-69 (1996); Margaret Howard, Avoiding Powers and the 1994 Amend­
ments to the Bankruptcy Code, 69 AM. BANKR. LJ. 259, 268-77 (1995); Scott Everett, Com­
ment, Debtors' Delight? Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994: How Revisions to 11 U.S.C. 
§ 522(f) Affect Debtors' Ability to Avoid Liens Which Impair Texas Personal Property Exemp· 
lions, 26 TEx. TECH L. REv. 1331 (1995). 
18. See In re Allard, 196 B.R. 402, 410-11 (Banl<r. N.D. Ill.) (rejecting as irrelevant after 
the 1994 Amendments the reasoning of the court in In re Harrison, 164 B.R. 611 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 1994), to the effect that because the homestead exemption amount must be paid off 
as part of valid forced sale, judicial lien could not impair the exemption), affd. sub nom. 
Great S. Co. v. Allard, 202 B.R. 938 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
19. But see infra note 20 (referring to the legislative history that does address this issue 
but that, unfortunately, did not find its way into the text of the statute itself). 
20. Some courts and commentators resolve the issue by taking the position that the fresh­
start objectives of§ 522 are thwarted by an approach that permits junior lienors, rather than 
the debtor, to benefit when an exemption-impairing lien is avoided. See Losieniecki v. Thrift 
Consumer Discount Co. (In re Losieniecki), 17 B.R. 136, 139-40 (Banl<r. W.D. Pa. 1981); 2 
EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 16, § 8-28, at 566 (relying as well on the trustee's power under 
§ 549(a) to set aside postpetition transfers); John T. Cross, The Application of Section 522(f) 
of the Bankruptcy Code in Cases Involving Multiple Liens, 6 BANKR. DEV. J. 309, 333-35 
(1989); Margaret Howard, Multiple Judicial Liens in Bankruptcy: Section 522(f)(l) 
Simplified, 61 AM. BANKR. LJ. 151, 180-84 (1993). 
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question of whether the junior unavoidable lien simply fills the 
vacuum created by the avoidance of the judicial lien or whether the 
concept of preservation of avoided liens for the benefit of the estate 
under 11 U.S.C. § 551 can be imported into 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) in 
order to allow the debtor to rely on section 522(i)(2) to claim an 
exemption out of the avoided lien. Permitting the junior lien to 
claim the priority formerly occupied by the avoided judicial lien 
might be defended as corresponding more or less with the result 
under state law.21 Furthermore, there is an arguable theoretical 
benefit to the debtor attendant to the avoidance of the judicial lien, 
even if the nonavoidable junior lien is not subordinated to the 
exemption.22 In the final analysis, however, it is a result that serves 
For examples of decisions concluding that the junior consensual liens are not altered by 
the elimination of the judicial lien, with the result that they simply move up in priority as a 
result of the avoidance, see Simonson v. First Bank (In re Simonson), 758 F.2d 103 (3d Cir. 
1985) (refusing to construe § 522(g) to allow the debtor to improve its position at the expense 
of the holder of a nonavoidable lien); Kenpack Converters, Inc. v. Patterson (In re Patterson), 
139 B.R. 229, 231 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1992). The 1994 amendments, by dictating the manner in 
which impairment is measured, overrule cases like Simonson to the extent they stand for the 
proposition that unavoidable liens can be cumulated to wipe out any equity, and thereby any 
impairment in the first place. Amended § 522 does not, however, expressly address the pres­
ervation and priority issues when an avoidable judicial lien is sandwiched between unavoida­
ble liens. Nevertheless, the legislative history of the amendments indicates that they adopt 
the dissent's position in Simonson. See H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 52-54, reprinted in 1994 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3361-63. Importantly, one of the points made in that dissent was that the 
lien in question should not only be avoided, but also preserved, for the debtor's benefit under 
§ 522(i)(2). 
21. See Patterson, 139 B.R. at 231 Gustifying awarding the value of the avoided lien to the 
junior consensual lien on the basis that state-law priority rules ought to be preserved except 
where expressly inconsistent with the terms of the Code); In re Shafner, 165 B.R. 660, 662 
(Banlcr. D. Colo. 1994) (suggesting that avoidance of a "sandwiched" judicial lien would 
impermissibly disturb the "established order of priority of the encumbrances"), affd., 82 F.3d 
426 (10th Cir. 1996). Actually, under state law this situation presents a sort of circular prior­
ity problem - the homestead exemption is "senior" to the judicial lien, and the judicial lien 
is senior to the second mortgage, but, because of the operation of law or an explicit subordi­
nation or waiver provision in the mortgage, the second mortgage is senior to the exemption. 
Therefore, it is not at all clear that allowing the junior unavoidable lien to move up in priority 
in fact corresponds, as the court maintained in Patterson, with state law. See infra text accom­
panying notes 172-82. Given this uncertainty, as well as the idiosyncrasies of state law, it 
seems that a uniform solution, derived from a normative view of the scope of the fresh start, 
might make more sense than attempting to decide the issue by abiding the principle of leav­
ing state-law priorities undisturbed. 
22. By eliminating the judicial lien, the debtor may effectively redeem the property for its 
current value, thereby attaining full value of future appreciation and eliminating any hold-up 
value the judicial lienor might have extracted as a condition to releasing its lien, should the 
debtor wish to alienate the property in a voluntary transaction. Prior to the 1994 
Amendments, even this limited benefit would not have been available in jurisdictions that 
"carved" the exception out of the lien but otherwise left the balance of the lien intact. See, 
e.g., Wrenn v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co. (In re Wrenn), 40 F.3d 1162, 1166 (11th Cir. 
1994) (per curiam) (holding that under former § 522(f), the maximum extent to which a 
debtor could avoid a judicial lien was defined by the dollar amount of the exemption). In 
Holloway v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. (In re Holloway), 81F.3d 1062, 1069-70 
(11th Cir. 1996), a case in which the debtors had no equity in their homestead, the court 
acknowledged that Wrenn had been overruled by the 1994 Amendments. Nevertheless, 
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rather poorly the humanitarian impulses that accounted for the 
adoption of the debtor avoiding power in the first instance.23 The 
other, and candidly, more logical, alternative would be to permit 
the debtor to use 11 U.S.C. section 506( d) in tandem with section 
522(f)(l)(A) to set aside the second consensual mortgage in the 
bankruptcy proceeding to the extent of that creditor's unsecured 
deficiency.24 The problem, of course, is that Dewsnup foils this neat 
solution, forcing debtors to resort to far more costly and convoluted 
schemes for accomplishing the same result.25 
because the case was filed before the effective date of the 1994 Amendments, the court felt 
constrained to apply Wrenn and leave the lien intact. This pre-1994 practice of carving the 
exemption out of the unsecured portion of the lien but otherwise leaving the lien intact as a 
continuing encumbrance against the property, resulted in what Professor Howard aptly 
termed an "empty exemption" for the debtor. See Howard, supra note 20, at 166, 174-80 
(using as an example of this phenomenon the decision in Kroger v. Beneficial Commercial 
Corp. (In re Kroger), 11 B.R. 785 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987)). 
23. Section 522(f)'s avoidance power is an important component in the Code's overall 
objective in consumer bankruptcy cases of affording a financial fresh start to the debtor. See 
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 362 (1977), reprinted in 1918 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6318 {"Subsection 
(f) [of§ 522] protects the debtor's exemptions, his discharge, and thus his fresh start by per­
mitting him to avoid certain liens on exempt property."). The discharge and the exemption 
provisions of the Code are perhaps the two most critical elements of the Code's fresh-start 
policy. See Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert Their 
Assets on the Eve of Bankroptcy: Villains or Victims of the Fresh Start?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
235, 239-41 (1995); see also Cross, supra note 20, at 338-39 (explaining that Congress singled 
out nonpurchase money security interests and judicial liens because neither type of interest 
represents a true "reliance" claim, and because of their tendency to interfere with the fresh 
start by undermining the debtor's exemptions). 
24. Section 506(a) requires a partially secured creditor to bifurcate its claim into a 
secured and unsecured portion based on the value of the collateral. On its face, § 506(d) 
then seems to allow for avoidance of the lien to the extent it is unsupported by value. This 
makes a great deal of sense, given that the claim represented by that portion of the lien is 
being allowed and adjusted as an unsecured claim in the ensuing bankruptcy proceeding. 
Application of this approach to the facts of our hypothetical would require avoiding the 
$15,000 unsecured portion of the mortgage under § 506( d) and then avoiding the judicial lien 
pursuant to § 522(f) so that the property is left with $105,000 in encumbrances and the debtor 
enjoys the full $15,000 homestead exemption. Avoidance of the judicial lien under § 522(f), 
even if the lien is preserved for the benefit of the debtor, still leaves the property subject to 
$120,000 in encumbrances if nothing is done about the second mortgage. Thus, this approach 
allows the debtor to enjoy the benefit of the homestead exemption not only in the event of 
foreclosure but also on immediate transfer. It also preserves for the debtor the benefit of 
future appreciation. In a chapter 11 case, the creditor has the ability to defeat that kind of 
lien stripping by electing to have its claim treated as fully secured under 11 U.S.C. § llll(b) 
{1994), although the debtor-in-possession can dilute the benefits of such an election with a 
minimum of effort. See Carlson, Unsecured Claims, supra note 6, at 291-92 (explaining the 
orthodox interpretation of the § llll(b) election, but demonstrating how, by extending the 
payment period, the economic value of this election nearly always can be defeated by the 
debtor-in-possession). In a chapter 7 case, there is no such statutory restraint. See Margaret 
Howard, Stripping Down Liens: Section 506{d) and the Theory of Bankruptcy, 65 AM. 
BANKR. LJ. 373 (1991) (urging, pre-Dewsnup, that lien stripping under § 506(d) should be 
permitted as a fair accommodation of the tension between the bankruptcy fresh-start policy 
and the secured creditor's entitlement to the value of its claim in bankruptcy). 
25. One of these more "costly and convoluted schemes" is to resort to the device known 
as a "chapter 20," a technique involving the rapid-fire filing of a chapter 13 case as soon as 
the debtor receives a discharge under chapter 7. See Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 
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How did we arrive at this curious state of affairs? As always, 
through the most circuitous of routes. Our story begins not at the 
beginning but at what we gather (and hope) is nearly the end. Prior 
to the 1994 Amendments, several courts, including at least four cir­
cuit court of appeals panels,26 had ruled that in order to be subject 
to the debtor's avoiding power in 11 U.S.C. section 522(f)(l),27 the 
debtor had to have equity in the property over at least the amount 
of senior nonavoidable liens.28 Accordingly, if the judicial lien were 
completely unsecured (in the bankruptcy sense of the word), it was 
nonavoidable because it did not, to use the language of the statute, 
impair an exemption to which the debtor would otherwise be enti­
tled.29 Thus, on the facts of the hypothetical posed earlier, the 
78 {1991) (declining to adopt an absolute bar to the chapter 20 technique); infra text accom­
panying notes 246-51; see also Newborn, supra note 4, at 579-81 (explaining that the issue in 
Johnson was not lien avoidance, but the effect of discharge on the underlying claim, and that, 
therefore, Johnson is not authority for the proposition for which it was cited in Dewsnup, 
namely, that liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected). 
26. See Wrenn v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co. (In re Wrenn), 40 F.3d 1162 {11th Cir. 
1994) (per curiam); Menell v. First Natl. Bank (In re Menell), 37 F.3d 113 {3d Cir. 1994); City 
Natl. Bank v. Chabot (In re Chabot), 992 F.2d 891 {9th Cir. 1993); Wachovia Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Oppennan (In re Oppennan), 943 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1991). One of the first Code cases 
to adopt this approach was Day v. Boteler (In re Boteler), 5 B.R. 408 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1980). 
27. As originally enacted,§ 522(f)(l) of the Code referred solely to the debtor's power to 
avoid a judicial lien to the extent that the lien impaired an exemption. See Bankruptcy 
Refonn Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, sec. 101, § 522(f)(l), 92 Stat. 2549, 2589 {codified at 
11 U.S.C. § 522{f)(l) (1994)). Section 522(f)(2) then conferred a similar power on debtors 
with respect to nonpossessory, nonpurchase money security interests in certain types of con­
sumer collateral, professional tools, and health aids. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 
Pub. L. No. 95-598, sec. 101, § 522{f)(2), 92 Stat. 2549, 2589 (codified at 11U.S.C.§522{f)(2) 
{1994)). The 1994 Act collapsed both provisions into § 522(f){l), as subparagraphs {A) & 
(B), respectively, and carved out, in subparagraph (A), an exception to the power to avoid a 
judicial lien where the lien was given to secure a debt to a spouse, former spouse, or child, for 
alimony, maintenance, or support. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(l) (1994). Section 522(f)(2) now 
contains the statutory fonnula for determining the extent to which a lien will be considered 
to impair an exemption. See 11 U.S.C. § 522{f)(2) (1994); supra note 15. 
28. In addition, some courts included junior nonavoidable liens in the determination of 
whether the debtor had any equity in the property that might be impaired by the judicial lien. 
See Simonson v. First Bank (In re Simonson), 758 F2d 103 (3d Cir. 1985) (discussed supra 
note 20). The corollary of the view that a debtor could not avoid a lien if it did not attach to 
equity having monetary value, was that even when equity existed, avoidance would be lim­
ited to the lesser of the monetary value of the equity or the amount of the exemption. See, 
e.g., Menel� 37 F.3d at 115 {holding that only the part of the lien that interferes with the 
exemption may be avoided); Chabot, 992 F.2d at 895. The effect of this approach was that 
when the amount of the lien exceeded the exemption value, the unavoided (and unsecured) 
portion of the lien would remain as a charge against the property. The most generous view 
was that the statutory exemption amount set the outer limit of impairment. See, e.g., West v. 
West (In re West), 68 B.R. 647, 648-49 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986). In light of postbankruptcy 
realities in most cases, this rendered the debtor's exercise of the § 522{f) avoiding power an 
essentially meaningless act. See supra note 15. 
29. Many bankruptcy courts reached the opposite result, permitting total avoidance when 
the debtor's equity was insufficient to satisfy both the exemption amount and the judicial 
lien. See, e.g., In re Cross, 164 B.R. 496, 497-98 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994); Osborne v. Dominion 
Bank, N.A. (In re Osborne), 156 B.R. 188, 191 {Bankr. W.D. Va. 1993), revd., 165 B.R. 183 
(W.D. Va. 1994); LaPointe v. Snelling & Snelling, Inc. (In re LaPointe), 150 B.R. 92, 94-95 
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entire judicial lien might have survived because the debtor had no 
equity in the property over and above the sum of the nonavoidable 
liens.30 This line of authorities, which in part was seen as offering a 
preferred construction of the statute because of its consistency with 
the Supreme Court's holding in Dewsnup, 31 has now also been 
overruled by the statutory formula for determining "impairment" 
that was added to the Code by the 1994 Amendments.32 The avoid­
ance power in section 522(f)(l)(A), however, is limited to judicial 
liens.33 Thus, while it surely calls into question the holding in 
(Banlcr. D. Conn. 1993); In re Magosin, 75 B.R. 545, 547 (Banlcr. E.D. Pa. 1987). But see In 
re Corio, 190 B.R. 498 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (affirming the banlcruptcy court's order that a judicial 
lien could not be avoided as impairing the debtor's homestead exemption because the debtor 
had no equity in the property, and, therefore, no exemption to be impaired). 
30. A possible exception existed, in the view of some courts, where one or more of the 
unavoidable liens was junior to the judicial lien under attack. See Silver v. Savings Bank (In 
re Fiore), 27 B.R. 48, 50 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983) (holding that junior, unavoidable liens are 
not considered in determining impairment). In effect, this approach would produce, in some 
cases, an equity figure where none would otherwise exist. In other cases, it would produce an 
equity figure sufficient to cover both the judicial lien and the exemption, thereby depriving 
the debtor of her right to avoid any portion of the judicial lien under § 522(f). See In re 
Shafner, 165 B.R. 660, 662 (Banlcr. D. Colo. 1994), affd., 82 F.3d 426 (10th Cir. 1996); 2 
EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 16, § 8-28, at 564-65. 
31. See Chabot, 992 F.2d at 895 ("Our holding [precluding avoidance of the lien in excess 
of the amount of the exemption] is consistent with . . .  Dewsnup v. Tunm. "). But see Wrenn 
v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co. (In re Wrenn), 40 F.3d 1162, 1165-66 (11th Cir. 1994) {per 
curiam) (observing that avoidance of the entire lien would not be inconsistent with Dewsnup 
if one were to accept the debtor's argument that the discharge of the underlying claim effec­
tively disallowed the creditor's claim). In addition, there was the view that the prohibition 
against lien stripping in Dewsnup did not extend to the avoidance of an "underwater" judicial 
lien that impaired exempt property. See Howard, supra note 20, at 165. 
32. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A) (1994) (discussed supra note 15). Recent cases constru­
ing the operation and effect of this new formula for determining impairment include Zeigler 
Engg. Sales, Inc. v. Cozad (In re Cozad), 208 B.R. 495 (Banlcr. 10th Cir. 1997); Pepper v. Pub. 
Serv. Employees Credit Union, No. 97-10574 CEM, 1997 Banlcr. LEXIS 902 (Bankr. D. 
Colo. June 27, 1997); Corson v. Fidelity and Guar. Ins. Co. (In re Corson), 206 B.R. 17 
(Banlcr. D. Conn. 1997); Marshall v. Suntrust Banlc, Savannah N.A. (In re Marshall), 204 
B.R. 838 (Banlcr. S.D. Ga. 1997); In re Jakubowski, 198 B.R. 262 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1996); In 
re Allard, 196 B.R. 402 (Banlcr. N.D. Ill.), affd. sub nom Great S. Co. v. Allard, 202 B.R. 938 
(N.D. Ill. 1996); In re Todd, 194 B.R. 893 (Banlcr. D. Mont. 1996). See also Butler v. South­
ern 0 Corp. (In re Butler), 196 B.R. 329, 330-31 (Banlcr. W.D. Va. 1996) (reviewing in detail 
the legislative history to § 522(f)(2), concluding that Dewsnup is no barrier to avoidance of a 
judgment lien where the lien impairs an exemption, and noting that the Amendments over­
ruled cases such as Chabot); In re Cavenaugh, No. CIV.A.95-4408, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
14962 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 1995). See generally Carlson, supra note 17, at 67-69; supra note 18. 
In dictum, the Ninth Circuit itself has conceded that, for cases filed on or after the effective 
date of the 1994 Amendments, Chabot has been overruled. See Jones v. Heskett (In re 
Jones), 106 F.3d 923, 924 n.2 (9th Cir. 1997); Wynns v. Wilson (In re Wtlson), 90 F.3d 347, 350 
(9th Cir. 1996); see also Higgins v. Household Fin. Corp. (In re Higgins), 201 B.R. 965, 967 
(Banlcr. 9th Cir. 1996) ("Congress has made it clear in amending Section 522 that a lien will 
be deemed to impair an exemption, even when there is no equity in the property • • • •  "). 
33. "Judicial liens" are defined in§ 101(36) of the Code as "lien[s] obtained by judgment, 
levy, sequestration or other legal or equitable process or proceeding." 11 U.S.C. § 101(36) 
(1994). They are distinguished from both consensual liens and statutory liens. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 101(51), (53) (1994). Curiously, the 1994 Amendments also added a new subsection (f)(3) 
to § 522 of the Code, which purports to give the states a limited opportunity to opt out of 
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Dewsnup, it does not compromise the continuing viability of that 
holding - at least not directly.34 
If and when permitted, the power to avoid "underwater" liens35 
has value to the debtor in at least three circumstances. First, before 
creditors can foreclose, the debtor may be able to scrounge up 
enough cash from other sources to redeem the property by paying 
off all nonavoided liens. In the example used previously, the prop­
erty could be redeemed for, at most, exactly its judicially 
determined value: $120,000, and, with full lien stripping, that value 
less the amount of the exemption, or $105,000. Alternatively, if the 
debtor is otherwise able to stave off foreclosure, market factors may 
create equity in the property in the future that will inure to the 
debtor's benefit and not to the benefit of an undersecured lienor. 
While lenders might understandably regard the reallocation of 
future appreciation as unfair, the nature of bankruptcy is such that 
any postpetition gain properly belongs to the debtor.36 Finally, and 
most problematic, the court may have undervalued the property, 
resulting in the debtor's immediate enjoyment of existing wealth at 
the expense of secured creditors as soon as the property is aban­
doned or the bankruptcy case is closed.37 In all three cases, the 
subsection (f)(l){A) when the collateral is worth more than $5,000. See Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 310(2), 108 Stat. 4106, 4137-38 (codified as amended at 11 
U.S.C. § 522{f)(3) {1994)). This new provision is awkwardly worded, and its full effect is not 
yet fully understood. See Carlson, supra note 17, at 76-84. There are only a few cases so far 
attempting to give meaning to the convoluted linguistic meanderings of§ 522(£)(3). See In re 
Ehlen, 202 B.R. 742 {Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1996), affd., 207 B.R. 179 (W.D. Wis. 1997); In re 
Parrish, 186 B.R. 246 (Bankr. W.D. WIS. 1995); In re Zimmel, 185 B.R. 786 (Bankr. D. Minn. 
1995). 
34. Of course, it is our position that the 1994 Amendments indirectly call into question 
the wisdom of that decision because, along with other developments, they reflect how aber­
rant Dewsnup really was, insofar as contemporary bankruptcy jurisprudence is concerned. 
See infra notes 174-83 and accompanying text. 
35. A lien is considered to be "underwater" to the extent it is unsupported by value. See 
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 424 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Howard, supra note 20, at 
165. 
36. See infra notes 216-24 and accompanying text. 
37. Distrust of judicial valuation, coupled with the belief that markets do a better job of 
establishing values, has been a central theme in the writings of a loosely associated group of 
bankruptcy scholars who have approached the subject area using the tools of economic anal­
ysis and corporate finance. For a survey of that literature, see John D. Ayer, The Role of 
Finance Theory in Shaping Bankruptcy Policy, 3 .AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 53 (1995). Much 
of this writing has been aimed at reform, or outright elimination, of the present system in 
chapter 11 for court-supervised reorganizations of financially distressed business entities. See 
generally Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CoRNELL L. REv. 439 (1992); 
Philippe Aghion et al., The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J.L. EcoN. & 0RG. 523 
{1992); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 127 {1986); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 
101 HAR.v. L. REv. 775 {1988); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case 
for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043 (1992); Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., The 
Economic Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 85 (1995); 
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judicial lienor in our hypothetical, never a true reliance creditor to 
begin with,38 is now wholly eliminated. Ideally, the junior lienor 
would also be relegated to what, under these circumstances, the 
Code in section 506(a) determined a party in that position to be all 
along anyway; namely, an unsecured creditor to the tune of $15,000. 
How does this result square with Dewsnup, and with the charac­
terization of secured claims in bankruptcy implied by Justice 
Blackmun in his majority opinion in that case? Not very well. In 
Dewsnup, the debtors, husband and wife, argued that pursuant to 
Code sections 506(a) and 506(d), they were entitled to reduce the 
balance of a $120,000 judgment lien against their nonexempt farm 
property to the judicially determined value of that property, or 
$39,000.39 The debtors lost at the bankruptcy court, district court, 
and court of appeals levels,4o despite favorable authority from other 
jurisdictions authorizing debtor lien avoidance (so-called lien strip­
ping) in these circumstances pursuant to section 506( d).41 By this 
Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 527 {1983). However, the same suspicion of misvaluation of an individual debtor's 
real property also fuels the case in favor of prohibiting strip down in chapter 7 and preserving 
the holding in Dewsnup. See infra text accompanying notes 57-61. 
38. The fact that judicial lienors are nonreliance creditors is an important part of the 
justification for the debtor-avoiding-power provision, in § 522{f){l){A), in circumstances 
where the lien has actual economic value. It is not essential, however, to the related issue of 
whether strip dovm should be permitted under § 506( d), as, in those instances, the lien has no 
current economic value. However, to the extent that the defense of Dewsnup is cast in terms 
of the bargain metaphor, see infra note 43 and accompanying text, it is a factor that appears 
to weigh more heavily in actuality than we think it should. 
39. The judgment lien arose from a default by the debtors for amounts due under the 
terms of two mortgages that the debtors had granted to a private lending group in 1978 in 
order to finance acquisition of additional farmland. The sad plight of the Dewsnups is 
recounted in detail in Margaret Howard, Dewsnupping the Bankruptcy Code, 1 J. BANKR. L. 
& PRAc. 513, 513-14 {1992). 
40. The bankruptcy court concluded that because the property had been abandoned, the 
estate no longer had an interest in the property and § 506{d), by its terms, was inapplicable. 
See Dewsnup v. Trmm (In re Dewsnup), 87 B.R. 676, 683 (Bankr. D. Utah 1988), affd. per 
cuiram, 908 F.2d 588 {10th Cir. 1990), affd., 502 U.S. 410 {1992). The court also expressed the 
view that, as a matter of policy, to permit strip down in these circumstances would constitute 
an unwarranted intrusion on the rights of secured creditors. See Dewsnup, 87 B.R. at 683. 
The district court affirmed without a separate opinion, while the Tenth Circuit added to the 
bankruptcy court's rationale that to allow strip down would be to permit a de facto redemp· 
tion of real property in apparent contravention of 11 U.S.C. § 722 {1994), which limits 
redemptions to personal property intended primarily for personal, family, and household use. 
See Dewsnup, 908 F.2d at 592 {10th Cir. 1990), affd., 502 U.S. 410 {1992). The court also 
opined that lien avoidance under § 506( d) would create an anomalous situation in which 
debtors would receive more in liquidation than they would in reorganization under chapter 
11 or 13 because of the prohibitions against modification in, respectively, 11 U.S.C. 
§§ llll{b) and 1322{b)(2) (1994). See Dewsnup, 908 F.2d at 592. 
41. See, e.g., Gaglia v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan, 889 F.2d 1304 {3d Cir. 1989). The pre­
Dewsnup authorities pro and con are collected in Howard, supra note 24, at 374 n.2 (indicat­
ing that a majority of the decisions hold that a chapter 7 debtor may use § 506{a) and {d) to 
avoid liens unsupported by value). 
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time, LaMar Dewsnup had died and his widow Aletha Dewsnup's 
last stop was the United States Supreme Court. When she arrived 
there, the reception was no warmer than it had been in the lower 
courts. 
In the majority opinion, Justice Blackmun offered a variety of 
rationales to justify the denial of Ms. Dewsnup's claim,42 reflecting 
perhaps a concern that any one alone was not a sufficiently sound 
analytic structure upon which to rest the majority's decision. 
Among these rationales, and of principal interest for purposes of 
this article, was the assertion that permitting lien stripping under 
section 506( d) would deprive undersecured creditors of access to 
postvaluation appreciation in the encumbered property in violation 
of the prepetition bargain that had been struck between mortgagor 
and mortgagee.43 Relying primarily upon case law decided under 
the former Act, and taking that case law wholly out of context,44 
Justice Blackm.un and the Justices who joined him in the majority 
opinion adopted bargain as the appropriate metaphor for conceptu­
alizing the nature of security and secured claims in bankruptcy. 
In a dyspeptic dissenting opinion,45 Justice Scalia chided the 
majority for engaging in what he regarded as a wholly untenable 
construction of the clear language of the statute.46 He did not, how-
42. Tue majority offered several justifications. First, under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 
Pub. L. No. 55-541, § 67d, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978), unavoided liens passed through bank­
ruptcy unaffected. See Dewsnup v. TIIlllll, 502 U.S. 410, 418 (1992). Second, Congress was 
presumed to have enacted § 506( d) with a full understanding of the fact that under pre-Code 
law, involuntary debtor lien avoidance was not permitted. See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 418-19. 
Third, there was no indication in the legislative history of the Code to suggest that § 506(d) 
should be interpreted to permit lien avoidance. See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 419-20. 
43. See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417-18. The Court assumed that this would be the result if 
the mortgagor elected to remain aloof from the proceeding, and thus could "see no reason 
why his acquiescence in that proceeding should cause him to experience a forfeiture of the 
kind the debtor proposes." 502 U.S. at 418. Of course, since even the debtor can file a proof 
of claim on a creditor's behalf, see 11 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1994), the point really adds very little. 
See In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 462 (7th Cir. 1995) ("A secured creditor may be dragged into 
the bankruptcy involuntarily, because the trustee or debtor . . .  may file a claim on the credi­
tor's behalf."). The bottom line remains that the majority in Dewsnup considered it a "wind­
fall" for the debtor to enjoy the benefit of any subsequent increase in the value of the 
property. It is difficult, however, to understand how the "windfall" attributable to postfiling 
appreciation differs fundamentally, for example, from the "windfall" the debtor enjoys by 
being able to retain postpetition earnings free from prepetition contractual obligations. And 
yet, while not always a feature of American bankruptcy law, today no one seriously questions 
that the law should contain some system for discharging debts. See, e.g., Charles Jordan 
Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325 (1991). 
44. See infra note 51. 
45. See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 420 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Souter joined in the 
dissent, while Justice Thomas did not participate, making it a 6-2 vote for the appellees. 
46. "The Court makes no attempt to establish a textual or structural basis for overriding 
the plain meaning of § 506(d), but rests its decision upon policy intuitions of a legislative 
character . • • •  " Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 422 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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ever, respond directly to the policy-based aspects of the majority's 
opinion,47 comfortable presumably in his conviction that the 
unarguable meaning of the statutory text rendered such discussions 
superfluous, however interesting they might be in another con­
text.48 With all deference to Justice Scalia, we believe the major­
ity's articulated concern over upsetting the secured creditor's 
bargain merits a response since the implications of that conception 
of security extend beyond simply the issue of lien stripping in chap­
ter 7. 
Other commentators have already called into question Justice 
Blackmun's reliance on Long v. Bullard49 and Louisville Joint Stock 
Land Bank v. Radfords0 as authority for the proposition that a 
secured creditor is entitled not just to the value of its collateral in 
bankruptcy, but also to have its rights in the collateral protected in 
perpetuity.51 The proposition itself remains the subject of consider­
able disagreement. Scholars associated with the law and economics 
mode of analysis have argued most vigorously, and not unpersua­
sively, that bankruptcy law should not modify state-law property 
interests except in extraordinary circumstances.52 As a general 
47. Justice Scalia did, however, at least intimate that these policy intuitions might have 
been served without "evisceration" of the language in § 506(d). See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 
422 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
48. The dissent pointed to the Court's holdings in Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151 
(1991), and United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, 489 U.S. 235 (1989), as examples of how the 
majority's opinion was totally at odds with the Court's established "plain meaning" method 
of interpretation in previous Bankruptcy Code cases. See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 433.35 
(Scalia, J., dissenting); see also supra note 11. 
49. 117 U.S. 617 (1886). 
50. 295 U.S. 555 (1935). 
51. See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 418-19. Professor Howard explains that the Court's reli­
ance on Radford as apparent authority for the view that strip down would raise constitutional 
concerns was misplaced. See Howard, supra note 39, at 524-25. First, she notes that while 
Radford involved a successful challenge to the Frazier-Lemke Act amendments, Pub. L. No. 
73-486, 48 Stat 1289 (1934) (expired 1949) to the Bankruptcy Act, the problem with those 
provisions was that they were given retroactive effect and permitted farmer-debtors to 
purchase property for less than its judicially established fair market value. After Frazier­
Lemke was amended in 1935 to assure creditors of the full value of their collateral, attempts 
to challenge its constitutionality as an impermissible taking failed. See Wright v. Vinton 
Branch, 300 U.S. 440 (1937); Howard, supra note 39, at 525 & n.60; see also Howard, supra 
note 4, at 314-15; Newborn, supra note 4, at 580-81 (pointing out that Long v. Bullard "stands 
only for the proposition that bankruptcy discharge extinguishes only the debtor's personal 
liability for the debt" and that there was pre-Code precedent for the practice of lien avoid­
ance). While the Supreme Court's decisions in Radford and Long do not, therefore, stand in 
the way of lien avoidance generally, Radford in particular does carry some implications for 
liquidations under the Code that would need to be addressed were Dewsnup repealed. See 
infra note 273 and accompanying text. 
52. This proposition is one of the central tenets of the well-known creditors' bargain 
model developed in the 1980s by Douglas G. Baird and Thomas H. Jackson. According to 
Baird and Jackson, bankruptcy exists in order to solve the "common pool" problem created 
by the debtor's insolvency. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE Lome AND LIMITS OF 
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avowal, the point is virtually unarguable. As always, however, the 
real action is at the margins,53 and the view that the protection of a 
secured creditor's rights includes preserving creditor control over 
all decisions concerning when and how his or her interest will be 
foreclosed faces far tougher sledding in the face of numerous bank­
ruptcy provisions that effectively freeze a secured creditor's claims 
BANKRUPTCY LAW 7-19 (1986); Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and 
Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. RE.v. 815, 822-24 (1987). Faced with the 
prospect of a multiplicity of wasteful and expensive individual creditor collection actions, 
Baird and Jackson maintain that bankruptcy represents the ex ante bargain that, had they the 
opportunity, creditors would have reached had they negotiated in advance over the conse­
quences of financial reversals that would place them in competition with one another for 
limited assets. Such an agreement necessarily would preclude any reordering of the legal 
priority of existing claims because the prospect for different patterns of distribution would 
presumably induce self-interested behavior antithetical to the interest of the common pool. 
See Baird, supra, at 823 (asserting that the priorities that exist under bankruptcy law and 
nonbankruptcy law should remain parallel; if one changes, so too should the other). This is 
the problem of "forum-shopping" which plays such a pivotal role in Baird and Jackson's view 
of bankruptcy. See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and 
the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured 
Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. Cm. L. RE.v. 97, 101 (1984); Baird, supra, at 824-28 (arguing 
that having multiple avenues of enforcement for every substantive right creates special costs 
and, thus, can only be justified in relation to the reasons for having separate avenues, and not 
in terms of the substantive rights, under one scheme or the other, of the party affected). To 
instantiate this justification for a separate bankruptcy system, Baird and Jackson adopt as 
their fundamental principle the rule that bankruptcy must leave undisturbed the relative enti­
tlements of all creditors under state law. See JACKSON, supra, at 20-24, 71-83 (maintaining 
that changes in substantive rules, unless intended to preserve assets for the common good, 
run counter to the proper goals of bankruptcy); see also Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, 
Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 868-71 (1982). 
Note that Jackson does not maintain that a bankruptcy system must honor state-law entitle­
ments in every respect; a secured creditor could hardly be permitted to foreclose as it could 
under state law in the face of the stay rules in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994). What matters, then, 
is preserving "relative values" of state-law entitlements. See JACKSON, supra, at 29. More­
over, even that principle may be ignored if it can be shown that recognition of a particular 
right would compromise the collectivizing goal of the bankruptcy process. Id. at 29 n.15. 
Although commentators writing from an economics-based perspective of the law have sug­
gested that the market may be better suited to solve the collective action problems that for 
Baird and Jackson justify a separate bankruptcy system, all of these theorists, without much 
question, accept creditor wealth maximization as the sole normative object of any bankruptcy 
regime. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate 
Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. RE.v. 311, 319-23 (1993); Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, 
Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U. CHI. L. RE.v. 645, 647 (1992). 
53. Not even the most strident adherents of the view that bankruptcy is designed to maxi­
mize creditor returns have called into question the centrality of fresh-start policy in consumer 
bankruptcy cases. See JACKSON, supra note 52, at 225-79 (attempting to offer a normative 
justification for discharge that, if not exactly consistent, is at least not at odds with the first 
principles posited under the creditors' bargain model). For further discussion of Jackson's 
view of discharge in consumer cases, see Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 23, at 249-52. 
Nevertheless, while acceptance of the economic account of bankruptcy, with its limited view 
of bankruptcy purposes, may predispose one to be sympathetic with the rationale in 
Dewsnup, it does not require acceptance of that rationale. Instead, the issue still comes down 
to the extent to which one's conceptualization of secured credit outside of bankruptcy is 
altered by the federal policy of fresh start that is implicated once an individual bankruptcy 
case is initiated. 
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and entitlements as of the time of filing or plan confirmation.54 
Moreover, whatever justification one accepts for secured credit 
generally,55 one cannot assume necessarily that all of the entail­
ments that derive from that justification carry over unaffected into 
bankruptcy.56 
54. Initially, there was considerable concern about the implications of Dewsnup in reor­
ganization proceedings. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 4, at 319-36 (addressing the hannful 
effects of Dewsnup in various reorganization proceedings); Newborn, supra note 4, at 582-96 
(discussing the "damaging legacies of Dewsnup"). By and large, that concern has been laid 
to rest. Subject to the separate limitation in § 1322(b)(2) in chapter 13 cases, and the 
§ llll(b) election in chapter 11 cases, there is no longer any serious argument that Dewsnup 
alters the widely accepted premise that secured creditors in these proceedings are entitled 
only to the present value of their secured claim, in the traditional § 506(a) sense of the tenn, 
as of the relevant valuation date, although the timing of that valuation remains an unsettled 
and controversial question. See infra notes 112, 223. See generally Jane Kaufman Winn, Lien 
Stripping After Nobelman, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 541, 597-616 (1994) (reviewing the treat­
ment of secured claims under chapters 11, 12, and 13). There are several general Code provi­
sions that reinforce this view of security, in addition to the basic definitional provision in 
§ 506(a) and the exemption impairing lien-avoidance power in § 522(f)(l}(A) already dis­
cussed. For example, § 552(a) prevents a security interest containing an after-acquired prop­
erty clause from attaching to postpetition property. Section 363(f) permits the estate to sell 
encumbered property free and clear of liens provided inter alia that there is equity in the 
property over and above the value of all liens. Fmally, the Supreme Court's earlier decision 
in United Savings Assn. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates (In re Timbers of Inwood 
Forest Associates), 484 U.S. 365 (1988), construed the adequate protection requirement that 
conditions the estate's ability to retain and use property subject to a prepetition security 
interest as protecting only the value of the collateral as of the filing date and not the loss of 
the creditor's immediate right to possession or foreclosure under state law. Professor Carl­
son argues, however, that contrary to the implications of T1111bers, the most logical interpreta­
tion of Dewsnup is that valuations in bankruptcy are not final unless and until the property is 
sold at a liquidation sale or a plan of reorganization is confirmed. See Cnrlson, supra note 10, 
at 22. 
55. See infra Part III for further discussion of the different positions that have been 
espoused by commentators attempting to justify a system of secured credit. 
56. This is one of the central positions we advance in this work; namely, bankruptcy rep­
resents not only a collective debt-collection device but also, in pursuit of the goals of the 
fresh start, a complete reordering of contractual rights and priorities under state law. See 
infra text accompanying notes 147-51, 216-18. It is a view that is obviously in conflict with the 
economic account of bankruptcy. See supra note 52. In chapter 11, the same debate is 
framed in terms of whether reorganization is merely intended to maximize the economic 
value of the estate for creditors with legally cognizable interests under state law, or whether 
the process is intended to take into account the broader range of interests affected by finn 
failure. See generally Christopher W. Frost, Bankruptcy Redistributive Policies and the Limits 
of the Judicial Process, 74 N.C. L. REv. 75 (1995) (describing the nature of the debate but 
concluding that the bankruptcy judicial process is ill suited to redistributing the costs of busi­
ness failure); Lawrence Ponoroff, Enlarging the Bargaining Table: Some Implications of the 
Corporate Stakeholder Model for Federal Bankruptcy Proceedings, 23 CAP. U. L. REv. 441, 
472-86 (1994) (suggesting that public company bankruptcies affect a broader range of constit­
uencies than simply traditional creditor groups and, therefore, that those interests should be 
taken into account in allocating the losses occasioned by the enterprise's financial collapse); 
Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Implied Good Faith Filing Requirement: 
Sentinel of an Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 919, 948-66 (1991) {describing 
and comparing the competing views of bankruptcy policy and concluding that bankruptcy 
purposes are not only several and varied, but also are in a state of continuous evolution). 
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In the context of lien stripping other than pursuant to section 
522(f)(l)(A), the most recent, and perhaps the most cogent, 
defense of Dewsnup along policy lines comes from Professor Barry 
Adler.57 While Adler submits that the majority's decision yielded a 
good result, even he concedes that it did so based on a flawed inter­
pretation of the language in section 506.58 In Adler's estimation, 
strip down, and for that matter cram down,59 unfairly exposes the 
creditor to the risk of error in court valuation of the collateral, a 
risk that he views as a very serious one.6° The better solution, 
according to Adler, would be openly to require surrender to the 
secured creditor of any collateral that the court values as worth less 
than the sum of the liens that encumber it, rather than abandon­
ment followed by either strip down or cram down.61 In the 
meantime, however, Adler seems inclined to accept Dewsnup, 
interpretational shortcomings notwithstanding, as a means of forc­
ing a debtor either to repay her debt in full or to allow the secured 
57. See Barry E. Adler, Creditor Rights After Johnson and Dewsnup, 10 BANKR. DEV. J. 1 
(1993-1994). 
58. Id. at 12 ("The Court decided Dewsnup incorrectly, yet the decision yielded a good 
result."). In direct contrast, we are far less troubled with the majority's liberal approach to 
statutory construction, and far more troubled with the outcome insofar as consistency with 
core bankruptcy policy is concerned. 
59. Adler contrasts strip down in chapter 7 with "cram down" in chapter 13, which essen­
tially pennits a debtor to retain property so long as the plan proposes to pay an undersecured 
creditor in present dollars the judicially determined value of the property, even where the 
debtor has previously discharged the unsecured portion of the creditor's claim in chapter 7. 
Id. at 5-6 (discussing Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991)). The apparent incon­
gruity between Dewsnup and Johnson, which Adler avoids dwelling upon by arguing instead 
against a debtor's entitlement to both abandonment and judicial determination of collateral 
value, is discussed further infra text accompanying notes 246-56. 
60. Adler acknowledges that if courts could determine value accurately and quickly, cred­
itors should be indifferent between cram down or strip down on the one hand and foreclo­
sure sale on the other. See Adler, supra note 57, at 5. Of course, implicit in Adler's 
assumption that courts consistently misvalue assets is the further assumption that the mis­
valuation consistently inures to the debtor's benefit, that is, that courts' valuations are always 
too low. The response to this is threefold. First, there is no empirical evidence to support 
this assumption. Second, even if courts do undervalue assets, this makes the case only for 
improving the judicial valuation process, not for prohibiting strip down. See Howard, supra 
note 24, at 418-19 (making this point as well as observing that secured creditors do, after all, 
have the opportunity to fully litigate the issue). Finally, it is hardly clear that the alternative 
to strip down - release from the stay and foreclosure - produces more accurate valuation. 
In fact, commentators writing from both sides of the issue reject as naive the suggestion that 
permitting debtors to strip-down liens under chapter 7 merely replicates the foreclosure pro­
cess. See Adler, supra note 57, at 5 (referring to the assessment as "incredible"); Howard, 
supra note 24, at 406 (calling the proposition an "oversimplification"). The disagreement 
centers on whether foreclosure is the most likely alternative to strip down and who, as 
between debtor and creditor, has the superior claim to postbankruptcy appreciation in the 
absence of foreclosure. See generally id. at 408-18. 
61. See Adler, supra note 57, at 15. 
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lender to retain all of the proceeds from foreclosure up to the out­
standing balance of the loan. 
Implicit in Adler's argument may be a concession. Specifically, 
Adler seems willing to concede that "true" postbankruptcy appreci­
ation belongs to the debtor.62 However, given the apparent diffi­
culty in separating true appreciation from the phantom 
appreciation attributable to judicial misvaluation, Adler concludes 
that the only fair solution is to effectively give the property to the 
creditor to dispose of as it wishes. While this notion may not be too 
far from Justice Blackmun's admonition that lien stripping deprives 
the creditor of its bargain, the two approaches are not in fact identi­
cal. The majority in Dewsnup indulges, without much scrutiny or 
analysis, in two questionable assumptions: first, that such a bargain 
exists in fact, and, second, that this bargain (even if one concedes its 
existence) is inviolate in bankruptcy. As will be discussed further,63 
we think both assumptions are suspect, and Adler does not neces­
sarily endorse either one.64 
Indeed, Adler's defense of Dewsnup is curious. It is curious in 
the sense that while he is extremely concerned (perhaps not without 
good reason) for the accuracy of judicial valuations, he seems to 
accept without blanching the notion that state-law foreclosure sales 
produce better estimates of value.65 In fact, neither approach con-
62. See supra note 60. "True" appreciation would be appreciation attributable to actual 
changes in market conditions, rather than the appreciation "created" by undervaluation. 
63. See infra text accompanying notes 144-58. 
64. Adler's concern is, at bottom, much more prosaic. It is a concern over the risk of 
court error in valuation. Although not essential to the elimination of that risk, not to be lost 
in the wash is the fact that Adler's solution to the valuation error problem - prohibiting 
abandonment of encumbered property unless each creditor holding an interest in such prop­
erty consents - serendipitously reallocates the benefit of true postbankruptcy appreciation 
to the secured creditor. Perhaps a more neatly tailored solution would be to reform the 
valuation process to eliminate from the system the risk of persistent bias against secured 
creditors in that process. See infra note 65. 
65. See Adler, supra note 57, at 5 (suggesting that strip down would be acceptable if, in 
fact, it provided to creditors the same economic result as foreclosure). The evidence, how­
ever, is overwhelmingly at odds with the notion that foreclosure sales establish fair market 
value. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537 (1993) ("[M)arket value, as it is 
commonly understood, has no applicability in the forced-sale context; indeed, it is the very 
antithesis of forced-sale value."); OB/Gyn Solutions v. Six (In re Six), 80 F.3d 452 (11th Cir. 
1996) (noting that foreclosure sale price does not conclusively establish the value of the prop­
erty at-issue even if no objection is made); Howard, supra note 24, at 407. Therefore, to the 
extent that the secured portion of the creditor's claim for § 506(a) purposes is determined 
with reference to market as opposed to forced-sale value, the creditor should end up with a 
greater return from the property as a result of strip down and retention than could be 
expected from the logical alternative of abandonment and foreclosure. In fact, the trend in 
the courts has been away from a foreclosure approach to valuation in favor of a replacement 
or fair market value theory, focusing on retail rather than wholesale value. Most recently, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled the "replacement value," rather than the lower "foreclo­
sure value," should be used in valuing the allowed secured-credit claim of a creditor when a 
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sistently produces the same price that would be established at a true 
auction conducted under optimal conditions with open and compet­
itive bidding.66 Quite simply, the issue boils down to who should 
bear the risk of valuation error, and as to that question Adler offers 
no more than an opinion that it should be the debtor rather than 
the secured creditor, even though in reorganization proceedings the 
governing rules of law produce the opposite result.67 In fact, one 
chapter 13 debtor proposes to retain the collateral over the secured party's objection. See 
Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), 65 U.S.L.W. 4451 (U.S. June 16, 1997). 
Initially, the retreat from a foreclosure sale approach began when several courts con­
cluded that the deduction of hypothetical repossession, foreclosure, and sale costs was inap­
propriate in circumstances in which the debtor intended to retain the secured asset. See 
Huntington Natl. Bank v. Pees (In re McClurkin), 31 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 1994); Lomas 
Mortgage USA v. Wiese, 980 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated, 508 U.S. 958, modified, 998 
F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1993); Brown & Co. Sec. v. Balbus (In re Balbus), 933 F.2d 246 (4th Cir. 
1991); United States v. Case (In re Case), 115 B.R. 666 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990). From these 
decisions, it was a rational leap to the view that fair market value, rather than forced-sale 
value, is the proper valuation of secured assets that the debtor intends to retain. See, e.g., 
Taffi v. United States (In re Taffi), 96 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 1996) (involving property retained 
by chapter 11 debtors), petiticm for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3433 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1996) (No. 96-
881); Metrobank v. Trimble (In re Trimble), 50 F.3d 530 (8th Cir. 1995); Wmthrop Old Farm 
Nurseries v. New Bedford Inst. for Sav. (In re Wmthrop Old Farm Nurseries), 50 F.3d 72 (1st 
Cir. 1995). The Court's decision in Rash not only overruled the foreclosure value standard 
that had been adopted below, 90 F.3d 1036 (5th Cir. 1996), but also replaced the hybrid 
approach adopted in the Seventh Circuit, which used a midpoint between foreclosure and 
replacement value as the proper method for valuing a secured creditor's interest in property 
retained by a chapter 13 debtor. See In re Hoskins, 102 F.3d 311 (7th Cir. 1996). Although 
use of any greater-than-wholesale-value approach arguably overcompensates creditors, see 
Hoskins, 102 F.3d at 320 (Easterbrook, J., concurring in the judgment); the point is that, since 
replacement cost is now the prevailing standard, the contention that creditors are somehow 
prejudiced by permitting a debtor to strip an undersecured lien down to the amount of the 
secured claim as determined under § 506(a) seems particularly unfounded, if not incredulous. 
66. Producing those conditions, however, is no sure thing. For example, some markets 
are just too "thin" to ensure that a well publicized auction will always bring the best price. 
See generally Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11, 36 J.L. & ECON. 633, 647-
52 (1993) (suggesting that auctions may not be the most effective way of achieving maximum 
value in all cases); David A. Skeel, Jr., Markets, Courts, and the Brave New World of 
Bankruptcy Theory, 1993 WIS. L. REv. 465, 477-79 (pointing out some of the limitations of an 
auction approach as applied to whole firms). The Code recognizes that the standard of valu­
ation will vary with the circumstances, because value is to be determined in light of the pur­
pose for the valuation. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 356 (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.A.A.N. 5963, 6311-12; see also In re Vitreous Steel Prods. Co., 911 F.2d 1223, 1332 (7th 
Cir. 1990). Moreover, contrary to Adler's assumption, there is no such thing as an objective, 
determinable value out there waiting to be revealed under the right circumstances. Just as 
value depends on context, so too is it the case that "value" is inherently subjective. That 
judicial valuation is simply an estimate or prediction does not automatically make it less 
reliable than a value established by actual sale. Only under perfect market conditions does 
an arms-length sale emulate "real value," but such conditions exist only in hypothesis, not 
reality. See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MicH. L. 
REv. 336, 380 (1993) (pointing out that in testing economic principles, researchers ignore 
transaction costs, informational asymmetries, and ambiguous property rights that are always 
present in real markets). 
67. See supra note 54. It also strikes us as odd that debtors whose financial condition or 
financial prospects are sufficiently strong to permit reorganization should be given a fresher 
start than debtors whose only alternative is liquidation. The protection of human capital, 
which lies at the heart of the fresh-start policy in consumer cases, would seem to militate 
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suspects that Adler's concerns in this area have been assuaged to at 
least some degree now that, at least for purposes of cram down, the 
courts have moved away from a foreclosure-sale standard of valua­
tion to standards more closely approximating a true "fair market 
value" measurement.68 Ultimately, then, lack of faith in the ability 
of the bankruptcy process specifically and the judicial process gen­
erally to render rational and accurate valuation judgments cannot 
form the basis for a principled defense of Dewsnup. 
m. THE :euzZLE OF SECURED CREDIT 
A. A Brief History 
In order to decide what to do about lien stripping in chapter 7, 
we thus must return to the fundamental question of how we should 
understand security in bankruptcy. As bankruptcy law seems to 
have adopted to a substantial degree state-law conceptualizations of 
the security interest, inquiry must begin with a review of the posi­
tions that have been staked out in relation to the same question 
outside of bankruptcy. In the late 1970s, legal scholars associated 
with the law and economics movement began to question the con­
ventional explanation that secured financing expands debtors' 
access to credit markets and, in the process, increases the overall 
availability of credit.69 Using the analytical tools of modem finance 
theory, these writers attempted to show that, viewed from a macro 
perspective, the benefits flowing from secured credit in the form of 
lower borrowing costs are more than offset by the combination of 
against any approach that gives prepetition creditors a stake in the debtor's postpetition life. 
See generally infra notes 223-34. The tenn human capita� used to refer to value derived by 
the debtor after filing, comes from Professor Jackson. See Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh­
Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HAR.v. L. REv. 1393, 1440 n.147 (1985). While Jackson 
tends to limit use of the tenn to a debtor's earned income, there seems no logical reason for 
drawing a line between wealth derived from postpetition labor and wealth attributable to 
postpetition appreciation in exempt or abandoned assets. 
68. See supra note 65. 
69. The first salvo was fired by Thomas Jackson and Anthony Kronman in 1979. See 
Jackson & Kronman, supra note 9 (offering a justification for security interests in the fonn of 
reduced monitoring costs). The fonnal challenge to solve the "puzzle" of secured credit was 
issued a couple of years later by Professor Alan Schwartz, who observed that, in a perfect 
market, the benefits derived from secured financing would be offset exactly by higher rates of 
interest charged for unsecured credit because of the increased risk undertaken. See Alan 
Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981). Subsequently, several legal academics employing the tools of eco­
nomic analysis have labored unsuccessfully to provide a general account of secured credit 
that demonstrates its efficiency. See infra note 72. 
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the increased cost of unsecured credit and the transaction costs 
entailed in establishing enforceable security arrangements.70 
Having thus exposed and debunked the conventional "myth" 
that there is a net gain in the aggregate amount of credit available 
because of the high-risk loans that would not be made but for the 
existence of secured credit,71 these theorists turned to the task of 
constructing an explanation for secured financing that would 
demonstrate why the social gains from secured lending exceed the 
social costs.72 That is to say, they launched a quest to justify the 
existence of secured financing on grounds of systemic efficiency, the 
same normative imperative that had served as the benchmark for 
declaring the failure of the traditional analysis.73 The conventional 
70. Applying the basic insight of the Modigliani-Miller Irrelevance Theorem, which holds 
that in a perfectly functioning capital market the value of a firm is independent from the 
particular mix of debt and equity securities that comprise its capital structure, Professor 
Schwartz has hypothesized that secured credit is a zero-sum game. See Schwartz, supra note 
69, at 10. That is to say, the benefits to one creditor garnered by taking security are offset 
exactly by the increased cost imposed on unsecured creditors who will extract a higher charge 
to compensate for the diminishment in the amount of assets available to satisfy their claims. 
For a further discussion and analysis of the Irrelevance Theorem as applied in this context, 
see Alan Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 31 V AND. L. REv. 1051, 1053-65 
{1984). 
71. See, e.g., JAMES C. VAN HoRNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND PouCY 464 {10th ed. 
1995) (arguing that without security, high-risk debtors would be denied access to credit 
altogether). 
72. Several good articles survey this literature at various points in its evolution. See 
sources listed infra notes 73, 75. For example, Professor Scott suggested that the premium 
earned by secured creditors could be seen as a return for the valuable counseling functions 
they provided to the debtor. See Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 
86 CoLUM. L. REv. 901, 930-33 (1986). In 1989, Professor Shupack argued that the general 
efficiency of security interests could be demonstrated by casting away the erroneous assump­
tion that the cost of secured credit always exceeds that of unsecured credit, although he also 
pointed out that explaining security interests in economic terms left unanswered several 
important policy questions. See Paul M. Shupack, Solving the Puzzle of Secured Transac­
tions, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1067, 1121-24 (1989). In 1992, Professor Triantis attempted to 
explain how two different and seemingly inconsistent explanations for secured debt - signal­
ing and agency cost theories - could be reconciled by differentiating between the different 
types of market informational asymmetries to which they are a response. He concluded that 
secured debt is the most cost-effective way for addressing a variety of informational imper­
fections in the market. See George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions of Imperfect 
Information, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 255-58 {1992). More recently, Professors Kanda and 
Levmore have attempted to explain the existence of security, as well as bankruptcy priorities, 
as representing a compromise between the benefits and dangers of late-in-time borrowing by 
financially troubled debtors. See Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, Explaining Creditor Priori­
ties, 80 VA. L. REv. 2103, 2121-27 (1994). 
73. Most of the law and economics literature assumes that security is efficient and then 
labors to explain or prove that it is so. One more recent work from the genre, however, not 
only rejects the presumption of efficiency, but also concludes that, in fact, full recognition of 
the rights of secured creditors in bankruptcy is inefficient. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse 
M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE LJ. 
857, 904-26 {1995) (arguing tJiat adoption of one of two alternative partial-priority rules 
would eliminate the efficiency costs associated with the current norm, full priority) .. 
Professor Ronald Mann has gone even a step beyond Bebchuk and Fried in his assertion that 
wealth-maximization considerations demand nothing less than the complete abandonment of 
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wisdom that secured lending expands access to capital markets on a 
transactional basis was apparently no longer worthy of note or com­
ment once it was shown that the gains to those firms and secured 
creditors were achieved at the expense of correspondingly greater 
losses to other creditors and, presumably, firms at large. 
The several alternative explanations advanced by economic the­
orists since 1979 have already been neatly catalogued and described 
in the periodic literature.74 By and large, they have failed alto­
gether or offer astonishingly anemic justifications for secured 
credit.75 While steeped in the impressive language of finance eco­
nomics and mathematics, these frequently elaborate models end up 
doing little more than identifying a few dollars saved here or there 
in the form of monitoring, credit investigation, or other costs associ­
ated with the extension of credit. Proceeding from the premise that 
any rationale for secured financing ultimately must be judged on 
the basis of its efficiency in reducing costs or risks to the secured 
party relative to the increase in costs and risks to unsecured credi­
tors, the benefits of secured credit as identified by the legal econo­
mists are disappointingly small and fundamentally uninteresting.76 
temporal (first-in-time) priority rules in favor of a system of contextualized rules designed to 
create party incentives that minimize the prospect for business failure. See Ronald J. Mann, 
The First Shall Be Last: A Contextual Argument for Abandoning Temporal Rules of Lien 
Priority, 15 TEXAS L. REv. 11 (1996). 
74. See generally Harris & Mooney, supra note 13, at 2025-27; Scott, supra note 72, at 
904-11; Shupack, supra note 72, at 1073-93. 
75. As recently as 1994, Professor Schwartz declared the puzzle still unsolved. See Alan 
Schwartz, Taking the Analysis of Security Seriously, 80 VA. L. REv. 2073, 2080 n.13 (1994). 
Earlier Schwartz concluded that a significant reduction in transaction costs, and a concomi­
tant increase in firm value, could be achieved by abandoning the priority scheme in article 9 
in favor of a regime in which the debtor's initial long-term financier would rank first, whether 
secured or not See Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL Sruo. 209, 211, 
243-47 (1989). Several commentators also have attacked the law and economics literature on 
methodological grounds. See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, On the Efficiency of Secured Lend­
ing, 80 VA. L REv. 2179, 2192-95 (1994) (questioning the assumption that risk cannot be 
reduced in absolute terms, only reassigned); Homer Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring 
the Economic Efficiency of Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 929 
(1985) (arguing that the social value and utility of security interests should be approached as 
an empirical question, rather than as a matter of "cloistered" economic theorizing relying on 
assumed facts and bereft of conventional legal analysis); James J. White, Efficiency Justifica­
tions for Personal Property Security, 31 V AND. L. REv. 473, 491-502 (1984) (explaining secur­
ity interests in traditional terms of making credit available to high-risk borrowers). 
76. Early on, Professor Kripke observed that the law and economics analysis of secured 
credit proceeds from a perspective unburdened by a practical appreciation for the factual 
world of commerce and the role of financing in our systems of manufacturing and distribu­
tion. See Kripke, supra note 75, at 931-33. Not to be insulting, along the same lines it might 
also be said that, to the average lawyer or banker engaged in the real world of secured 
financing, the legal economists' analysis of what they do and why is of little relevance. Per­
haps the fatal error was committed at the onset, with the assumption that all secured transac­
tions were reducible to a single explanation or "unified theory." See Jackson & Kronman, 
supra note 9, at 1146 (stating as their objective the development of a unified theory as to why 
the law permits secured financing in the first place). This flaw has been pointed out by a 
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The game seems hardly worth the candle when one considers the 
transaction costs inevitably associated with secured lending.77 In 
short, economics.:based analysis has provided less than satisfying 
answers, even to scholars employing that mode of analysis. This is 
evidenced by the persistent efforts at theoretical justification among 
commentators sympathetic to the genre7s and, more recently, the 
admission and proof by two of their number that security indeed is 
not efficient.79 
In the wake of unfulfilled promises of the law and economics 
approach, we were left, until recently, with what might be termed 
the "folk theory" justification for secured credit. This is the con­
ventional theory that holds that secured credit is worth having 
because it makes credit easier to obtain or, in some cases, possible 
where it would not be otherwise.so Even if the economics-based 
analysis is correct that making credit available to those who would 
otherwise be excluded does not invariably yield a system-wide 
return of the ilk that the economics model insists upon as an a pri­
ori normative proposition, the folk theory's observation about one 
of the effects of secured lending is no less valid. Transactional effi­
ciency might not alone justify the existence of a social institution, 
but when it is clearly an intended consequence,81 its accomplish­
ment should not be regarded as superfluous merely because the 
institution fails to abide by an after-invented standard.82 
number of later commentators. See Picker, supra note 52, at 650 (expressing skepticism that 
secured credit plays the same role in all transactions). 
77. See F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REv. 1393, 1403 (1986) 
(arguing that the external costs of secured lending exceed any efficiencies gained from 
security). 
78. See authorities cited supra note 72; see also Carlson, supra note 75, at 2195 ("On this 
explanation of secured lending, security interests lower risk and make credit available that 
otherwise could not be obtained."); Shupack, supra note 72, at 1083 (noting that practicing 
lawyers accept as true what they know from their own experience; that some debtors will 
have to offer security or they will not receive loans). 
79. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 73, at 895-903. Bebchuk and Fried's article is dis­
cussed in more detail infra note 90. 
80. See, e.g., Kripke, supra note 75, at 941-49 (making the case in traditional terms for 
secured credit on personal property); White, supra note 75, at 491-502 (pointing out that 
noneconomic considerations may lead lending officials to withhold credit from risky borrow­
ers unless the officials are able to take security). 
81. See Shupack, supra note 72, at 1072 n.15 (distinguishing between general efficiency 
and transactional efficiency, and pointing out that transactional efficiency was clearly one of 
the intended purposes in the minds of the drafters of the U.C.C.). 
82. The institution of secured debt has been around since the beginning of recorded his­
tory. See White, supra note 75, at 479-80. Even if that is a little bit of an exaggeration, 
nobody can argue seriously against the prevalence of secured lending practices well before 
Professor Schwartz insisted that its global efficiency be demonstrated using the jargon and 
tools of modem microeconomic theory. See generally Carlson, supra note 75 (arguing that 
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Unlike the economics-based analysis, which itself has failed to 
offer a solution to the puzzle of secured transactions,83 the folk 
theory at least offers an explanation without contradiction. How­
ever, to declare that secured credit is "justified" because it makes 
more credit available, or more credit more easily available, is not to 
offer a justification in the first place, a fact that appears to have 
been missed in the literature thus far, and particularly overlooked 
in the legal economists' summary rejection of folk wisdom. That is, 
folk theory does not offer a normative justification at all. Rather, it 
leaves open the fundamental question of whether we should have 
secured credit in any form, or, at the very least, whether we might 
be better off without it in some cases.84 At most, then, folk theory 
states the ontological effects of having secured credit while blandly 
assuming that those effects are normatively desirable without tell­
ing us why. 
B. The Contemporary Debate 
1. Functional Analysis 
Into the disarray left in the wake of the failure of earlier theo­
ries has stepped another group of scholars,85 led initially by 
Professor Lynn LoPucki.86 The thrust of the argument launched 
from this quarter is that the institution of secured credit allows 
debtors and their chosen creditors to enjoy a subsidy at the expense 
the efficiency literature on secured lending proceeds from the false premise that risk can 
never be created or destroyed but only shifted around). 
83. See authorities cited supra note 78. 
84. The significance of the conventional explanation for secured lending, postulated as an 
effect rather than as a rationale, has yet to be meaningfully analyzed. Indeed, as Professor 
Carlson has recently reminded us, the question is, at bottom, an empirical one, although 
Carlson goes on to offer a theoretical justification for secured credit in traditional terms. 
That justification posits that the reduction in risk to creditors in an imperfect market result­
ing from the use of security interests outweighs the external costs, resulting in a net increase 
in available credit. See Carlson, supra note 75, at 2192-97. 
85. These scholars are uncharitably referred to in certain quarters as "Symps" (shorthand 
for the tongue-in-cheek school of thought dubbed "Sympathetic Legal Studies") because of 
their concern for the negative effects of secured financing on certain categories of unsecured 
creditors. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 13, at 2045. In fact, the label is unfair since 
other commentators, for reasons unrelated to fairness to unsecured creditors per se, have 
endorsed their own version of this theory. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 73, at 913-21 
(explaining that their proposal for a rule of only partial priority for secured creditors in bank­
ruptcy is predicated on concerns about the use of inefficient (non-welfare-maximizing) secur­
ity interests, not the welfare of "victimized" unsecured creditors); Mann, supra note 73, at 42-
49 (using the construction context as a working example of the purely economic superiority 
of a rule that gives contractors priority over construction lenders without regard to who was 
first-in-time.). 
86. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887 (1994). 
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of nonconsensual and unwitting unsecured creditors.87 By transfer­
ring a priority position in the debtor's assets to the favored creditor, 
the debtor and that creditor are able both to externalize the risk of 
subsequent tort liability and to "victimize" certain other unsecured 
creditors - particularly those in the middle credit markets88 -
who simply lack the sophistication to appreciate that their exten­
sion of credit to the debtor is little more than a trip to the roulette 
wheel.89 LoPucki contends that the combination of these subsidies 
causes a misallocation of resources by encouraging more secured 
lending to occur than is optimal.9o 
To rectify this situation, LoPucki proposes two simple yet con­
troversial reforms of article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
The first is to subordinate secured creditors' priority in the debtor's 
assets to the claims of tort victims.91 The second, and somewhat 
more ambiguous proposal, is to award secured creditors priority 
only over those unsecured creditors who can be shown to have con­
sented in fact, rather than hypothetically, to a subordinate posi-
Erl. See id. at 1891 (suggesting that the institution of secured credit "tends to misallocate 
resources by imposing on unsecured creditors a bargain to which many, if not most, of them 
have given no meaningful consent"). LoPucki divides the vast bulk of unsecured creditors 
into two categories - involuntary creditors and uninformed creditors - and describes 
unsecured creditors' prospects for recovery as wholly contingent on cash flow; that is to say, 
without any expectation of recovery against the assets of the debtor in the event of liquida­
tion. See id. at 1931-41. LoPucki distinguishes both of these categories of creditors from the 
sophisticated, unsecured creditors who rely on negative covenants to stake out a claim to the 
net worth of their borrowers, who are ordinarily large, public companies. See id. at 1924-31. 
88. Large companies, LoPucki observes, are the only ones that approach bankruptcy with 
significant amounts of unsecured credit. See id. at 1924-25. 
89. These are LoPucki's "cash-flow surfers." See id. at 1907-16. 
90. See id. at 1897-98 (noting that by simply entering into the security agreement the 
debtor and a favored creditor are able to appropriate for themselves value that, in the 
absence of such an agreement, would go to unsecured creditors); see also Bebchuk & Fried, 
supra note 73, at 882-91 (explaining the phenomenon in terms of imposing a negative exter­
nality on involuntary and uninformed creditors who are unable to adjust the terms of their 
credit to reflect the expected loss arising from the existence of the secured credit). In order 
to eliminate the incentive - consisting of this ability to transfer value from nonadjusting 
unsecured creditors - on the part of the debtor and certain creditors, to adopt a secured 
financing relationship even if value is lost as a result of that arrangement, Bebchuk and Fried 
propose a rule of partial priority in bankruptcy for secured creditors based either on the 
actual extent of nonadjustment or, patterned on the 1985 proposal by the German 
Commission on Bankruptcy Law, a fixed percentage of every secured claim. See id. at 905-
13. Moreover, contrary to the approach customarily taken by commentators concerned with 
theoretical efficiency, Professors Bebchuk and Fried explain that a rule of partial priority 
should be imposed by legislative fiat, and not left to private ordering by the parties. See id. at 
930-31. 
91. Of course, the universe of involuntary creditors is broader than merely tort victims, 
but LoPucki limits the scope of his subordination of secured creditors to tort creditors. See 
LoPucki, supra note 86, at 1896-97; see also Lynn M. LoPucki, Chapter 11: An Agenda for 
Basic Reform, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 573, 579-80 (1995). 
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tion.92 LoPucki maintains that the cumulative effect of these two 
reforms would eliminate the unjustified advantages secured credi­
tors presently enjoy under article 9 as a result of its tacit endorse­
ment of the wholly :fictitious bargain invented by law and economics 
scholars in their futile attempt to prove secured credit efficient.93 
2. A Property-Based Account of Secured Credit 
Against the backdrop of this two-front assault on the article 9 
security interest, Professors Harris and Mooney have developed a 
normative justification for secured :financing grounded in deeply 
rooted and hallowed concepts of private property.94 Harris and 
Mooney's property-based analysis is straightfonvard and direct, but 
no less elegant or compelling for its simplicity than some of the 
more intellectually pretentious challenges to which it is in large 
measure a response.95 Moreover, it raises a formidable challenge 
92. See LoPucki, supra note 86, at 1947-48. To round out his package of reforms, 
LoPucki also calls for modernization of the article 9 filing system to provide greater disclo­
sure of the terms and conditions of the security arrangement between the debtor and the 
secured party. See id. at 1950-51. For a more detailed account of these proposals, see Lynn 
M. LoPucki, Computerization of the Article 9 Filing System: Thoughts on Building the 
Electronic Highway, LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBs., Summer 1992, at 5; see also Lynn M. LoPucki, 
Why the Debtor's State of Incorporation Should Be the Proper Place for Article 9 Filing: A 
Systems Analysis, 79 Mum. L. REv. 577 (1995) (advocating an incorporation-based choice-of­
law rule in order to assist searchers in assuring and reducing system costs). 
93. See LoPucki, supra note 86, at 1892-96, 1935; see also James J. White, Work and Play 
in Revising Article 9, 80 VA. L. REv. 2089, 2090-91 (1994) (agreeing that the economic effi­
ciency debate is irrelevant, "pure intellectual masturbation," to quote his colorful phrase). 
At the same time, however, White described LoPucki's proposal to elevate unsecured credi­
tor priority as the "real threat" to the goal of maintaining systemic efficiency. See id. at 2093-
102. Using the results of perhaps the most comprehensive empirical investigation under­
taken to date, Professor Ronald Mann also has cast into doubt the conclusions reached by 
both the efficiency justifications for secured credit and the scholarship that criticizes the cur­
rent regime as intended to exploit the inability of certain unsecured creditors to adjust the 
cost of credit to reflect the higher risk that secured lending imposed on them by reducing the 
pool of assets available to apply to their claims. See Ronald J. Mann, Explaining tlze Pattern 
of Secured Credit, 110 HAR.v. L. REv. 625, 683 (1997) (speculating that secured credit may 
lower the cost of lending transactions "by enhancing the borrower's ablity to give a credible 
commitment to refrain from excessive future borrowing and by limiting the borrower's ability 
to engage in conduct that lessens the likelihood of repayment."). 
94. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 13, at 2047-53. Professors Harris and Mooney are 
the reporters for the Drafting Committee for the proposed revision of article 9, conducted 
under the joint supervision of the American Law Institute and the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. In large measure, the proposed revisions proceed 
from a property-based conception of security. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REVJSBD 
ARTICLE 9 (Discussion Draft No. 2, Apr. 1997). The adverse distributional impact of this 
approach on unsecured creditors has raised serious questions about its appropriateness. See 
LoPucki, supra note 86, at 1891, 1924-41. 
95. But see Schwartz, supra note 75, at 2086 (asserting that Harris and Mooney fail in 
their effort to explain security because they "do not seriously consider inefficiencies, arising 
from market externalities and asymmetric information, that may be associated with 
security"). 
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for anyone who advocates, as we do, that lien stripping ought to be 
permitted in chapter 7 bankruptcy cases. 
Concisely, Harris and Mooney advance an apologia for secured 
credit grounded upon the normative theories that justify the institu­
tion of private property.96 Although cognizant that all property 
interests are not identical and that to recognize an interest as a 
property interest does not end further inquiry,97 they accept as 
essentially sound the baseline principles that underlie the policies of 
freedom of contract and free alienability of property rights.98 They 
then explore the implications of those baseline principles for the 
law of secured transactions, concluding that there is nothing suffi­
ciently different or unique about conveyances for security purposes 
or their distributive effects to warrant a deviation from the ordinary 
deference to party autonomy that controls when dealing with other 
forms of property transfers.99 While Harris and Mooney construct 
their account of security in the context of the debate over the future 
of the law of personal property financing, what they have to say in 
support of a "hands off" approach to article 9 security interests 
applies equally to secured credit as an institution, including real 
property liens and encumbrances. 
Harris and Mooney's defense of security transfers from the 
attacks that have been leveled from the right, on grounds of waste­
ful inefficiencies, and from the left, on grounds of unfairness, serves 
as a healthy reminder that the burden of persuasion rests with those 
who would favor eliminating or limiting the effectiveness of consen­
sual security interests.100 Although we can conceive of that case 
96. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 13, at 2048-53. Encapsulated within this conceptu­
alization are the related precepts of freedom of contract and the right to alienate property 
freely, as well the right of an owner of private property to enjoy his property, within certain 
widely circumscribed parameters, to the exclusion of others. 
97. The issue is not so much whether property rights are absolute, but the extent to which 
the state may limit or interfere with private property ownership. While opinions on this 
question differ, nobody in our political-economic system seriously questions the importance 
and deference to be accorded to such rights as a threshold proposition. See generally 
Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 23, at 321 n.347, and authorities cited therein. 
98. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 13, at 2050. 
99. See id. at 2052-53. The two important principles the authors derive from analogizing a 
security transfer to any other transfer of an interest in property are: (1) Article 9 should be 
drafted to facilitate rather than impede the creation of security interests; and (2) the scope of 
article 9 should be expanded to include several types of transactions that are now excluded. 
See U.C.C. § 9-104 (1994). 
100. See also White, supra note 93, at 2092, 2099 (suggesting, in connection with a com­
mentary on Harris and Mooney's work, that if article 9 were repealed, the response inevita­
bly would be the development of what, in all likelihood, would be even less efficient and less 
advantageous security substitutes). Professor White has broadly called for retention and 
even expansion of the first-to-file priority principle that now forms one of the central under­
pinnings of article 9. See James J. White, Reforming Article 9 Priorities in Light of Old Igno-
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being made, perhaps most easily in relation to the priority of non­
consensual unsecured claims,101 Harris and Mooney have refocused 
and centered the debate by pointing out, quite accurately, that any­
one who has a proposal to make in this area writes against the back­
drop of a deeply rooted legal tradition, and not tabula rasa. 
Harris and Mooney conclude that the extent to which secured 
transactions promote efficiency considerations and general social 
welfare are empirical questions probably not conducive to reaching 
a definitive answer.102 While that assertion certainly is true, it is 
equally certain, regardless of whether the precise effects can be 
measured or not, that a debtor that fully encumbers its assets has 
externalized the cost of its tort and other general business risks to 
its unsecured creditors and, in the process, effectively eliminated 
any hope for successful reorganization if the debtor later 
encounters :financially turbulent waters.103 Harris and Mooney 
would respond to this point presumably by pointing out that by 
focusing only on the distributional consequences of secured credit, 
we potentially overlook the fact that an extension of credit to a 
troubled debtor, even if secured, may still be better for unsecured 
creditors than if their debtor is unable to borrow at all.104 Although 
ranee and New Filing Rules, 79 MINN. L. REv. 529, 535 (1995). For another contemporary 
apologia for the current system, as well as the current direction of the refonn process, see 
Peter A. Alces & David Frisch, On the UCC Revision Process: A Reply to Dean Scott, 37 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1217 (1995). 
101. The authors of this article differ on whether uninfonned creditors, so-called 
"Bubbas," should be accorded the same treatment as tort creditors, but then one of us is 
biased by his lifelong affiliation with that group, while the other is perhaps insensitive 
because of his inability to relate. See Steve Knippenberg, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain: 
An Essay in Reply, Reprisal, or Support?, 80 VA. L. REv. 1967, 1969 n.13 {1994). 
102. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 13, at 2047. 
103. This is essentially a problem of scope; that is, whether secured creditors should be 
permitted, to the detriment of general creditors, to take a lien on virtually everything the 
debtor owns, thereby ensuring participation in the debtor's successes if things go well, with­
out risking serious loss if the debtor fails. We are sympathetic to the view that the reach of 
secured credit should not extend to this extent. In fact, one of us has been active in advanc­
ing a proposal that would permit a lien creditor of a business debtor to execute on a fully 
encumbered debtor's assets and receive a specified percentage of the proceeds of sale ahead 
of the secured creditor. However, the issue insofar as this proposal is concerned is an inter­
creditor issue and, as such, it is outside the scope of this article. However, the existence of 
the debate does serve to underscore the point that, in both a bankruptcy and a nonban­
kruptcy setting, we have some control over the concept of security, and that, in defining a 
security interest, we have the freedom to proceed from a sound balancing of nonnative 
objectives, not an immutable set of a priori principles. 
104. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 13, at 2035. The authors refer to this phenomenon 
as the "second best" result for unsecured creditors. See also Steven L. Schwartz, The Limits 
of Theory: A Lesson from the Secured Credit Controversy (May 27, 1997) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with authors) (arguing that Bebchuk and Fried, as well as other commen­
tators critical of article 9's basic priority scheme, tend to ignore the fact that the increased 
liquidity afforded by secured credit in times of financial difficulty actually creates value for 
unsecured creditors as well as for the debtor). 
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this observation fails to address satisfactorily all of the problems 
associated with a system that permits a debtor to pledge all of its 
assets to a single creditor, Harris and Mooney's conveyance model 
remains a highly workable heuristic apparatus for understanding 
how security operates under state law. Moreover, it reveals why 
the quest to solve the "puzzle" of secured credit may simply have 
been a wild goose chase from the beginning.10s 
But what of the conveyance model as it relates to secured credi­
tors and secured claims in bankruptcy? More specifically, what are 
the implications of this conceptualization of a security interest as a 
form of private property not just for the general creditors of a 
firm, 106 but specifically for a consumer debtor? Even more to the 
point, what are the implications of the conveyance model for the 
Dewsnup issue, and are they tenable? It is at this juncture that we 
encounter the limits of the conveyance model precisely because, 
ironically enough, of its distributional effects in the case of those 
debtors who do become insolvent. 
IV. SECURED CLAIMS AND BANKRUPTCY POLICY 
A. The Limits of the Conveyance Model 
Insolvency, of course, is the risk against which a secured creditor 
has hedged. Harris and Mooney's defense of secured credit is pre­
mised, in significant part, on the belief that the distributive effects 
of secured credit upon insolvency are neither contrary to the wealth 
maximization norm nor any more prejudicial to unsecured creditors 
than are other forms of wealth transfers.107 Some, but far fewer 
than all, insolvent debtors seek bankruptcy relief. Those who do 
and who are individual debtors are presumptively entitled to a fresh 
105. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 13, at 2036 ("Whether the benefits of secured 
credit outweigh its costs in a few, many, or most of the circumstances in which security inter­
ests are granted is an empirical question that cannot be answered with any certainty using 
existing information."). The first serious effort to develop these empirical data reveals that 
the reasons why commercial debtors resort to secured and unsecured credit are more com­
plex, as well as industry- and context-dependent, than they have been given credit for in the 
literature to date. See Mann, supra note 93, at 630 (pointing out that prior attempts at grand 
theoretical justifications have ignored important party motivations and incentives that signifi­
cantly affect borrowers' decision to use or not to use collateral). 
106. See supra note 99. 
107. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 13, at 2067-71 (arguing that the purposes and 
benefits of giving and taking security would be undermined considerably if security interests 
were not generally honored in bankruptcy). But see Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 73, at 891-
903 (maintaining that according full priority to secured creditors in bankruptcy undermines 
the goal of economic efficiency by promoting excessive use of security interests). 
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start.1os In addition, it is certainly not unheard of for a balance­
sheet-solvent debtor to take refuge from cash flow pressures or 
other business problems in a chapter 11 proceeding. Thus, when 
Harris and Mooney test their conveyance model of security inter­
ests against bankruptcy policy, and find the two not fundamentally 
incompatible,109 they overlook a central tenet of their own norma­
tive view of security interests. Specifically, they fail to see that the 
logical concomitant of a property-based theory would be that a 
secured creditor's protectible interest is not limited to the value of 
the property at any given point in time. Rather, it should extend to 
future as well as to existing equity and to control over the decision 
of when to realize that value through foreclosure or otherwise.no 
In bankruptcy, however, while there may be general agreement that 
bankruptcy proceeds from state-law entitlements and priorities, 111 
we also begin with the notion that a claim is "secured" only to the 
extent of the value of the underlying collateral as of the date of 
108. Section 707(b) of the Code, which essentially pennits dismissal of a chapter 7 case 
where the debtor is able to pay off a substantial portion of her debts in a chapter 13 plan, 
nevertheless provides: "There shall be a presumption in favor of granting the relief 
requested by the debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1994). 
109. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 13, at 2067. The authors conclude both that bank­
ruptcy policy does not conflict with the principle of honoring a debtor's prebankruptcy trans­
fers of property generally, and that there is nothing "special" about security interests that 
give rise to a conflict with bankruptcy policy. Of course, the Code regards at least some 
transfers as beyond the pale. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547-548 (1994). Although we have no prob­
lem with respecting and enforcing the transfer, or with its conceptualization as a property 
interest for state-law purposes, we believe that in a bankruptcy context, fresh-start policy 
dictates the interest should not be deemed to continue beyond the filing of the case. See infra 
notes 222-29 and accompanying text. 
110. This follows naturally from Harris and Mooney's insistence that the transfer of a 
security interest must be understood in the same manner as the physical transfer of posses­
sion. As we demonstrate below, however, once we abandon the unstated assumption that the 
conveyance- or property-based model is the only appropriate metaphoric concept for defin­
ing security, the secured creditor's claim to future appreciation through control over the dis­
position of the property immediately becomes more attenuated. See infra text accompanying 
notes 204-10. 
111. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 13, at 2067 n.135. The basic disagreement that 
exists in the literature is not over the recognition of state-law rights and priorities as a start­
ing place for analysis, but over whether, and the extent to which, bankruptcy should have a 
distributional policy separate and apart from the distributional scheme imposed by state debt 
collection law. See Frost, supra note 56, at 82-91, 122-35 (describing the nature of the disa· 
greement, but concluding, wrongly in our judgment, that bankruptcy is not suited to 
redistributing the social and economic costs of business failure). But see Elizabeth Warren, 
Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 789-90 (1987) (pointing out that the bankruptcy 
process is our system for distributing the costs of simultaneous default to multiple creditors 
- an issue that is not addressed directly by state law). 
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filing or confumation.112 Moreover, with one curious exception,113 
a secured creditor's protectible interest in a debtor-rehabilitation 
proceeding is limited to the current value of its collateral.114 
Harris and Mooney perhaps even overstate the threshold point 
that most scholars agree that, at least as a baseline, bankruptcy law 
should honor nonbankruptcy entitlements.Us Even the law and 
economics scholars who adhere most strictly to that baseline - due 
mainly to its compatibility with their view on the scope of bank­
ruptcy policyn6 - acknowledge that a bankruptcy system cannot 
honor state-law entitlements in every respect. Rather, they contend 
that what matters is preserving the "relative value" of state-law 
rights and entitlements.117 But this is very different from preserving 
every aspect of the interest including, potentially, its future entail-
112. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a), 1129(b)(2), 1225(a)(5), 1325(a)(5) (1994); Carlson, Under­
secured Claims, supra note 6, at 304-06 (discussing whether bankruptcy values should be 
regarded as fixed or subject to change as circumstances during the course of the case dictate). 
The time for valuation, particularly in reorganization cases, is a subject of vigorous and con­
tinuing disagreement; see also supra note 54. See Peter V. Pantaleo & Barry W. Ridings, 
Reorganization Value, 51 Bus. LAw. 419 (1996); infra note 223; see also In re Maddox, 194 
B.R. 762 (Bankr. D.N.J.) (addressing the issue in the context of a chapter 13 plan), affd., 200 
B.R. 546 (D.N.J. 1996). 
113. The exception, of course, is for debts secured only by the debtor's principal resi­
dence pursuant to § 1322(b)(2), which cannot be modified in a chapter 13 plan. See 
Nobelman v. American Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993). The exception is curious, in our 
judgment, precisely because it attaches to what is usually the single most important asset in a 
consumer bankruptcy case: the debtor's home. Its inclusion in the Code may be explicable 
much more easily with reference to special-interest pressure than in terms of its consonance 
with Code policy. Cf. Veryl Victoria Myles, The Bifurcation of Undersecured Residential 
Mortgages Under § 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code: The Final Resolution, 67 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 207, 218 (1993) (describing the provisions as a compromise reflecting Congress's 
desire to protect the home mortgage industry). Because, however, most home mortgage 
loans will have a remaining term considerably longer than the term of the chapter 13 plan, 
this restriction is of less practical significance than might be apparent at first blush. See In re 
Foster, 61 B.R. 492 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986) (suggesting that § 1322(d) (formerly (c)) should 
be read as prohibiting modification of any debt, the last payment under which is due after the 
last payment date under the proposed plan); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(2) (1994) (added by 
the 1994 Amendments to permit modification of a home-mortgage loan, the final payment 
for which is due prior to the date on which the final payment under the plan is due). More­
over, as a practical matter, if the mortgage bas ten or more years remaining, even if modifica­
tion were not prohibited, it would be difficult in most cases to come up with a plan that 
satisfied the confirmation standard for the secured portion of the debt as set forth in 
§ 1325(a)(5). 
114. See supra note 12. In a chapter 11 case, a qualification must be made for a creditor 
that makes the § llll(b) election, but even then the creditor is only entitled to payments 
with an aggregate value of the amount owed, and not the present value of the face amount of 
the claim. For an alternative reading of § llll(b), see Carlson, Unsecured Claims, supra note 
6, at 300-04. We adopt the reading that Professor Carlson acknowledges to be the "orthodox 
interpretation." Id. at 291. 
115. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 13, at 2067 n.135. 
116. See supra note 52. 
117. See supra note 53. But see Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 73, at 862-63 (challenging 
the traditional view that it is desirable to recognize the state-law priority rights of secured 
creditors to the greatest extent possible in bankruptcy). 
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ments. Moreover, there are numerous instances in which the Code 
substantively alters prebankruptcy entitlements and priorities in 
order to advance a specific bankruptcy policy, whether it be equal­
ity, 118 equity,119 maximization of value,120 or fresh start.121 Finally, 
even among scholars whose normative judgment about the efficacy 
of legal rules is inversely correlated with their assessment of the 
extent to which such rules produce negative distributional conse­
quences, there is no longer unanimous assent to the view, derived 
from the "creditors' bargain theory,"122 that economic efficiency 
demands that the secured creditor's bargain must be emulated in 
bankruptcy.123 
B. "Liens Survive Bankruptcy": Eternal Verity or Silly 
Semantics? 
A 1995 decision from the Seventh Circuit,124 authored by Chief 
Judge Posner, illustrates this point, albeit perhaps inadvertently. 
John and Alyce Penrod were hog farmers. They executed a promis­
sory note for $150,000 to the predecessor in interest of Mutual 
Guaranty Corporation. The note was secured by the Penrods' hogs. 
A year later, the Penrods filed for relief under chapter 11 and even­
tually proposed and confirmed a reorganization plan in which 
Mutual Guaranty's claim would be paid in full, with interest, over 
seven years.125 The plan made no mention of Mutual Guaranty's 
lien on the hogs. After the plan went into effect, the Penrods sold 
what Mutual Guaranty apparently believed were still its hogs. 
When the Penrods refused to tum the proceeds from the sale over 
to Mutual Guaranty as required under the terms of the original 
118. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994) (permitting the trustee to avoid prebankruptcy trans­
fer of the debtor's property, including transfers for security purposes, that undermine the 
bankruptcy policy of equality among creditors). 
119. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1994) (conferring discretion on the bankruptcy court to alter 
the legal priority of claims based upon equitable considerations). 
120. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362(a), (d) (1994) (allowing the debtor to prevent enforcement 
of a security interest by providing adequate protection to the secured creditor). 
121. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(13) {1994) (permitting the debtor to avoid nonpossessory, 
nonpurchase money security interests in certain collateral, including consumer goods and 
tools of the trade, to the extent such security interest impairs an exemption). 
122. See supra note 52. 
123. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 73, at 895-902 {arguing that according full priority 
to secured claims in bankruptcy tends to reduce the efficiency of the loan agreement consum­
mated between the borrower and the secured creditor); Picker, supra note 52, at 661-62 
(maintaining that secured credit can be employed to solve the common-pool problem, 
thereby eliminating the need for the mandatory Eden that the creditors' bargain theory 
imposes to justify the existence of the bankruptcy system). 
124. See In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459 (7th Cir. 1995). 
125. See 50 F.3d at 461. 
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security agreement, Mutual Guaranty sued in state court to enforce 
its lien against the proceeds. The Penrods responded by seeking a 
contempt order from the bankruptcy court on the ground that 
Mutual Guaranty had violated the confirmation order. The bank­
ruptcy court ruled that Mutual Guaranty's lien had been extin­
guished and enjoined Mutual Guaranty from attempting to enforce 
it, and the district court affirmed.126 
On further appeal, the Seventh Circuit observed that the default 
rule under the Code for secured creditors who file claims for which 
provision is made in the plan is extinction of the lien unless the plan 
expressly provides otherwise.127 Because this particular plan did 
make provision for the claim, and because that provision did not 
include continuance of the lien, the court concluded that of neces­
sity the lien was extinguished upon confirmation. In response to 
Mutual Guaranty's property-based rejoinder, Judge Posner's opin­
ion expressed surprise that it was still necessary to debunk the myth 
that "liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected," observing that, 
"[t]hey do - unless they are brought into the bankruptcy proceed­
ing and dealt with there."128 Finally, the court dismissed as 
126. See 50 F.3d at 461. 
127. See 50 F.3d at 462-63. The court based its interpretation on the express language of 
§ 114l{c), which provides that "except as otherwise provided in the plan or in the order 
confinning the plan, after confirmation of a plan, the property dealt with by the plan is free 
and clear of all claims and interests of creditors." 11 U.S.C. § 1141{ c) {1994); see also Simon 
v. Tip Top Credit Union (In re Simon), Nos. 94-3304, 94-3312, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 8733, at 
*7 {10th Cir. Apr. 22, 1996) (applying Penrotf); Tor Husjord Shipping v. Isabel/San Benito 
Navigation Dist. (In re Burton Secs. S.A.), No. C96-68, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16951, at *23 
(S.D. Tex. July 2, 1996) (citing Penrod in support of the proposition that liens, once brought 
into a bankruptcy proceeding, can be altered there). In FDIC v. Union Entities (In re Be­
Mac Transp. Co.), 83 F.3d 1020 {8th Cir. 1996), the court observed that a creditor could only 
lose its lien under§ 114l{c) "if the lien holder participated in the reorganization; otherwise, 
its lien would not be 'property dealt with by the plan."' 83 F.3d at 1026 (citing Penrod, 50 
F.3d at 463). However, even if the creditor elects to ignore the proceeding, the debtor can 
always force the issue by filing a claim for the creditor under § 50l{c). See supra note 43 
(quoting Penrod, 50 F.3d at 459, 462). Moreover, in Winchell v. Town of Wilmington (In re 
Winchell), 200 B.R. 734 {Bankr. D. Mass. 1996), the court relied on the broad definition of 
property of the estate in § 541 as the basis for finding that the creditor's lien was extinguished 
upon confirmation of the debtor's plan, even though neither the creditor nor the debtor had 
filed a proof of claim. See 200 B.R. at 737-38. 
128. Penrod, 50 F.3d at 463. The court rejected as well the argument that the plan dealt 
only with the secured creditor's claim, but not with its lien. See Penrod, 50 F.3d at 463. But 
see Cen-Pen Corp. v. Hanson, 58 F.3d 89 {4th Cir. 1995) (refusing to interpret § 1327(c), 
despite its linguistic similarity to § 114l{c), as releasing the debtors' property from a mort­
gage that, under the terms of the plan, had been treated as an unsecured claim); Manistee 
County v. Reef Petroleum Corp. (In re Reef Petroleum Corp.), 92 B.R. 741 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mich. 1988). While Chief Judge Posner in Penrod recognized that the axiom that "liens pass 
through bankruptcy unaffected" was little more than a mesmerizing rhetorical aphorism, the 
court in Cen-Pen fell prey to that rhetoric even though, in that case, the mortgagee had raised 
no objection to its treatment under the plan. See Cen-Pen, 58 F.3d at 92 ("[L]iens pass 
through bankruptcy unaffected . . .  [u]nless the debtor takes affirmative action to avoid a 
security interest in the property of the estate . . • .  "); see also In re Beta Intl., Inc., No. 96-
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essentially frivolous Mutual Guaranty's suggestion that this inter­
pretation of the Code might be problematic under the Due Process 
Clause or Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.129 
Unquestionably, the decision in Penrod, authored by one of the 
early luminaries of the law and economics movement, establishes 
that what comes out of a bankruptcy proceeding may bear little 
resemblance to that which entered. The reason for this potential 
transmogrification, contemplated in Code provisions like section 
506(d) no less than in section 1141(c), is that bankruptcy does have 
certain normative policy objectives distinct from those of state col­
lection law.130 Not the least of these, in a consumer bankruptcy 
case, is the fresh start for a financially beleaguered debtor.131 
In spite of the majority's deliberate attempt to limit the prece­
dential value of the holding,132 Dewsnup might have triggered a 
71561, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18869 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 7, 1996) (distinguishing Cen-Pen and 
Penrod based on the specific provisions of§ 1141(c)); Coffin v. Malvern Fed. Sav. Bank, 189 
B.R. 323 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (distinguishing Penrod on the grounds that the mortgagee in this 
case had not attempted to collect, and the plan did not provide for, the entire debt owing to 
the creditor, but only the past due arrearages). But see Green Tree Fin. Servicing Corp. v. 
Smithwick, 202 B.R. 420 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (applying Penrod in the context of a confinned 
chapter 13 plan). 
129. See Penrod, 50 F.3d at 464 (noting that the creditor's reliance on United States v. 
Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982), was misplaced since the creditor could have 
protected its property interest from an uncompensated taldng by appealing from the order 
confirming confinnation). With respect to lien stripping per se, Security Industrial Bank is 
equally not a bar since, by virtue of having a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of 
the value of the secured claim, and by having an unsecured claim for the unsecured portion 
of the claim, nothing has been taken from the creditor. See Howard, supra note 24, at 416 
(noting that the lien avoided under § 506(d) is without current value - an "empty legal 
right"); see also In re Butcher, 189 B.R. 357, 372-73 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995) (rejecting a similar 
challenge to § 522(b) premised on a rational basis standard); infra note 144. 
130. As observed supra note 53, this is a pivotal point of disagreement in contemporary 
scholarship over bankruptcy purposes and policymaking. See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, 
supra note 56, at 948-62; see also infra text accompanying notes 230-34. 
131. See supra note 23. The fresh start represents neither a cognizable legal right nor a 
fonnal legal status. Rather it is the condition intended to result from the application of spe­
cific bankruptcy rules in particular cases. While the centrality of the fresh start as a core 
feature of the consumer bankruptcy system is no longer an open question, serious disagree­
ment over the nonnative underpinnings of the fresh-start doctrine still exists and has enor­
mous implications for questions relating to application of the doctrine in particular contexts. 
See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 23, at 250-52; see also Beth A. Buchanan 
Staudenmaier, Note, Survival of Liens: "Liens Pass Through Bankruptcy Unaffected" - Or 
Do They? In re Penrod - Challenging an Adage, 21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 445 (1996) (argu­
ing that the approach taken by Judge Posner in Penrod adequately balances the competing 
fresh-start and creditor-protection goals of bankruptcy). 
132. The Court stated: "We • . .  focus upon the case [only] before us and allow other facts 
to await their legal resolution on another day." Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 416-17 
(1992). The court went on to admonish that "we express no opinion as to whether the words 
'allowed secured claim' have different meaning in other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code." 
Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417 n.3. For discussion of how courts have interpreted that language in 
other debtor-relief contexts, see supra note 12. 
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return to an in rem notion of security interests in bankruptcy.133 As 
Penrod robustly illustrates, however, it did not.134 Instead, it seems 
that the Supreme Court's decision in United Savings Association v. 
Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Inc. (In re Timbers of Inwood 
Forest Associates)135 rendered four years prior to Dewsnup, was 
indeed the watershed event it appeared to be at the time, in terms 
of laying to rest the notion that a secured creditor's "interest in 
property" could be determined in isolation from other provisions of 
the Bankruptcy Code.136 In virtually every context in which the 
Dewsnup issue has been presented to the courts, the outcome has 
been to reject expansion of the doctrine beyond the narrow factual 
parameters of the case.137 For a time, the only significant exception 
was in the case of lien avoidance under section 522(f) of the 
Code.138 However, as discussed earlier, Congress has now 
amended that provision in a manner that implicitly abnegates a 
property-based conception of security in this context as well in 
favor of one that recognizes only the secured creditor's priority in 
collateral to the extent of its immediate prebankruptcy value.139 
As useful and as normatively appealing as Harris and Mooney's 
property metaphor may be for understanding the institution of 
secured credit within the broader framework of the commercial 
law, the explanatory prowess of the model breaks down when 
extended to the bankruptcy milieu. It does so not because this con­
ceptualization of security is flawed necessarily, although the 
133. See Newborn, supra note 4, at 573-81 (suggesting that prior bankruptcy law, includ­
ing the former Bankruptcy Act, was more inclined to accept an in rem notion of security and, 
thus, was more reticent about altering the lien enforcement rights of secured creditors). 
134. See supra notes 12, 54 and accompanying text. 
135. 484 U.S. 365 (1988). 
136. In Timbers, the Court rejected the argument that an undersecured creditor, as a 
condition to the continuation of the stay, was entitled to compensation for the "lost opportu­
nity costs" attributable to the delay in repossessing and realizing the value of the collateral. 
Instead, the Court concluded that the creditor's "interest in property" entitled to adequate 
protection under § 361 was limited to the value of the collateral as of the time of filing. See 
Timbers, 484 U.S. at 370-82. How to measure that value, and at what point in time, has been 
a continuing source of controversy and uncertainty. See supra note 65; infra note 223. But 
see Carlson, supra note 10, at 20-23 (contending that, after Dewsnup, secured creditors are 
entitled to claim post-filing appreciation value in reorganization proceedings until confirma­
tion, and again upon conversion or dismissal). While his main focus is on reorganization 
cases, Professor Carlson points out that a logical reading of Dewsnup is that § 506(a) valua­
tion might never constitute a ceiling on undersecured entitlements to collateral, short of 
actual sale. See id. at 4. 
137. See supra note 12. For example, in Harmon v. United States, 101 F.3d 574, 581-83 
(8th Cir. 1996), the court noted that the weight of authority now establishes that lien­
stripping is permitted in all reorganization chapters. 
138. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. 
139. See supra notes 15-17. 
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attempt to define a security interest as a property interest has been 
vigorously resisted in some quarters.140 Rather, even giving this 
conceptualization of security its due, the model fails because bank­
ruptcy policy establishes the limits of private property no less than 
it does the limits of sanctity of contract.141 Dewsnup's interdiction 
against lien stripping has been rejected in chapter 11 and 13 cases 
because it would effectively eviscerate the rehabilitative policy that 
underlies those chapters.142 Similarly, Dewsnup should be dis­
carded in chapter 7 because it interferes fundamentally with fresh­
start policy and is not necessary to protect the secured creditor's 
interest in the estate's property in a bankruptcy proceeding. To the 
extent that the property-based characterization of security interests 
is at odds with this formulation, it too should be rejected once a 
bankruptcy proceeding has been initiated.143 
Once we get beyond the false rhetoric in Dewsnup that lien 
stripping implicates constitutional concerns,144 we can appreciate 
140. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 13, at 2051 n.82 (referring to a functional approach 
to security devised by Professors LoPucki and Warren); see also John D. Ayer, Rethinking 
Absolute Priority After Ahlers, '07 MICH. L. REv. 963, 989-90 (1989) (describing the "demise 
of property as possession" in the Supreme Court's (pre-Dewsnup) approach to property 
interests in bankruptcy cases). 
141. See Robert A. Hillman, Contract Excuse and Bankruptcy Discharge, 43 STAN. L. 
REv. 99 (1990) (discussing bankruptcy's liberal policy of discharging individuals from con­
tractual obligations in comparison to traditional contract law's "miserly approach" to excus­
ing parties who fail to perform as agreed from liability for breach). 
142. See supra notes 12, 129. 
143. Of course, it is not a foregone conclusion that a property-based conception of secur­
ity is inconsistent with this view of bankruptcy policy and purposes. To the extent the under­
secured creditor receives a priority claim in its collateral, its property interest arguably has 
been fully vindicated. It is the undersecured portion of the claim - which has no value -
that is stripped down. In this sense there is no taking. This is why, for example, strip down 
poses no serious constitutional question. See infra note 144. On the other hand, if one 
includes within the definition of the property right conveyed to the secured creditor the right 
to foreclose on the collateral and choose the time of foreclosure, then, to that extent, bank­
ruptcy conflicts with the property-based understanding of security. 
144. See Howard, supra note 39, at 524-25 (explaining that the constitutional issue in 
relationship to Dewsnup is a false one; that is, there can be no taking if the lien avoided 
under § 506(d) has no value); see also James Steven Rogers, The Impairment of Secured 
Creditors' Rights in Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth 
Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REv. 973, 9'07-88 (1983) (explaining 
why Fifth Amendment uncompensated takings arguments with respect to the impairment of 
secured claims fail because of the primacy of the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution); 
supra note 129. It might also be argued that even if one were to conclude in this context that 
there was a taking for the benefit of another private person, the taking might still be permit­
ted as a justifying public purpose - the national interest in debtor relief, with the creditor's 
corresponding unsecured claim as compensation. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 
U.S. 229, 240-41 (1984). This assumes that an undersecured creditor whose lien is not 
stripped down has no claim for the unsecured portion of its claim. See Howard, supra note 
39, at 517-18. However, as discussed infra note 183, it is not clear that an unsecured claim is 
barred in the absence of strip down and that, therefore, it can properly be treated as recom­
pense for strip down were it permitted to occur. 
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that Justice Blackm.un's analysis was influenced heavily by the 
implicit conception of a security interest as entailing a bargain 
between the debtor and creditor,145 a notion that is congruent in 
many respects with the theoretical underpinnings of Harris and 
Mooney's conveyance model.146 This bargain metaphor, perfectly 
valid and fiercely rational under state law and procedures, conjures 
up entailments of vested rights and interests that, once internalized, 
preordain the protection of those rights and interests under virtu­
ally any circumstances. The bankruptcy regime, however, changes 
the rules of the game. Many bargains, fairly struck and fully 
enforceable in the workaday world, come undone once a bank­
ruptcy petition is filed. Hard-core promises are broken and, in the 
process, losses reallocated between debtor and creditors and among 
creditors inter se.147 In fact, in its most fundamental sense, bank­
ruptcy, whether in its liquidation or reorganization mode, repre­
sents nothing less than a wholesale and compulsory readjustment of 
contractual obligations148 and realignment of property interests.149 
In this mix, the time-honored axioms that "liens pass through bank­
ruptcy"1so and "bankruptcy respects state law entitlements"1s1 are 
145. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992) ("[f]he creditor's lien stays with the 
real property until the foreclosure. That is what was bargained for by the mortgagor and the 
mortgagee."). 
146. See supra section III.B.2. Admittedly, this assumes that the property interest con­
veyed includes not only the right to foreclosure value but the right to choose the timing on 
foreclosure. Since bankruptcy is always a known possibility, and since, under state law, a 
mortgagee is not always assured of controlling the timing on foreclosure - for example, 
another lienholder may elect to initiate such proceedings - it is not by any means impossible 
to reconcile a property-based conception of security with the characterization of secured 
claims in bankruptcy advanced here. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 13, at 2068 (observing 
that bankruptcy requires "that property claimants recover their property or its value before 
the conclusion of the case" (emphasis added)). 
147. See Warren, supra note 66, 352-61 (discussing the distributional functions of the busi­
ness bankruptcy system). 
148. See generally Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of 
Bankruptcy, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 717, 774 (1991) (describing the bankruptcy system as the 
forum where the diverse aims and values of the participants in financial distress can be 
debated and ultimately synthesized into a coherent view of what it is that the rehabilitated 
enterprise shall exist to do in the future). 
149. There are numerous Bankruptcy Code provisions that have the effect of either elimi­
nating liens entirely or altering the post-bankruptcy rights of lienholders, including the 
trustee's avoiding powers, the debtor's power to avoid certain liens under § 522(f)(l), and the 
ability to modify the rights of secured claimholders in various reorganization proceedings. 
See supra notes 118-21; see also In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 463 (7th Cir. 1995), discussed supra 
text accompanying notes 124-29; Howard, supra note 39, at 526 ("A more accurate statement 
is that liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected only if none of bankruptcy's powers to affect 
liens have been brought to bear."). 
150. See Dewsnup v. T1Illlll, 502 U.S. 410, 418 n.4 (1992) (identifying support for the 
proposition in the 1898 Bankruptcy Act). 
151. See supra note 54. 
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still bandied about with great frequency. Yet they are alone only 
empty incantations, and even in context they at best represent 
incomplete and imperfect expressions of reality that take on subtle 
shadings of different meaning depending on the particular context 
in which they are raised. 
There is nothing new � all of this. Put in its proper historical 
context, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was an evolutionary, 
not a revolutionary, piece of legislation. Debtors have been able to 
discharge contractual obligations, wholly valid and otherwise 
enforceable under state law, since at least the time of the Bank­
ruptcy Act of 1841.152 Renegotiation of contractual obligations, 
including secured obligations, in reorganization or rehabilitation 
proceedings goes back at least as far as the Chandler Act of 1938.153 
Furthermore, notwithstanding Justice Blackmun's protestations in 
Dewsnup to the contrary, even in straight bankruptcy, the Bank­
ruptcy Act of 1898 was not entirely neutral insofar as the treatment 
of the state-law rights of undersecured creditors was concemed.154 
Unquestionably, however, the Bankruptcy Reform Act did expand 
in certain critical respects the ability of the debtor or the trustee to 
alter prebankruptcy bargains in order to attain bankruptcy goals.155 
An essential component of this undertaking was the Code's adop­
tion, in a far more overt manner than anything even hinted at under 
the former Act, of the principle that the secured creditor's rights 
were limited to the value of its collateral rather than to a possessory 
152. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843); see Tabb, supra note 43, at 
350-53. 
153. Chandler Act, Pub. L. No. 75-575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (repealed 1978). The 
Chandler Act amendments to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 55-541, 30 Stat. 544 
(repealed 1978), added to the bankruptcy law, among other things, chapter X (addressing 
corporate reorganizations), and chapter XII (addressing real property arrangements), both of 
which permitted the extension or reduction of secured as well as unsecured debt under 
proper circumstances. See Vern Countryman, A History of American Bankruptcy Law, 81 
CoM. LJ. 226, 231 (1976). The other new form of reorganization, chapter XI arrangements, 
was confined to unsecured debt. The general principles of composition and extension have 
even more ancient antecedents in Anglo-American bankruptcy law. See generally JAMES 
ANGELL MAcLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF TiiE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 371-72 (1956); Charles 
Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Law of the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REv. 5, 27-29 (1995). 
154. See generally Frank R. Kennedy, Secured Creditors Under the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act, 15 IND. L. REV. 477, 482-86 (1982) (noting that the former Bankruptcy Act's approach to 
secured claims was largely left to implication); Newborn, supra note 4, at 565-67 (describing 
the treatment of undersecured claims in straight bankruptcy cases under § 57(h) of the Act). 
155. Explicit claim bifurcation under § 506(a), the liberalization of the standards gov­
erning preference recovery pursuant to § 547(b), the ability of consumer debtors to redeem 
items of personal property under § 722, and the right to avoid exemption-impairing liens can 
be pointed to as just a few examples. See generally Kennedy, supra note 154, at 486-97 
(describing the efforts made under the Code in relation to secured creditors as particularizing 
and clarifying the ways in which their rights are affected). 
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interest in the collateral itself.156 Th.is principle found substance, 
for example, in the concept that, under the Code, a debtor might 
retain essential collateral even though there was no equity cushion 
to protect the secured creditor.157 In short, the Code openly 
embraced a sufficiently new and different attitude toward under­
secured claims so as to render feeble at best Justice Blackm.un's 
contention that application of the plain language of section 506( d) 
would amount to an unwarranted break with pre-Code practices 
relating to the treatment of liens.15s 
C. The Multiple Lien Redux 
Whatever the answer is to the puzzle of secured credit as a mat­
ter of state commercial law,159 the bargain metaphor is untenable in 
a bankruptcy case. Bankruptcy generally, and chapter 7 in particu­
lar, represents a day of financial reckoning. All prefiling claims are 
accelerated,160 adjudicated (or estimated, if necessary),161 priori-
156. See Peter F. Coogan, Article 9 - An Agenda for the Next Decade, '67 YALE L.J. 
1012, 1028-30 (1978) {indicating that the Code had moved away from an approach that 
vie)ved the secured party's interest as "property rights" to one that recognized the interest as 
a prior claim against specific assets). That view, analogizing a security interest to a priority 
claim rather than a property right per se, is consistent with the approach to security advo­
cated in this article. See infra text accompanying notes 216-29. 
157. See 11 U.S.C. § 362{d){2) {1994); see also car!son, supra note 10, at 18-19 (noting 
that under the Act the absence of an equity cushion was per se grounds for relief from the 
automatic stay). 
158. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 418 n.4 {1992); see also Howard, supra note 39, 
at 527-29 {describing the changes made in the Code to the rights of lienholders as involving a 
"rebalancing" of the rights of debtors and creditors). Professor carlson goes even further, 
describing Congress's approach under the Code to undersecured claims as representing "a 
sweeping sea of change in the law of the undersecured creditor." Carlson, supra note 10, at 
20. Thus, he concurs with Professor Newborn that Dewsnup wrongly abandoned "the prior­
ity theory of the Code in favor of an outmoded in rem theory of the old Bankruptcy Act." Id. 
159. Under state law, the issue comes down to a battle of sorts between secured and 
unsecured creditors. LoPucki, for example, perceives as noted that security extracts a sub­
sidy from unsecured creditors that is not reflected in the fonn of lower borrowing costs, but is 
arrogated to the secured lender. Thus, LoPucki would subordinate secured creditors' priority 
to at least two classes of unprotected unsecured creditors. See supra notes 91-93 and accom­
panying text. While not unsympathetic to both the fairness and efficiency concerns motivat­
ing LoPucki's proposal, our assertions in this article are not nearly so bold or radical. We 
would recognize the secured creditor's priority in bankruptcy in its collateral to the exclusion 
of other creditors up to the value of that collateral. We propose only that if the debtor can 
find a way to save the property from foreclosure, any subsequent appreciation should be used 
to prime the debtor's fresh start. See infra notes 225-29 and accompanying text. 
160. In certain other instances, typically involving a prebankruptcy default in an install­
ment obligation, claims are actually deaccelerated. See Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers 
Mayer, Valuation in Bankruptcy, 32 UCLA L. REv. 1061, 1102 {1985) {discussing Code 
§§ 1123{a)(5)(G), 1124(2), 1322(b){3)). These situations occur, however, under the reorgani­
zation chapters of the Code. 
161. See 11 U.S.C. § 502{c){l) {1994) (authorizing the bankruptcy court to estimate any 
unliquidated or contingent claim when necessary to avoid undue delay in the administration 
of the estate). 
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tized inter se, and ultimately settled. The idea of "fresh start," 
whatever else it means, demands that we cleave a wide chasm 
between the debtor's pre- and postfiling lives.162 To do so implies 
that there is no more intrinsic reason for clinging to the bargain 
metaphor in the case of security interests than there is in the case of 
garden-variety unsecured contractual obligations.163 To illustrate 
the point we return to the example that was the organon for the 
original discussion. 
In that example we hypothesized a chapter 7 debtor with a 
homestead valued at $120,000 and subject to three liens consisting, 
in order of priority, of: (1) a $100,000 mortgage; (2) a $15,000 judi­
cial lien; and (3) a $20,000 second mortgagee. We also assumed a 
$15,000 homestead exemption in the applicable jurisdiction. If the 
property were to go to state-law foreclosure at the behest of the 
first mortgagee, one would anticipate that the first mortgagee 
would bid in the amount of its indebtedness - that is, bid its note 
- and either emerge as the successful bidder or be taken out by the 
second lienor seeking to protect its interest in the equity over and 
above the first mortgage by bidding in all or a portion of its indebt­
edness on top of the amount due on the first lien.164 Depending on 
the nuances of the law of the jurisdiction, junior lienors that elected 
not to bid at sale would then have a statutory right to redeem in 
order of priority.165 If the judicial lienor were inclined to redeem, it 
162. This is one of the reasons that the continued expansion of the categories of debt that 
are excepted from discharge under § 523(a) is troubling. On the other hand, it is instructive 
to recognize that the exclusive grounds for objecting to discharge enumerated in § 727(a) 
have remained fixed since the adoption of the Code. 
163. This point is discussed in greater detail infra text accompanying notes 204-10. 
164. It is well-recognized that, by and large, foreclosure sales do not attract the kind of 
lively concourse of bidders that is likely to produce a "fair" price. In fact, in most instances 
the only bidder will be the foreclosing party that bids its indebtedness. This is one of the 
reasons why, until recently, several courts refused to treat the sale price received at a regu­
larly conducted mortgage-foreclosure sale as a conclusive indication of "reasonably 
equivalent value" for purposes of the fraudulent transfer provisions of § 548(a)(2). See BFP 
v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 564 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("And where a 
property is obviously worth more than the amount of the indebtedness, the lending mortga­
gee's interests are served best if the foreclosure sale is poorly attended; then, the lender is 
more likely to take the property by bidding the amount of indebtedness, retaining for itself 
any profits from resale."). 
165. See, e.g., Cow. REv. STAT. §§ 38-38-302 to -304 (Supp. 1996) (containing a fairly 
typical statutory redemption scheme, with the first right to redeem accorded to the owner of 
the property or any other person liable for the deficiency, and thereafter to junior lienors and 
encumbrancers). Unlike personal property financing, where the Uniform Commercial Code 
has imposed some semblance of uniformity, local variations from state to state make it more 
difficult to generalize about the procedures governing real property foreclosures. See GRANT 
S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL EsTATE FINANCE LAw § 7.1, at 551-52 (3d ed. 1994) 
(distinguishing between the common law right of equitable redemption that exists after 
default but prior to sale and statutory redemption rights that pertain after the sale). Much of 
what is described here in the context of a statutory redemption process would apply equally 
June 1997] Secured Credit and Bankruptcy 2275 
would likely be required to tender, in cash, $115,000 to the court or 
trustee, consisting of the $100,000 bid166 and the amount of the 
homestead exemption as to which, under state law, the judicial lien 
is subordinate.161 The holder of the second mortgage might under­
standably elect not to redeem on these facts, even though its inter­
est is not subject to the exemption,168 as it would be required to pay 
at least $115,000, representing the sum of the two prior liens.169 If it 
did redeem in order to appropriate any additional value over and 
above the sum of the prior liens, obtain future appreciation in the 
property, or both, the $115,000 redemption price (plus other 
charges) would be distributed as reimbursement to the judicial lie­
n or. The result would be that the debtor's homestead would be 
to the dynamics in the bidding process at foreclosure in a jurisdiction that did not confer 
statutory redemption rights on the holders of junior liens and encumbrances. 
166. This would include accrued post-sale interest and other proper charges. See, e.g., 
CoLo. REv. STAT. § 38-38 302(1) (Supp. 1996); NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 165, at 554-
55. 
167. Ordinarily, a redeeming lienor would tender only the amount paid by the successful 
bidder or the next prior redeeming lienor, and the amount of the indebtedness secured by 
such lien - on these facts $100,000, plus interest and proper charge, if any. In this case, 
however, because the redeeming lien is subject to the debtor's homestead, it is presumed that 
the redemption price would have to include the homestead amount. This is not by any means 
a foregone conclusion. See Howell v. Farrish, 725 P.2d 9 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that, 
under Colorado law, the homestead exemption only applies to execution and attachment, 
and not to redemption). Under the alternative rule discussed in Howel� the junior lienor in 
this example could redeem by paying only $100,000 in cash and then submitting an affidavit 
attesting to the amount of its lien. See Cow. REv. STAT. § 38-38-303(4) (Supp. 1996). The 
affidavit is to protect the redeeming party in the event of a subsequent redemption. Assum­
ing the homestead exemption did pertain and further assuming no subsequent redemption by 
the holder of a junior encumbrance to which the homestead was subordinated, the $15,000 
homestead amount would ordinarily be turned over to the debtor. Even under these assump­
tions, however, the issue is not beyond cavil. For example, a nonredeeming junior encum­
brancer with a consensual lien might successfully make a claim to the homestead proceeds 
based either on an express contractual subrogation right or on an equitable basis in light of 
the legal priority of its interest in relation to the homestead. Obviously, there are no abso­
lutes in this area and the vagaries of individual state law would control. 
168. If the homestead exemption did not apply, there would be greater incentive to 
redeem, since there would be some value to claim. See infra note 170. 
169. On the other hand, because there is some equity ($5,000) over the sum of the two 
prior liens, the second mortgagee might well choose to redeem if it had the available cash and 
believed there was a potential for appreciation. Because of the circular priority situation that 
exists in this scenario, however, this assumes that the second mortgagee could argue success­
fully that the junior lien should effectively be deemed satisfied out of the homestead funds in 
order to recognize the priority of the second mortgage over the exemption. See supra note 
167. Failing that argument, redemption would make no sense, since it would require pay­
ment of both the $115,000 paid by the judgment creditor plus an additional $15,000 repre­
senting the amount of the judgment lien. If the judicial lienor elected not to redeem in the 
first place, the second mortgagee would be well advised to redeem on these numbers, since it 
would take title free and clear of both the judgment lien and the debtor's homestead exemp­
tion. See, e.g., Cow. REv. STAT. § 38-38-304(1) (Supp. 1996). In this context the debtor's 
only hope would be a claim for equitable subrogation to the priority of the judicial lien, but 
the argument is attenuated at best, probably not worth litigating, and without substantial case 
authority of any sort. 
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forfeited and the judicial lien would effectively have been frozen 
out of any excess value in the property.17° Alternatively, if the judi­
cial lienor did not redeem,171 whether the second mortgagee 
redeemed or not, the debtor would still lose her homestead exemp­
tion and the judicial lienor would still be frozen out of any excess 
value or future appreciation. 
If, in contrast to the scenario of a forced sale under state law just 
discussed, the debtor were to file bankruptcy prior to foreclosure, 
we arrive at a similar but not identical outcome. Under the new 
formulaic approach in section 522(f)(2)(A) for determining impair­
ment, the entire judicial lien impairs and, therefore, may be avoided 
under section 522(f)(l)(A).172 The one clear beneficiary of that 
action is the second mortgagee, who enjoys a $15,000 improvement 
in its state-law position, provided that the court is either not pre­
pared or unwilling to save the avoided lien for the debtor's bene­
fit.173 It is a little difficult to understand, however, why improving 
one creditor's position at the expense of another comports with 
either the core bankruptcy policy of equality among creditors or the 
baseline principle of respecting state law entitlements. Further­
more, elevating the priority of junior unavoidable liens hardly 
advances the fresh-start objectives underlying the lien-avoidance 
provisions in section 522(f)(l). 
A better approach - "better" defined in terms of its congru­
ence with bankruptcy policy - would be to allow the debtor also to 
invoke section 506( d) and void the second mortgagee's lien to the 
extent of the unsecured portion of its bifurcated claim as of the date 
of filing.114 The result would coincide in most respects with the 
result under state law,11s subject to the important difference that 
170. Assuming the homestead exemption applies at all in this proceeding, see supra note 
169, there is at least the argument that the second mortgagee, in order to redeem, must pay 
not just the judicial lienor's prior redemption amount but also the amount of the judicial lien 
itself. This might operate to preserve the homestead for the debtor. The problem is that, by 
the same reasoning, the second mortgagee should be entitled to the benefit of the homestead 
exemption, resulting in a $5,000 payment to the judicial lienor, the debtor being cut out of 
any homestead payment, and the second mortgagee with the property at a cost of $105,000. 
One observation that emerges rather clearly from this otherwise cloudy picture is that emu­
lating the state-law result is often easier said than actually done given the uncertainty and the 
consequent myriad of possible outcomes that exists under most states' law. 
171. Because of the requirement of producing cash, this is always a possibility, particu­
larly if the lienor is not a professional lender and foresees considerable carrying, mainte­
nance, and resale costs. 
172. See supra text accompanying notes 15-18. 
173. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
174. Under § 506(a), this would reduce the lien to $5,000. See supra note 24. 
175. But see text accompanying infra note 176. This assertion assumes that mortgage 
lenders are in the business of money lending, not real-estate speculating. While the point 
June 1997] Secured Credit and Bankruptcy 2277 
the debtor's homestead exemption would be protected. Of course, 
so long as Dewsnup remains the law of the land, that alternative is 
mere wishful thinking. In fairness, permitting the debtor to use sec­
tion 506( d) as an avoiding power may not always emulate the state­
law result with precision, depending on whether relevant state law 
resolves the circular priority issue between the judicial lienor and 
the junior unavoidable mortgagee by awarding the value of the 
judicial lien to the second mortgagee or to the debtor.176 Neverthe­
less, the main difference is that the outcome without Dewsnup -
that is, an outcome following lien stripping - would preserve the 
fresh start instincts in section 522(f)(l)(A) and avoid a rearranging 
of state law priorities in a manner that served no compelling bank­
ruptcy purpose. 
The argument might be made that it is not necessary to overrule 
Dewsnup for this reason alone because application by analogy of 
the lien-preservation concept of section 551 eliminates the prob­
lem.177 Suppose, however, as is likely to be the case, that the prop­
erty is not liquidated during the course of the bankruptcy 
administration. Under no scenario is there any incentive for the 
trustee to sell the property17B and, more than likely, it would simply 
be abandoned.179 After the case is closed, two possibilities are 
presented: (1) immediate foreclosure by the first mortgagee, or (2) · 
the debtor staves off foreclosure by reaching an understanding with 
the holders of the first and second mortgages.180 In the former 
seems self-evident, even to the extent that one is inclined to see both activities as legitimate 
components of a secured creditor's expectation, rarely will the mere hope of future increases 
in value justify the present costs of carrying the property. See Howard, supra note 24, at 408-
09 (pointing out, as well, that many lenders are restricted by regulatory rule from owning 
significant inventories of repossessed properties). Practical constraints, such as complying 
with loan-loss reserve requirements or the tax benefits of booking and writing off loan losses 
in the current year, also operate in this connection. 
176. See supra note 169. 
177. See supra notes 19-21; see also In re Gonzalez, 149 B.R. 9, 10 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993) 
(invoking § 522(f) as the basis for subordinating the unavoided portion of a judicial lien to 
the portion of the lien avoided, due to its impairment of an exemption to which the debtors 
would otherwise have been entitled), vacated sub nom Gonzalez v. First Natl. Bank, 191 B.R. 
2 (D. Mass. 1996). 
178. Section 363(f)(3) prohibits the trustee from selling assets of the estate free and clear 
of liens unless "the price at which such property is to be sold is greater than the aggregate 
value of all liens on such property." 
179. The standard under 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1994) of "burdensome to the estate or that is 
of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate" would seem to be easily satisfied. 
180. As a practical matter, this would probably have to be in the form of an enforceable 
reaffirmation agreement under 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) and (d), although a de facto redemption is 
also possible. The problem with the first option is that, while it is no longer necessary to 
establish that the reaffirmation is in the best interests of the debtor and his dependents, see 
§ 524(c)(6)(B), it is still difficult to rationalize a decision to accept personal liability for what 
is, for all intents and purposes, an unsecured claim. The problem with the redemption alter-
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case, how do we ensure that the debtor's subrogated position will 
be respected in the state-law foreclosure?ts1 In the latter case, how 
can we reasonably expect the holder of the second mortgage to go 
along with any proposal the debtor is likely to be able to afford as 
long as the second mortgagee's lien secures a $20,000 claim? More­
over, because the holder of the second mortgage has the power to 
initiate, or threaten to initiate, its own foreclosure proceeding even 
though there would be little direct economic reason for it to do so, 
it retains enormous hold-up power to secure a concession from the 
debtor greater in value than the true value of the lender's interest in 
the property.182 
But for Dewsnup the debtor would be assured of her homestead 
exemption in either case. The only "loss" to the second mortgagee 
would be the loss of its prebankruptcy right to future appreciation. 
The response to the charge of unfairness in pushing that loss on the 
second mortgagee is twofold. First, compensation for the additional 
$15,000 already was provided in the form of an unsecured claim in 
the prior bankruptcy case.1s3 Second, the assertion that the secured 
native is the "hold-up" leverage that the failure to strip the lien in bankruptcy has given the 
junior mortgagee. See infra note 182. 
181. In the usual situation in which 11 U.S.C. § 551 (1994) is employed to preserve an 
avoided lien for the benefit of the estate, the property will be liquidated in the course of the 
bankruptcy administration in order to realize for the estate the value represented by the 
avoided lien. See, e.g., Sorenson v. Board of County Commrs. (In re Knights Athletic 
Goods), 128 B.R. 679 (D. Kan. 1991). In a situation in which an avoided lien is preserved for 
the debtor's benefit, the existence of the junior unavoidable encumbrance typically means 
that there is no reason for the trustee to sell the property, and ordinarily the debtor would 
not want that to occur. This raises the problem of how to enforce the debtor's subrogated 
position under state law, particularly in the face of a contractual subordination of the home­
stead in the unavoided junior lien. In effect, there is no obvious enforcement mechanism 
short of incurring the expense and delay of reopening the bankruptcy case in the event of 
either a subsequent sale or foreclosure of the property, so as to protect the interest of the 
debtor established in the earlier proceeding. Cf. In re Kampen, 190 B.R. 99 (Bankr. N.D. 
Iowa 1995) (involving an action to reopen a case in order to enjoin the sheriffs sale of certain 
previously unadministered real property in order to protect the debtors' homestead rights). 
182. The ability of the undersecured second mortgagee to extract from the debtor a price 
which is greater than the value of the lien can be attributed to the debtor's nonfinancial 
attachment to the property, what Professor Howard terms the "emotional increment." See 
Howard, supra note 24, at 421 (demonstrating how, in a foreclosure context, the second 
mortgagee can use the "underwater" portion of its lien to increase beyond market value the 
amount the debtor must bid to secure the property in the event of foreclosure). In addition, 
even in a sale context, the lien creditor can exploit its strategic advantage by requiring pay­
ment in excess of the true value of its lien as a condition to its willingness to release its lien in 
order to clear title. 
183. There may or may not be any actual value available for distribution in respect of 
unsecured claims, but the same is true for all other unsecured claimants, consistent with 
bankruptcy's basic equality principle. In any event, that risk also was part of the original 
"bargain," to the extent one is inclined to imagine the relationship in those terms. It has 
never been quite clear to us, frankly, what the position of the undersecured creditor properly 
ought to be with respect to any dividend paid to unsecured creditors. On the one hand, there 
is at least a suggestion in the majority opinion in Dewsnup that the secured creditor must 
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creditor has some form of indefeasible right to postbankruptcy 
appreciation is a rhetorical position of advocacy, not an eternal 
legal verity as the solemnity with which the argument is sometimes 
advanced would lead one to believe. The two points are obviously 
related. To conflate the matter, once the debtor files bankruptcy, 
the second mortgagee's secured claim in this case is limited to 
$5,000. Not only does post:filing appreciation belong to the debtor, 
but the prospect of ultimately losing the property to foreclosure, a 
result often inimical to fresh-start objectives, also is reduced precip­
itously. Reaching this result, however, requires that we dispatch 
with the holding and the normative result in Dewsnup. That, in 
tum, requires us to accept the possibility of and to construct an 
alternative to the conceptualization of security in bankruptcy 
implicitly endorsed by Justice Blackmun in his Dewsnup opinion, 
an undertaking that occupies our attention in the final two parts of 
this article. Part V offers an explanation of what we mean when we 
speak of a new conception of security. That part explains the basis 
for our analysis of extant concepts of security, and, for that matter, 
all legal concepts, as metaphor. Part VI then offers an alternative 
metaphor that we submit advances the discourse about security in 
bankruptcy beyond the limits imposed by the bargain and convey­
ance metaphors that have enjoyed a conceptual monopoly in the 
doctrinal analysis thus far. 
V. LEGAL CONCEPTS AND METAPHORIC REASONING 
. A. Legal Concepts as Metaphors 
Throughout this article, we have regularly referred to the bar­
gain metaphor and the conveyance or property metaphor. Our use 
of that term is not casual; rather, it is central to the doctrinal analy­
sis that follows. When we speak of reconceptualizing security, we 
are calling for a fresh consideration of the metaphors by which 
sacrifice its unsecured claim as compensation for having its lien left intact and for having 
access to future appreciation. See Dewsnup v. Tunm, 502 U.S. 410, 418 (1992); Howard, 
supra note 39, at 517. It is far from obvious, however, that this is what actually transpires. 
Instead, in most cases it is logical to assume that the creditor enjoys its pro rata share of 
distributions to unsecured creditors, crediting such amount against its total claim, and then 
sits back and seeks eventual recovery of the balance out of its in rem claim. While this result, 
if it occurs, prejudices other unsecured creditors by reducing their dividends pro tanto in 
violation of the basic policy interdiction against unequal distributions, it is difficult to see how 
the result can be avoided, since there is no statutory basis for disallowance of the unsecured 
claim. Indeed, § 506(a) seems to support the argument that the claim is proper and, from the 
debtor's perspective, it is advantageous to have as much as possible of the undersecured 
creditor's total claim satisfied out of the estate. Also, as earlier noted, the debtor has the 
authority to file the claim on the secured creditor's behalf even if the creditor elects to ignore 
the bankruptcy entirely and rely on its lien. See 11 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1994). 
2280 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 95:2234 
security has come to be understood. In so doing, we proceed from 
recent insights from the cognitive sciences that make a compelling 
case for the proposition that virtually all our concepts, including 
legal concepts, are metaphoric in nature. A brief excursus may be 
helpful here. Experiential Realism ("Experientialism")184 provides 
an account of reasoning relatively new to the cognitive sciences 
that, among other things, reveals the singular role metaphor plays 
in human conceptual systems.185 On the Experientialist account, 
only the least sophisticated concepts are garnered directly from 
experience. Concepts such as up-down, light-dark, and contain­
ment emerge from our interactions with physical reality and thus 
are directly grasped.186 
These rudimentary concepts have natural dimensions and are 
therefore well delineated and sharply defined.187 Most of our con­
cepts, however, do not arise directly from physical experience. 
Reasoning to concepts without natural dimensions therefore 
requires the capacity for metaphor, whereby well-defined concepts 
from a source domain are deployed to structure ill-defined or 
under-defined concepts from another and different domain, the tar­
get domain.188 The target concept is thus modeled on, and is under­
stood in terms of, the source concept.189 
Consider the following simple example. One of our rudimen­
tary concepts is that of physical containment.190 We continuously 
184. The term, "Experientialism," or "Experiential Realism," is the cognitive theory 
advanced by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, 
METAPHORS WE LivE BY (1980). The philosophical assumptions on which Experientialism 
is premised are outlined in detail in MARK JOHNSON, THE Booy IN THE MIND: THE BODILY 
BASIS OF MEANING, IMAGINATION, AND REASON (1987). Evidence from the cognitive sci­
ences, which is in part the basis of their theory of cognition, is elaborated on in GEORGE 
LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT 
THE MIND (1987). 
185. See LAKoFF & JOHNSON, supra note 184, at 3. 
186. In referring to rudimentary concepts, we refer to those that are directly appre­
hended from experience and that are not modeled on other concepts - that is, are not 
understood metaphorically. See id. at 56-57. 
187. The source of rudimentary concepts is the kinesthetic image schemata. Image 
schema are preconceptual and have a bodily basis. They emerge from endlessly recurring 
patterns we discern in experience, such as the ways in which we experience our physical 
orientation in the world around us. Since those patterns are repeating, they become recog­
nizable and are embodied as image schematic concepts. See JOHNSON, supra note 184, at 13. 
For a summary explanation of image schema, see F. Stephen Knippenberg, Future 
Nonadvance Obligations: Preferences Lost in Metaphor, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1537, 1563-65 
(1994). For an extended discussion, see JoHNsoN, supra note 184, at 19-28. 
188. See LAKoFF & JoHNSON, supra note 184, at 115-17. 
189. See id. 
190. See JOHNSON, supra note 184, at 21. Johnson has identified and catalogued several 
image schema, including up-down, front-back, linear order, and part-whole, to name a few. 
See id. at 19-37. The concept of containment, born of the container schema from physical 
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experience ourselves and other objects in the physical world as con­
tained within buildings, rooms, and so on. With its physical basis, 
the concept of containment is crisply defined by its natural dimen­
sions.191 The concept of trouble, on the other hand, lacks natural 
dimensions and cannot therefore be directly grasped.192 Recogniz­
ing analogies between the way we experience troublesome situa­
tions and physical containment enables the metaphor, trouble-is-a­
container, such that we can speak of "getting into" or "getting out 
of trouble." The ill-defined target concept of trouble is understood 
in terms of the well-defined source concept of containment from 
the physical domain. The concept, that is to say, is understood 
metaphorically .193 
The Experientialist insight that most concepts are metaphoric is 
premised on an important epistemological conviction that our con­
cepts are not abstractions of some set of conditions that exists in the 
world independent of the reasoner. Experientialism rejects the fun­
damental assumptions of what has been called an epistemology of 
objectivism.194 
Objectivism posits a mind-independent reality wherein objects, 
events, and states of affairs are inherently possessed of various 
properties and naturally stand in a fixed relation to one another.195 
Concepts are abstract likenesses of that reality, true when they cap­
ture and faithfully represent it, but false otherwise. Cognition, from 
the perspective of objectivism, is algorithmic, such that the measure 
experience, is regularly deployed in structuring legal concepts. For an extended discussion of 
the containment metaphor at work in article 9 of the U.C.C., see Knippenberg, supra note 
187, at 1571-75. 
191. Because of its bodily basis, containment is meaningful in the most primary sense. 
See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 184, at 57-58. 
192. Experientialism teaches us that in considerable part we must come to understand 
experience through metaphor. Abstractions, like trouble, are directly experienced, but only 
indirectly understood. See ld. at 115. For further basic examples and summary explication, 
see Knippenberg, supra note 187, at 1561-71. 
193. On the Experientialist account, human conceptual systems are mainly metaphoric. 
See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 184, at 3. 
194. See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 184, at 196. 
195. On the Objectivist view, "there is or must be some permanent, ahistorical matrix or 
framework to which we can ultimately appeal in determining the nature of rationality, knowl­
edge, truth, reality, goodness, or rightness." RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND 0BJECTIVISM 
AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAx:Is 8 (1983). Objectivism might use­
fully be defined as the antithesis of subjectivism. If, for the Objectivist, the world consists of 
naturally occurring, mind-independent properties, categories, and structures, for the 
Subjectivist they are altogether relative to the prevailing aims of the reasoner. Reality is very 
much up to the individual. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 184, at 224. For an extended 
discussion of Objectivism, its evolution, and principle themes, see RICHARD RoRTY, 
PmLOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979). Objectivist influences and themes in 
semantic theory are described in JOHNSON, supra note 184, at xxix-xxxv. 
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of the correctness (and utility) of our concepts is the degree to 
which there is a verifiable correspondence of the symbols they 
employ to the reality they are meant to represent.196 
In contrast, the Experientialist view holds that conceptual cate­
gories do not capture slices of a reality or of categories as they are 
out there. Rather, conceptual categories are entirely the product of 
human cognitive processes, which are dependent on imaginative 
devices such as metaphor.197 Whereas under the objectivist regime 
categories transcend cognition, under Experientialist rule catego­
ries have no ontological status independent of it.198 
That concepts are metaphoric has important ramifications for 
legal analysis and law transformation. Traditional legal analysis is 
deeply grounded in objectivist assumptions that postulate a tran-
196. The epistemology of Objectivism, unsurprisingly, supposes the task of human cogni­
tion to be one of capturing and describing objective reality. Knowledge transcends cognitive 
processes, since it is "out there" whether or not there is a reasoner to "discover" it. 
Objectivist epistemological assumptions have been referred to as "metaphysical realism." 
See Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Tum in Modem Theory: A Tum for the Worse?, 41 
STAN. L. REv. 871, 881-90 (1989). 
197. On the Experientialist account, there are no categories that are not conceptual cate­
gories. The naturally occurring properties of objects, states of affairs, conditions, and so forth 
that we experience do not define a category, simply because those things have no inherent 
properties a priori. Instead, conceptual categories are defined by perceived prototypes, 
which are distinctly human conceptual constructs. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 184, 
at 122-25. 
198. 1\vo features of metaphoric reasoning must be noted and explained. First, knowl­
edge and meaning arrived at by understanding one concept, the target concept, in terms of 
another, the source concept, are by hypothesis partial and incomplete. See LAKOFF & 
JOHNSON, supra note 184, at 12-13. If a source and target concept were identical in every 
particular, they would be the same concept. The latter feature gives rise to a corollary propo­
sition, that in highlighting similarities between source and target concepts, asymmetries (a 
term we use to refer to dimensional differences between source and target concepts) are lost 
to view. Second, when one concept is structured and defined by another, in the process of 
metaphoric mapping, the inferential consequences, or "entailments," belonging to the source 
concept are carried to, or mapped on, the target concept. For an extended discussion of 
entailments, see JOHNSON, supra note 184, at 130-38. 
As to the first of these features, consider the following example from contract law. A 
contract is partially defined by the metaphor, a-contract-is-a-container-for-contracting-parties. 
The metaphor is manifested in expressions like, "they entered into a contract," and "she could 
not get out of her contract." The metaphoric concept is useful because it highlights certain 
dimensions of our experience of contracts shared with our experience of the concept of physi­
cal containment But the concept of containment from the physical domain only partially 
structures the concept, contract. To provide more complete meaning, other metaphors must 
be pressed into service, which in conjunction afford a fuller understanding of the target con­
cept. To continue the above example, "contracts" or "agreements" are also partially defined 
by the metaphor, an-agreement-is-a-place, or, more particularly, an-agreement-is-a­
destination. The metaphor finds expression in statements like, "they arrived at an agree­
ment." The containment and destination metaphors together tell us more about how we 
experience contracts than either alone. The more metaphors by which a target concept is 
understood, the richer the definition, and the fuller our understanding of that concept. 
Important, sophisticated concepts are the most likely to be highly defined by multiple meta­
phors. Lakoff and Johnson have, for instance, catalogued some ten ontological metaphors 
that define the concept idea. See LAKoFF & JOHNSON, supra note 184, at 46-48. 
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scendental, objective reality that exists independent of human con­
cepts.199 The method of traditional legal analysis is to abstract 
principles from cases, statutes, and other authority to arrive at tran­
scendent propositions.200 Inasmuch as the propositions transcend 
their instantiations in the concrete cases from which they derive, 
they are assumed to be capable of objective application when 
brought to bear in subsequent cases. There is a "right answer," and 
the analyst has only to find it - the decisionmaker need only avoid 
contaminating the proposition to be applied with subjective 
impulses. 
For example, as discussed in considerable detail above,201 much 
of the discourse about the treatment of secured claims in bank­
ruptcy turns on the nature of security,202 whether the rights of 
secured claimants with security interests or mortgages are property 
or contract rights. Under an analytic program guided by objectivist 
assumptions, there is an immutable, correct conception of security 
- the rights of secured claimants are property or they are contract 
rights. The business of legal analysis, rightly understood, is to iden­
tify the correct conception. 
On acknowledging that our concepts, legal and otherwise, are 
no more and no less than metaphoric constructs that enable mean­
ing in accordance with our goals and purposes, rather than abstrac­
tions of things the way they really are, analysis of legal doctrine 
takes a different tum.203 For example, it is one thing to say that a 
contract is a container, but something very different to say that the 
concept of contract shares recognizable dimensions with the con­
cept of physical containment and so can be usefully, if only par­
tially, understood in that way. As we make clear in the next part, 
exploring alternative metaphors by which the concept of security is 
structured forces attention upon aspects of security and the fresh 
199. Objectivism finds its expression in the law as Externalist principles, or legal formal­
ism. This is not to say, of course, that legal formalism has gone unchallenged. See Moore, 
supra note 196, at 890 (discussing "interpretivism," which discounts metaphysical debate as 
impossible of resolution, and so not worth scholarly attention). Moore characterizes as illus­
trative the work of Stanley F!Sh, Robert Cover, and Ronald Dworkin. See id. at 891-92. 
200. See id. at 888; cf. Steven L. Wmter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of 
Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. R:Ev. 1371, 1387 (1988) (positing that the law of standing has 
proceeded from the metaphor of standing regarded as a literal truth). 
201. See supra Part III. 
202. See generally Knippenberg, supra note 187 (offering an extended discussion of the 
Coogan-Gilmore debate over the "true nature" of the security interest in the context of 
future advance priority under article 9). 
203. See, e.g., Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 23, at 312-24 (demonstrating how con­
version of nonexempt assets to exempt assets on the eve of bankruptcy can be understood 
either as an act of bad faith or as a legitimate exercise of a property right). 
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start that are otherwise lost to consideration. Moreover, recogniz­
ing that our concepts are imaginative devices of cognition, and not 
symbolic representations of some transcendental state of affairs in 
experience, frees us to augment, modify, or, where it serves our 
ends to do so, suspend one concept in favor of others. 
B. Beyond the Bargain, Conveyance, and Property Metaphors 
We have so far described the bargain and conveyance/property 
metaphors and identified the failure of both to offer either a viable 
explanation, in the case of the bargain metaphor, or justification, in 
the case of the conveyance and property metaphors, for secured 
credit in bankruptcy. Here, we seek to explain the reasons those 
models are driven to inextricable impasse. As it is central to our 
analysis and explication, we would at this juncture reiterate the fun­
damental principle upon which Experientialism rests: All concepts 
are the product of imaginative instruments of cognition, most nota­
bly the capacity to understand a target concept by reference to a 
source concept, the capacity to reason metaphorically. 
The conveyance/property metaphor advocated by Harris and 
Mooney serves both to illustrate Experientialist principles and to 
advance our remaining discussion of the troublesome holding in 
Dewsnup. By insisting that a security transfer must be understood 
as a conveyance of property from debtor to creditor, Harris and 
Mooney corroborate the conceptualization of security at the basis 
of article 9. On entering into the security agreement with its credi­
tor, the debtor transfers something to the creditor, some interest 
that thereafter belongs to the creditor and that is as a matter of 
course understood to be property. The security agreement, then, is 
as much an instrument of conveyance as it is a contract between the 
parties that gives rise to contractual rights and duties. In short, the 
undisputed traditional metaphor regards the creation of a security 
interest as representing the movement of property from the debtor 
to the creditor. Security is thus understood in terms of property 
concepts ordinarily associated with absolute transfers, the proto­
type for which is the transfer of physical possession of real or per­
sonal property from one party to another.204 
204. As we noted earlier, important concepts tend to be well defined by multiple meta­
phors. See supra note 198. Article 9, a case in point, is a complex cognitive model consisting 
of a variety of coherent ontological metaphors and an overarching structural metaphor (the 
secured transaction is a journey). 
For an in-depth discussion of the metaphors that structure the concepts in article 9, see 
Knippenberg, supra note 187. It is worth noting here that the property and bargain meta­
phors are consistent with the cognitive model by which article 9 is structured. 
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That a security interest can usefully be thought of in terms of a 
conveyance of possession is irrefutable.205 That security must neces­
sarily be thought of in those terms is not. The creation of a security 
interest is, in many respects, like a physical transfer of property. 
Accepted rules of conveyancing are modeled on the source-path­
goal image schema,206 whereby physical possession passes from one 
party to another. The security transfer can be, and routinely is, con­
ceived of in the same way. The debtor, in conferring upon the 
secured creditor the right to seize an asset identified in the security 
agreement, can be taken to have passed something to the secured 
creditor, thereby forfeiting an aspect of ownership of that asset;207 
the right to hold it as against all others under all circumstances. 
The debtor thereby alters the relationship to property that she 
would otherwise enjoy under settled notions about property 
ownership.208 
The conveyance/property metaphors are useful in defining 
security, an abstraction without natural dimensions of its own. The 
concept of a physical conveyance of property has natural dimen­
sions in that it can be directly observed, directly experienced, and 
so directly understood without recourse to other defining concepts. 
Security, in contrast, represents a conceptual ex;tension beyond the 
rudimentary notion of a physical transfer. Nothing observable 
passes from debtor to creditor as the result of the security "trans­
fer." Nevertheless, to think of security in terms of a conveyance, 
and so to think of the security interest in terms of property, is to 
make the concept of security meaningful. The source concept of 
the conveyance is well understood, and the clearly defined attrib­
utes associated with it serve to define the target concept of security 
when conveyance is mapped onto that concept. 
Understanding security in terms of a conveyance of property 
enables us to reason about security by highlighting those features 
that we perceive the two concepts to share. As indicated earlier, 
however, metaphoric reasoning is by hypothesis partial. While sim­
ilarities between concepts are highlighted, asymmetries are lost to 
view. It is one thing to say that the creation of a security interest 
can usefully be understood in terms of a conveyance of property, 
205. See supra notes 100·01 and accompanying text. 
206. This is one of the several image schema identified by Lakoff and Johnson. See supra 
note 184. 
207. See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 23, at 313-14 (describing the metaphor of 
encumbered property as a physical resource depleted by the security transfer). 
208. See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 2-5 (1984). 
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but quite another to say it is a conveyance of property. The former 
assertion acknowledges that security is in many respects like a con­
veyance of property, but admits of differences between them. The 
latter assertion denies those distinctions. The loss of asymmetries 
is, of course, the natural product of metaphoric reasoning: In high­
lighting similarities between concepts, differences are eclipsed or 
hidden. 
The hiding power of metaphor is hardly remarkable. Meta­
phoric reasoning is so pervasive in cognitive processing, so ubiqui­
tous in our concepts, that we are mainly unaware of it.209 It is a 
natural inclination to presume that our concepts are not imagina­
tive constructs, but slices of reality, or symbolic representations of 
external conditions or phenomena. 
For example, in constructing an entire statute, article 9, around 
security understood as property, the implicit assumption is that the 
security transfer is a conveyance of property, and that to assert as 
much is to proclaim the discovery of the true nature of the security 
interest about which there can be no doubt. The property model 
has therefore become the starting point, and frequently the ending 
point, for analysis of doctrine and the rules governing security, both 
in and out of bankruptcy. 
To insist that the creation of security is a conveyance of property 
rather than a target concept modeled on the source concept of the 
conveyance leads to doctrinal impasse and dysfunctionality, some 
instances of which have been and will be identified in this article. 
Worse, if discourse about security in bankruptcy is limited by the 
conviction that there is a single, correct conception of security, 
meaningful analysis of bankruptcy policy, insofar as it is related to 
secured claims in consumer cases at least, is foreclosed. To illus­
trate, we return to one of the features of metaphoric mapping dis­
cussed above: the imposition of entailments associated with source 
concepts onto target concepts. 
Entailments, it will be recalled, are the ontological conse­
quences that attend a concept. Consider again the conveyance met­
aphor on which security is modeled. Where one transfers 
possession of tangible property, the rela�onship of the transferor to 
the property conveyed terminates. The transferor may neither 
physically occupy the thing transferred nor subsequently transfer it 
to others. Such are the consequences, the entailments, of the trans­
fer of possession and of ownership. 
209. See LAKoFF & JOHNSON, supra note 184, at 28. 
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When the concept of security comes to be understood in accord­
ance with the metaphor, the-creation-of-a-security-interest-is-a­
physical-conveyance-of-property, the entailments associated with 
the source concept are mapped onto the target concept; that is, the 
ontological consequences associated with the concept, conveyance, 
are imposed upon the concept of security. Once it is decided that a 
lien is the product of a conveyance of property, the secured credi­
tor's claim suddenly enjoys special status because security interest 
or mortgage is property. The entailments-of-the-source concept, 
the property/conveyance metaphor, are axiomatic in the law. 
Whatever rights in the collateral that remain with the debtor are 
limited by that which she has "transferred" away - all value of the 
asset - unless there is value in excess of the claim. If the debtor 
"transported away" the value in the property, none remains to be 
given to, or taken by, others in the absence of equity. 
For present purposes, the most important entailment mapped 
from the source concept of property to the target concept of secur­
ity arises from the metaphor that defines the nature of the lien from 
the perspective of secured creditors. The security interest or mort­
gage is understood initially according to the simple ontological met­
aphor, a-lien-is-a-physical-object. That metaphor is, of course, 
entirely consistent with the conveyance metaphor, which envisions 
a physical transfer of lien rights from the debtor to the creditor. 
While this simple ontological metaphor does not go far in defin­
ing security, it does enable various extensions. For example, a 
security interest as a physical object can attach to the collateral, or, 
in the case of real estate, can be understood as a mortgage on 
encumbered property. That view of security coheres with the meta­
phor, the-collateral-is-a-container-for-property-interests, enabling 
various metaphoric extensions expressed in remarks like, "she has a 
security interest in the debtor's inventory." 
An entailment of singular importance follows from these onto­
logical metaphors. Where objects or substances are attached to or 
are contained within another - for example, where a security 
interest becomes attached to the collateral, where the secured 
claimant has an interest in the collateral - they remain with it 
unless they are somehow extricated. That is a fundamental conse­
quence of physical attachment and containment. The entailment is 
mapped onto the concept of security, meaning that it remains with 
the collateral should it pass out of the debtor's possession and con­
trol or, importantly, into the bankruptcy estate. 
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The above-described entailments emanate from the property 
and conveyance models. Those metaphors enable meaning in that, 
in conjunction, they define security such that we may manipulate 
the latter concept in useful ways. When we come to understand 
security in terms of the property and bargain metaphors, well­
defined concepts with natural dimensions like physical attachment 
and containment, it becomes possible to reason about security. 
But when we grant a conceptual monopoly to the conveyance 
and property models, the entailments of the conveyance model -
of security as property - tyrannize analysis and suppress penetrat­
ing considerations of policy. As stated earlier, entailments offer 
ready solutions to issues under consideration with no apparent need 
for meaningful justification beyond that suggested by the entail­
ments themselves. If we presume security to be property, then of 
course liens must "pass through" bankruptcy, since they are some­
thing within or attached to the collateral. 
But the entailments of the ontological metaphors that define 
property and security understood as property have consequences 
beyond the obvious. Both in and out of bankruptcy, property 
receives protection under the law that contract rights do not; for 
example, constitutional protection. For that and other reasons, it is 
axiomatic that property rights of creditors are left undisturbed in 
bankruptcy. Where it might not be deemed offensive to alter con­
tract rights, tampering with property invokes claims of taking and 
unfairness. As we explain in the next part, that is the very sort of 
limiting analysis we believe is responsible for Dewsnup. 
The Dewsnup opinion is completely dominated by the property 
and conveyance models of security that pervade state law. It evalu­
ates lien stripping exclusively by reference to the metaphor, 
security-is-property. In the majority opinion, the property meta­
phor is the beginning and ending point for analysis, and the dissent 
offers no contradiction on that point.210 Given the entailments 
mapped from that concept to the concept of security, the outcome 
in the case was inescapable: the secured claimant's "property" can­
not be divested through lien stripping. Justice Blackmun's hope­
lessly convoluted interpretation of the Code is powerful evidence of 
the influence of the entailments-of-the-property metaphor. 
Dewsnup is therefore dysfunctional. To say that security can 
only be understood as property leads inexorably to the conclusion 
reached in that case, but it is not a justification for it. Entailments 
210. See supra text accompanying notes 43-47. 
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compel results, but they do not implicitly justify them. Where anal­
ysis is limited by entailments, there is no room to consider counter­
vailing policy objectives at work in the bankruptcy case, including 
most importantly the fresh start in consumer cases. 
It is upon recognizing that legal concepts are metaphorically 
defined that analysis is enabled. In ending the search for the right 
way to conceive of security in favor of the quest for multiple meta­
phoric concepts to yield a more robust definition, we are freed to 
consider and reconsider concepts like security. 
More important, letting go of the commitment to a single meta­
phoric system advances discourse by diverting attention from 
results enjoined by metaphoric entailments to a wide-ranging explo­
ration of bankruptcy policy. Letting go of the property metaphor in 
bankruptcy focuses attention on the fresh start in a way that, we 
believe, leads to a very different view of lien stripping. Appraisal of 
rules and doctrine, unfettered by entailments that are necessarily 
mapped from source to target concepts, becomes an exercise in 
meaningful normative evaluation. In the next part, we offer an 
alternative model for security to enable precisely that sort of 
analysis. 
VJ. A RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF UNDERSECURED 
CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY 
A. In Concept 
As described earlier,211 one alternative to a property-based con­
ception of security interests in bankruptcy is a value-based account 
that recognizes the existence and priority of the secured creditor's 
interest in the debtor's property up to the value of the collateral as 
of the moment of filing.212 Several commentators have put forth 
cogent arguments based on the history of the Code in support of a 
priority approach to security and, in particular, undersecured 
claims.213 Rehashing those arguments at this time would serve no 
point. Instead, we would press the logic of those arguments one 
step further by proposing that, in a bankruptcy context, it is appro-
211. See supra notes 145-51 and accompanying text. 
212. Actually, the precise timing of the valuation, whether at the time of filing or some 
other point in the case, is a subject of some controversy. See infra note 223. 
213. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 952 (suggesting that under the Code the argu­
ment can be made that secured status consists of no more than a priority claim equal to the 
value of the creditor's collateral); Newborn, supra note 4, at 577-81 (arguing that the 
Bankruptcy Code evinces a congressional intent to bring undersecured creditors within the 
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, contrary to the Bankruptcy Act jurisprudence on which 
the majority in Dewsnup relied). 
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priate to reassess the character of secured claims with reference to 
the fundamental underlying nature of a bankruptcy case. We 
appreciate that this process has ramifications that resonate through­
out the fabric of the commercial law.214 For present purposes, how­
ever, we urge such a reconceptualization of secured claims simply 
as a means for more fairly balancing the rights of secured creditors 
with the Code's fresh-start policy, a policy that is without analogue 
in state debt/collection law.21s 
In substance, as earlier noted,216 a bankruptcy case involves 
nothing less than the complete acceleration and adjudication of all 
claims217 against the debtor - liquidated and unliquidated, contin­
gent and noncontingent, disputed and undisputed, matured and 
unmatured, secured and unsecured - in a single, expedited pro­
ceeding.21s A pivotal, although frequently unarticulated, premise 
214. See, e.g., Nickles, supra note 8 {discussing the inherent tension between bankruptcy 
and the commercial law). This is also part of the broader debate over whether a security 
interest represents a property interest or just another species of contract right. See infra text 
accompanying notes 224-34; see also Kenneth N. Klee, A Brief Rejoinder to Professor 
LoPucki, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 583, 587 {1995) (indicating support for a proposal to reform 
article 9 to carve a fixed percentage out of collateral for the benefit of a levying judicial lien 
creditor). 
215. See generally Warren, supra note 111, at 782-89 (explaining the policy difference 
between state collection and federal bankruptcy law). 
216. See supra notes 147, 151 and accompanying text. 
217. Tue term "claim" is broadly defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) {1994). However, the 
determination of when a claim arises, for purposes both of discharge and entitlement of 
administrative expense status, has proved an exceedingly nettlesome one, particularly in the 
area of environmental and product liability claims. See, e.g., In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. 
Paul & Pac. R.R., 974 F.2d 775, 786 {7th Cir. 1992) {decided under § 77 of the 1898 Act); 
United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997, 1004-06 {2d Cir. 1991) 
(involving environmental clean-up claims); Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198, 201 (4th 
Cir. 1988) (involving products liability claims); Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns­
Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988) (involving products liability claims). Recently, 
the Eleventh Circuit adopted a new test for determining whether persons asserting claims 
based on postconfirmation events, but arising out of products manufactured and sold before 
confirmation, would be treated as holding "claims" within the meaning of § 101(5). See 
Epstein v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of the Estate of Piper Aircraft Corp. (In re 
Piper Aircraft Corp.), 58 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1995). This test focuses on the existence of a 
preconfirmation relationship between the debtor's product and the claimant. See 58 F.3d at 
1577. Tue Fifth Circuit, relying heavily on the lower courts' opinions in Piper, has adopted a 
similar version of the "relationship" test. See Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268 
{5th Cir. 1994). Whatever standard ultimately predominates, the expansive definition of 
"claim" and the near-universal criticism evoked in response to the Third Circuit's decision in 
Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 {3d Cir. 1984), 
which used a state-law claim accrual theory for measuring when a claim arises, serve as com­
pelling testimony to the emphasis in bankruptcy cases placed on separating what happened in 
the debtor's prefiling life from the debtor's postfiling existence, regardless of whether the 
proceeding is in the nature of liquidation or rehabilitation. 
218. Tue procedures allowing for estimation of claims that cannot be determined without 
unduly delaying the administration of the case, moreover, reinforce the primacy of "closing 
the books" on all outstanding prebankruptcy transactions. See supra text accompanying note 
148. 
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of bankruptcy policy is that, with a few notable exceptions, pre­
filing claims lose their individual identity once a case is commenced. 
That is to say, except in circumstances in which strong competing 
public policy considerations predominate,219 the origin of any par­
ticular claim - whether incurred in good faith or bad, in contract 
or tort - is no longer relevant. Rather, inquiry is focused solely on 
questions of allowability and relative priority, essentially inter­
creditor issues. 
By and large, courts seem to recognize this principle in reorgani­
zation and debt-adjustment cases,220 but Dewsnup stands in the way 
of a comparable recognition in individual chapter 7 cases. The 
irony could not be more striking. In the one type of proceeding in 
which the bankruptcy fresh start is most sharply in focus, the 
debtor's ability to accomplish a clean break with her past is fore­
closed by a determination that the postfiling accrual of value will be 
burdened by a claim originating in the debtor's prefiling life.221 
How does this observation inform the question of the proper 
conceptualization of secured claims in bankruptcy? The in rem 
notion simply superimposes the state-law template onto the bank­
ruptcy landscape while remaining oblivious to the differences in the 
legal terrain. Under state law, a secured creditor can be said to 
possess two different sets of rights: rights against the debtor upon 
default of repossession and foreclosure triggered by default - so­
called "default rights" - and rights of exclusivity or priority against 
other claimants with an interest in the collateral - so-called "prior­
ity rights."222 What is often overlooked in the Dewsnup type of 
analysis is that only one set of rights survives a bankruptcy filing, 
219. These policies generally are reflected in the statutorily enumerated discharge excep­
tions. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1994). 
220. Initially, commentators expressed serious concern over the pernicious effects of 
Dewsnup in chapter 11, 12, and 13 proceedings. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 4, at 319-36. 
Despite some early indications of reason for concern, particularly in chapter 11, courts have 
seemed to recognize the importance of confining the holding in Dewsnup to the facts 
presented in the case and, in particular, of not extending the holding beyond chapter 7 pro­
ceedings. See supra note 12. 
221. The disruptive effect of extending Dewsnup's interdiction against lien stripping into 
rehabilitation proceedings has been widely recognized. As one court accurately described it, 
importation of Dewsnup into chapter 11 could not be accomplished without eviscerating the 
core principles of reorganization law. See Wade v. Bradford, 39 F.3d 1126, 1129 (10th Cir. 
1994). By the same token, Dewsnup's interference with the core policy in consumer cases, 
namely fresh start, is arguably no less ominous. 
222. For example, in the case of personal-property financing under article 9, attachment 
of the security interest vests in the secured party what might be termed its "vertical" rights 
against the debtor, which are triggered on default. See U.C.C. §§ 9-201, 9-203, 9-501 to -507 
(1994). Beyond this, consummation of the additional steps necessary to perfect the interest 
establish the creditors' "horizontal" rights in the collateral vis-a-vis other claimants, including 
creditors, buyers, statutory lienors, etc. See U.C.C. §§ 9-201, 9-301, 9-303(1), 9-307, 9-312 
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namely the creditor's priority rights in the collateral. Like other in 
personam claims, the secured creditor's default rights against the 
debtor are eliminated, save for a successful challenge to discharge 
or dischargeability. Furthermore, even the creditor's priority rights 
do not represent a continuing interest in property, irrespective of 
the appropriate characterization of those rights prior to bankruptcy. 
Instead, they represent a claim against the property that may con­
tinue after bankruptcy if the property is exempt or has been aban­
doned, but only to the extent of the value extant at the moment of 
filing.223 It is this closure of the debtor's prepetition life, expressly 
built into the confirmation standards in nonliquidation cases and 
implicit in the structure of chapter 7, that resides at the core of the 
fresh start.224 
(1994). The same basic dynamic occurs when a creditor secures a claim with an interest in 
realty. 
223. The particular time for valuation is itself a more complicated question, particularly 
in chapter 11. See generally David Gray Carlson, Time, Value, and the Rights of Secured 
Creditors in Bankruptcy, or, When Does Adequate Protection Begin?, 1 BANKR. L. & PRAc. 
113, 121-22 (1992) (noting that a moment-of-filing approach enhances the debtor's fresh start 
if strip down under § 506( d) is permitted). For an exhaustive review of the case law address­
ing the question of the applicable date of valuation of property of the estate, see Wood v. LA 
Bank (In re Wood), 190 B.R. 788 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1996). See also supra notes 54, 112. 
However, a priority-only construction of secured claims in bankruptcy can be reconciled with 
either a "later than petition filing date" valuation or even, as Professor Carlson has argued, 
with the date of "disposal" of the collateral, either by sale or confirmation of a plan. See 
Carlson, supra note 10, at 20-52 (exploring the finality of bankruptcy valuations in light of 
Dewsnup). 
224. Section 727(b) provides for the discharge of all debts arising prior to entry of the 
order for relief, and § 524(b) operates as an injunction against any attempt to collect a dis­
charged debt Obviously, along with the exemptions in § 522 and the right to be free from 
discrimination based on the fact of bankruptcy, the discharge and discharge injunction are 
key ingredients of the fresh start. Attempting to define the fresh start or to justify it in 
normative terms is a more difficult exercise. See generally Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra 
note 23, at 248-52; Charles Jordan Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start in Bankruptcy: 
Collateral Conversions and the Dischargeability Debate, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 56, 89-103 
(1990) (reviewing the various policy justifications that have been proffered for the discharge). 
Moreover, determining the proper scope of the fresh start in relatively precise functional 
terms, and not simply invoking the shopworn incantation that the discharge is intended for 
the "honest but unfortunate" debtor, is essential to the resolution of a variety of questions 
that arise during the course of a bankruptcy proceeding. See Margaret Howard, A Theory of 
Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 Omo ST. L.J. 1047, 1047-48 (1987) (proposing a 
"functional economic theory" as a means for resolving specific issues relating to, and propos­
als for, modification of the discharge); Lawrence Ponoroff, Vicarious Thrills: The Case for 
Application of Agency Rules in Bankruptcy Dischargeability Litigation, 70 Tur.. L. REv. 2515 
(1996) (describing the fresh start as a condition intended to result from application of specific 
bankruptcy rules in particular cases, rather than as a formal legal status or cognizable legal 
right). While it is not (thankfully) our goal to put forth a full-blown normative theory of 
fresh start in this work, it is clear nevertheless that to the extent a debtor otherwise deserving 
of discharge carries any of the financial burdens of the past into the postbankruptcy future, 
the fresh start has been encumbered. Thus, however one individually resolves the fundamen­
tal issues of essential nature and appropriate scope, the damage has been done, and done in 
deference to an ideal - protection of private property - that the very existence of a system 
for discharging debts belies in the first instance. 
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If the central issue in Dewsnup relating to the right to future 
appreciation in property is framed in these terms instead of using 
the rhetoric of property law, the picture develops quite differently 
than the outcome reached by the Dewsnup majority. Specifically, 
in the bankruptcy context, a secured claim must be regarded first 
and foremost as a "claim," indistinguishable from other claims inso­
far as the debtor/creditor analysis is concemed.225 The significance 
of the secured nature of the claim relates only to the question of 
priority in particular assets in the ultimate distribution of the estate 
among the body of creditors as whole - the creditor/creditor anal­
ysis. Contrary to Justice Blackmun's suggestion in Dewsnup, it is 
not property entitled to protection any more than an unsecured 
claimant can assert a protectible property interest in its state-law­
based contractual rights against the debtor. What was conveyed at 
the onset was the right to foreclose under state law upon default, 
not some form of joint- or common-ownership rights. Therefore, 
when a collective procedure is initiated, barring the creditor from 
unilaterally taking action to foreclose, this right translates into a 
prior claim to the asset - nothing more and nothing less. This was 
after all the real bargain, just as the unsecured claimant has the 
right to sue and levy upon specific assets under state law or to 
receive a pro rata distribution from unencumbered assets upon 
insolvency. While the bargain in many cases may not be explicit, or 
even voluntary in the sense of there being meaningful alternatives, 
there is no defensible basis for recasting the secured claim in a man­
ner that confers an unintended and unwarranted advantage on the 
secured creditor. This is particularly true when doing so potentially 
erects an insurmountable obstacle in the way of the debtor's fresh 
start. 
The preceding discussion points to a conceptualization of 
secured credit in bankruptcy that abandons the inherent subjectiv­
ity and ambiguity imbedded in the bargain metaphor and the state­
law property entailments that attend that metaphor. In their place, 
we urge a view that coheres with the bankruptcy notion of a 
"claim." In effect, a security interest can more accurately be seen 
as representing a kind of priority claim; it is a priority claim of a 
different ilk than the statutory priority unsecured claims,226 but only 
in that the priority is measured against certain assets of the estate 
rather than against the unencumbered residue. Thus, just as in the 
225. See supra note 156. 
226. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (1994). 
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case of any other priority claimant, the secured creditor's future 
rights against the debtor are severed by the filing of the petition, 
including its rights against the debtor's future property interests no 
less than against the debtor in personam. Properly understood, the 
secured claim is a claim against specific assets that, like any other 
claim, must be fixed as of the time of filing. This is, of course, a 
very different conception of security than one that envisions the 
secured claim as representing a continuing property right that "sur­
vives" bankruptcy. It will be recalled, however, that the claim sur­
vives, as Judge Posner put it so well, only to the extent we say it 
survives. 221 
Although imagining secured claims in this fashion may be con­
ceptually at odds with the orthodox state-law ideation of security, it 
is perfectly consistent with the jurisprudential principles that ani­
mate the consumer bankruptcy system. It squares with the fresh­
start principle embedded in chapter 7 in the same manner as, for 
example, the 1994 Amendments' statutory formulation of "impair­
ment" for section 522(f) purposes.228 Furthermore, once we accept 
this reconceptualization of the meaning of secured claims in bank­
ruptcy, it becomes very easy to let go of the antiquated notions of 
security in bankruptcy, and the "fairness" kinds of impulses that 
derive from those notions, that bolstered and may have even 
accounted for the result in Dewsnup. 229 
While basically explicated from a positivist stance - how the 
Bankruptcy Code operates in fact - the justification we have 
advanced for conceptualizing secured claims in bankruptcy also 
derives from a particular normative view of bankruptcy policy and 
purposes, a view that transcends the traditional consumer/commer­
cial bankruptcy dichotomy. By and large, in recent years the con­
troversy over the proper scope of chapter 11 has formed the 
backdrop against which the larger battle over bankruptcy policy has 
been waged.230 Yet that discussion has significant implications for 
all types of bankruptcy proceedings. Ignoring for simplicity's sake 
the subtle, albeit important, shadings of difference in the various 
227. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
228. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text. 
229. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44. In effect, this result strikes a fair and 
sensible balance between the fresh-start doctrine and the policy considerations, properly 
understood, that seem to have animated the Supreme Court's decision in Long v. Bullard, 
117 U.S. 617 (1886). See supra note 51. 
230. For citation to the voluminous literature devoted to this topic, see Linda J. Rusch, 
Bankruptcy as a Revolutionary Concept: Good Faith Filing and a Theory of Obligation, 57 
MONT. L. REv. 49, 96-97 n.236 (1996). 
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positions that have been staked out in the literature, the primary 
bone of contention among the commentators has been over the 
question of whether the bankruptcy process exists solely to maxi­
mize returns for creditors with cognizable state-law claims, or 
whether the process properly takes into account a broader range of 
social and economic concerns that includes protection of non­
creditor constituencies with an interest in the debtor firm.231 We 
subscribe to the latter view. That is to say, we recognize creditor 
wealth maximization as a legitimate, but not the only legitimate, 
purpose of the bankruptcy process. As we have argued elsewhere, 
bankruptcy purposes are several and varied, and these purposes 
"form the ever-shifting basis upon which bankruptcy courts must 
act to sort out and order a broad spectrum of interests clamoring 
for protection in the bankruptcy proceeding. "232 
This eclectic understanding of bankruptcy purposes coheres 
with the conceptualization of secured claims that we have advanced 
in this article in relation to the question of lien-stripping in chapter 
7. Specifically, it provides the normative fulcrum that we use in 
striking the appropriate balance between the legitimate expecta­
tions of secured creditors and the fresh-start policy in consumer 
bankruptcy cases. Contrary to the view held by most commentators 
who subscribe to the economic account's first principle that bank­
ruptcy provides nothing more than a collective mechanism for col­
lecting debt, we believe that distributional issues are preeminent in 
bankruptcy proceedings.233 Successful reorganization cannot be 
accomplished without taking into account and accommodating the 
conflicting, often antithetical, interests of all groups affected by firm 
failure. Likewise, fresh start, whether conceived in purely humani­
tarian terms or as a mechanism for returning the debtor to active 
participation in an open-credit economy,234 cannot be attained 
unless prebankruptcy rights are subject to adjustment and the 
norms of prebankruptcy collection law are subject to deviation. 
Therefore, reconceptualizing the rights of an undersecured creditor 
in bankruptcy as a "claim," no different in its essential character 
231. See generally Frost, supra note 56, at 81-91; Ponoroff, supra note 56, at 468-71 (dis­
cussing just whom the bankruptcy law serves). For an attempt to justify circumscribing the 
concern of the bankruptcy law to traditional creditor groups in constitutional terms, see 
Thomas E. Plank, The Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, 63 TENN. L. REv. 487, 559-84 
(1996). 
232. Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 56, at 966. 
233. See generally Warren, supra note 66, at 356 (offering a nonnative justification for 
distributive goals in bankruptcy). 
234. Alternative nonnative justifications for the discharge are discussed supra note 224. 
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than any other claim, secured or unsecured, is defensible on both 
positive and normative grounds. 
B. In Application 
Having a defining model or working theory for justifying a 
value-based approach to security, with all of the consequential pol­
icy implications that this approach holds for lien stripping, is an 
essential point of departure in any reform effort. Ultimately, how­
ever, the wisdom of the rule and the prospects for its adoption, will 
be judged in terms of its practical effects on the lending community 
and the market for consumer credit. Oddly, perhaps, given the 
furor the issue has generated, we surmise that reversal of Dewsnup 
would cause, at most, a proverbial blip on the screen, although that 
prediction is subject to one qualification that would have to be 
addressed as part of the overall fix. 
Most home- or other real-property-owning chapter 7 debtors 
will see their property sold either during the case235 or very soon 
after the stay is lifted. In either event, restricting the secured lender 
to the market value of the property at filing is not prejudicial to the 
lender because, as a practical matter, there is no, and never will be 
any, appreciation to be forfeited. A debtor with sufficient postpeti­
tion cash flow or resources to carry the property will have chosen, 
or have been forced into, a chapter 13 debt-adjustment proceed­
ing,236 or, in rare circumstances, a chapter 11 case.237 Thus, the fear 
of cram down in a chapter 7 case - where the debtor can retain the 
235. If that occurs, the valuation quandary is eliminated. It is the predictive character of 
valuation that accounts for its inherently speculative and subjective nature. See Carlson, Eely 
Character, supra note 6, at 70-75 (pointing out that all valuations, as distinct from actual sales, 
are exercises in "subjunctive" reasoning and, as such, are never reducible to a verifiable cer­
tainty). See also Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 160, at 1062 {observing that value is a func­
tion of time, but that bankruptcy ignores time in valuing claims). 
236. While there is no involuntary chapter 13, this is often the practical effect of a finding 
under 11 U.S.C. § 707{b) (1994) that the granting of relief to the debtor under chapter 7 
would be a "substantial abuse." Both the Eighth and the Ninth Circuits have adopted the 
view that the ability to fund a chapter 13 plan is per se a substantial abuse. See Fonder v. 
United States, 974 F.2d 996, 999 (8th Cir. 1992); In re Walton, 866 F.2d 981 (8th Cir. 1989); 
Zolg v. Kelly (In re Kelly), 841 F.2d 908, 913 {9th Cir. 1988). The Fourth and the Sixth 
Circuits take the approach that the ability to fund a chapter 13 plan is simply one factor in 
what amounts to a case-by-case facts and circumstances analysis. See Green v. Staples (In re 
Green), 934 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1991); In re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123, 126 (6th Cir. 1989); see also 
In re Higuera, 199 B.R. 196 (Bankr. W.D. Okla 1996) (holding that ability to pay, standing 
alone, is insufficient to warrant dismissal under § 707(b)); In re Ontiveros, 198 B.R. 284 (C.D. 
Ill. 1996) (adopting a limited form of the "totality of the circumstances" test); Heller v. Foul­
ston (In re Heller), 160 B.R. 655, 658 (D. Kan. 1993) (observing that whatever approach is 
taken, it is clear that the debtor's capacity for repayment is the primary factor in the 
analysis). 
237. Although statistically quite rare, a chapter 11 proceeding may be brought involunta­
rily. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1994). 
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property and modify the underlying obligation - is grossly exag­
gerated and cannot, as has been argued,238 alone form a sufficient 
policy justification for the outcome in Dewsnup. 239 
Even were Dewsnup to be repealed tomorrow, there are realisti­
cally perhaps only three scenarios in which the debtor would be 
able both to proceed under chapter 7 and to retain the property, 
thereby exposing the mortgagee to the risk of being deprived of the 
benefit of its state-law bargain or, more properly, its claim in and to 
the property forming the collateral for the loan.240 Each of these 
situations is taken up in turn. They reveal that (with one exception) 
even in these circumstances the "risk" to secured lenders is 
minimal. 
The first scenario occurs when the debtor is able to "redeem" 
the property immediately after the case is closed by coming up with 
the cash necessary to pay off the reduced value of the lien. This is 
obviously the clearest example of the lender being deprived of post­
fi.ling appreciation since the lender is divested completely of any 
interest in the property.241 But, as a practical matter, how much of 
a threat does this scenario really pose for professional lenders on a 
day-to-day basis? We submit that the risk is de minimis. First, short 
of an extraordinarily lucky day at the racetrack, relatively few debt­
ors who have just gone through a chapter 7 bankruptcy case will 
personally have the resources to fund the payoff. Second, it is 
unrealistic to presume that such a debtor will have the cash flow to 
re-qualify for new financing, particularly at or near the 100% of 
value level that would probably be required.242 Third, while family 
resources or similar private sources of credit are always a possibil­
ity, chances are that those options, if available, would have been 
exploited earlier in an effort to head off bankruptcy in the first 
238. See Adler, supra note 57, at 5, discussed supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text. 
239. See Joann Henderson, The Galia-Lowry Brief: A Quantum Leap from Strip Down 
to Chapter 7 Cram Down, 8 BANKR. DEV. J. 131, 167 (1991). 
240. This was, of course, a key ingredient underlying the majority's decision in Dewsnup. 
See supra text accompanying note 4. Because, however, the mortgage instrument is the con­
summate contract of adhesion, particularly in consumer transactions, the accuracy of the 
analogy is open to serious debate. 
241. Presumably, however, the affected creditor still has an unsecured claim for the 
undersecured portion of the debt under § 506(a), for whatever value it is worth, which there 
would be no reason not to file regardless of the creditor's desire under other circumstances to 
remain aloof from the proceeding entirely. See supra note 144. 
242. Alternatively, in a jurisdiction with generous exemptions, made applicable in bank­
ruptcy under § 522(b), the debtor might look to such assets as a source of cash or credit. 
Ordinarily, however, the high-exemption property is likely to be the very property that the 
debtor is seeking to save from foreclosure and that, therefore, by definition, is already 
encumbered. 
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place. Certainly there may be some calculating (or well-advised) 
debtors who are willing to suffer the stigma of bankruptcy and 
pocket their hole card to be played at a more strategically advanta­
geous moment, but we strongly suspect that those instances would 
be so numerically insignificant as to have virtually no effect on the 
cost or the availability of consumer credit at large.243 
In addition to the foregoing circumstances making it highly 
unlikely that most debtors would ever be in a position to redeem, it 
is also the case that the mere fact that a debtor has the capacity to 
redeem does not mean that she has the legal right to do so. That 
determination is governed by applicable state law and, more partic­
ularly, by private contract. The terms and conditions of loan agree­
ments and security instruments typically are negotiated, if at all, off 
of the lender's standard documents. Therefore the lender should 
have ample opportunity, within the perimeters established by appli­
cable regulatory legislation, to protect itself against an undesired 
redemption - for example, when the note carries a favorable rate 
of return - with a modicum of advance planning.244 Finally, even 
in those relatively few cases in which the debtor has both the ability 
and the right to redeem, the lender has not only received the full 
value of its collateral, but has been spared the costs and risks associ­
ated with foreclosure. Thus, subject only to the unsubstantiated 
charge that judicial valuations are consistently low, an assumption 
particularly suspect when the relevant comparison is with foreclo-
243. The opportunity for exploiting a strategic advantage is far more likely in the case in 
which the lien, although without any actual economic value, remains as an encumbrance 
against the property. See supra note 182. 
244. See Howard, supra note 24, at 391 (explaining this point in the context of a broader 
explanation of why an interpretation of § 506{d) that permits strip down of liens against 
realty does not violate either the spirit or purpose of § 722). Professor Howard cites O'Leary 
v. Oregon (In re O'Leary), 15 B.R. 881 (Bankr. D. Or. 1987), in support of this proposition. 
See Howard, supra note 24, at 391. In fact, the court in O'Leary observed that redemption, 
as distinct from strip down, depended on the terms of the note and mortgage, which might 
include "pre.payment penalties and other contractual obligations that would remain unal­
tered by fixing defendant's allowed secured claim under § 506." 75 B.R. at 884. In fairness, 
however, it should be noted that in many circumstances, such as primary home mortgage 
loans, requirements and restrictions imposed by the secondary market may effectively tie the 
hands of both parties when it comes to items such as prepayment penalties. Also, since its 
loan is now nonrecourse, in many cases the secured creditor would have no interest in 
obstructing early repayment even at the reduced amount of the lien remaining after strip 
down. Thus, in many instances where the debtor had the financial capacity to do so, the 
effect of the strip down would be to facilitate a de facto redemption of real property collat­
eral. Since the creditor would still be receiving the full value of its state-law security interest, 
however, we do not see any particular inequity in this result. Further, because the redemp· 
tion would occur pursuant to the debtor's rights under state law, we do not regard it as 
inconsistent with the Code's provision for redemption of personal property collateral. 
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sure rather than market values,245 the potential prejudice to the 
secured lender under this scenario is nominal at most. 
The second scenario in which the debtor may be able to strip 
down and retain the property is one that actually does not involve 
or require the repeal of Dewsnup. It �volves- accomplishing in two 
steps what Dewsnup now forbids doing in one by resorting to the 
device that has come to be known as "chapter 20."246 In its simplest 
form, a chapter 20 entails an initial filing of a chapter 7 case to 
discharge personal liability on dischargeable debts, followed by the 
rapid-fire filing of a chapter 13 designed to reimpose the automatic 
stay and, inter alia, permit retention of desired property or modify a 
nondischargeable debt.247 In Johnson v. Home State Bank,248 the 
Supreme Court rejected a mortgage lender's argument that once 
the debtor's personal liability had been discharged in the earlier 
chapter 7 case, the mortgage lien was no longer a "claim" subject to 
rescheduling in chapter 13.249 By implicitly placing its imprimatur 
on chapter 20s,250 the Court created the opportunity for debtors in 
Dewsnup situations to obtain all of the benefits of a prohibited strip 
down by simply using the chapter 20 technique to accomplish an 
installment redemption of the property at a price equal to the value 
of the property rather than the amount secured by the lien.251 
245. See supra note 66. 
246. "Chapter 20" is the informal name that has been attached to a particular pattern of 
serial filings used by individual debtors. See generally Lex A. Coleman, Individual Consumer 
"Chapter 20" Cases After Johnson: An Introduction to Nonbusiness Serial Filings Under 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 357, 363-65 (1992). 
247. See, e.g., Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Saylors (In re Saylors), 869 F.2d 1434 (11th Cir. 
1989); Downey Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Metz (In re Metz), 820 F.2d 1495 (9th Cir. 1987); 
Johnson v. Vanguard Holding Corp. (In re Johnson), 708 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1983) (per 
curiam). 
248. 501 U.S. 78 (1991). 
249. See 501 U.S. at 84-86 (holding that a surviving nonrecourse mortgagee lien is a 
"claim" within the meaning of § 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code). 
250. Prior to Johnson some bankruptcy courts had taken the position that chapter 20s 
were inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of chapter 13 and, accordingly, should be 
barred as a matter of law. See, e.g., In re McKissie, 103 B.R. 189, 191 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989). 
In Johnson, the Supreme Court failed to outlaw chapter 20 cases either as an abusive manipu­
lation of the system or as presumptively involving bad faith for purposes of the confirmation 
standard in § 1325(a)(3). Technically, however, the issue of good faith was not before the 
Court. See Johnson, 501 U.S. at 88 (declining to address the good faith issue (or the issue of 
"feasibility" under § 1325(a)(6)) because both the district court and the court of appeals had 
decided the case on the ground that the creditor's mortgage lien did not constitute a 
"claim"). 
251. The process would work as follows: Assume a debtor who owns real property with a 
current value of $100,000 subject to a lien securing an indebtedness of $150,000 that is cur­
rently in default Before foreclosure can be initiated, the debtor files chapter 7, discharging 
all personal responsibility for the debt Assuming no dividend to unsecured creditors (or that 
the creditor elects not to file in that capacity), the creditor emerges with an in rem claim for 
$150,000 (plus accrued interest). Because of Dewsnup, the debtor would have been pre-
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Again, the risk here to lenders is minimal. To begin with, the 
fact that a sophisticated or well-advised debtor can accomplish strip 
down today in spite of Dewsnup means that, at best, what we have 
now is unprincipled, selective regulation of mortgage strip down. It 
might be argued that this makes the case for reversal of Johnson, 
not Dewsnup.252 However, chapter 20 debtors are still subject to 
case-by-case scrutiny of their motives under the good faith standard 
in section 1325(a)(3),253 and, in point of fact, the highly individual­
ized nature of the fact mosaic in these cases suggests that potential 
abuses are best regulated in just this fashion rather than by attempt­
ing to draw sharp, inflexible lines.254 In addition, at least by dint of 
the number of reported decisions, there is no indication that this 
crack in the dam has created or threatens to create a flood of filings 
aimed at end-running Dewsnup. This may be due, in large measure, 
to the fact that Nobleman, as a matter of chapter 13 policy and 
interpretation, precludes use of chapter 20 to strip down a mortgage 
against the debtor's personal residence.255 In any event, this empir­
ical reality reinforces the notion that the repeal of Dewsnup poses 
no practical threat of consequence to the mortgage-lending commu­
nity. As nifty as it sounds, most debtors flirting \vith bankruptcy 
lack the :financial capacity to pull off an effective strip down, 
whether in one step or two. For those few who do have the ability 
to pay off the amount of the secured claim under a confirmed chap­
ter 13 plan and are not legally precluded from doing so, there are 
sound reasons for permitting them to do so and no apparent justifi­
cation for discriminating among them based solely on guile. Alter­
natively, if those reasons are not regarded as sufficiently 
eluded from avoiding the underwater portion of the lien in the chapter 7 case. At this junc­
ture, the creditor would be expected to commence foreclosure proceedings. However, before 
that can occur, the debtor now files a chapter 13 petition and in his plan proposes, in con­
formity with § 1325(a){5), to pay to the mortgagee over the life of the plan the present value 
of $100,000. Obviously, because of § 1322{b)(2) and the Nobe/man decision, the strategy will 
not work where the lien is on the debtor's principal residence. See supra note 12. Barring 
that circumstance, the debtor has managed to pull off in two steps what Dewsnup prohibits 
accomplishing in one. In fact, because of the payout feature of the plan, the debtor is in even 
a better position than would result from strip down alone, and this factor is doubtless the 
most troubling aspect of the practice. For further discussion of whether installment redemp­
tions, distinct from the question of lien avoidance, should be permitted, see infra notes 275-78 
and accompanying text. 
252. This is certainly, for example, the tack that Professor Adler would advocate. See 
supra text accompanying notes 59-61. 
253. Unlike some bankruptcy courts, all of the appellate courts to speak to the good faith 
issue in the context of a chapter 20 case have refused to find bad faith per se, instead leaving 
the determination to a fact-specific analysis in each case. See authorities cited supra note 247. 
254. See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 56, at 966-70 (advocating the advantages of 
developing the contours of good faith, as it relates to filing, using the case method}. 
255. See supra note 12. 
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compelling, then logically we cannot continue to indulge without 
closer scrutiny the rationale that has driven Congress's preference 
in recent years for chapter 13 over chapter 7.256 
The third scenario in which the repeal of Dewsnup might pose a 
serious practical threat to lenders is in those jurisdictions that inter­
pret section 521(2) of the Code257 in permissive rather than 
mandatory terms. It is this circumstance, as opposed to the chapter 
20 phenomenon where good faith still operates as a control,258 that 
poses the greatest risk of the debtor accomplishing an installment 
redemption of the stripped-down value of the lien. Accordingly, it 
is also the circumstance in which lender complaints are most legiti­
mate and would have to be addressed as part and parcel of any 
reform effort aimed at repealing Dewsnup. 
Section 521(2) requires an individual debtor in chapter 7 to file 
a statement with the clerk indicating the debtor's intention (to 
retain or surrender) with respect to property of the estate securing 
a consumer obligation and then to perform in accordance with that 
stated intention within forty-five days.259 This provision has created 
a split in the circuits over the question of whether a debtor who is 
current on the debtor's obligations to the creditor may propose sim­
ply to retain the property without either redeeming it260 or 
reaffirming the debt secured by the property.261 Relying on author­
ity from the Sixth Circuit to the effect that the Code neither pro-
256. See generally TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS 340 
{1989) (contending, based on empirical data, that the drive to push debtors into chapter 13 
has distorted the law in certain critical respects). 
257. Congress added § 521(2) to the Bankruptcy Code as part of the Bankruptcy 
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333. It pro­
vides, in substance, that if an individual debtor's debts include consumer debts secured by 
estate property, then the debtor, before the earlier of the first meeting of creditors or 30 days 
following filing of the petition, within a specific time frame, must state his intention with 
respect to retention or surrender of such property and, if the property is claimed as exempt, 
whether the debtor intends to redeem the property to reaffirm the debt secured by the 
property. 
258. See supra note 253 and accompanying text. 
259. See 11 U.S.C. § 521(2){A), (B) {1994). However, subparagraph (C) states that 
"nothing in subparagraphs (A) and (B) • • .  shall alter the debtor's or the trustee's rights with 
regard to such property under this title." 11 U.S.C. § 521{2)(C) {1994). 
260. See 11 U.S.C § 722 (1994) (providing individual debtors with the right to redeem 
personal property intended primarily for the debtor's personal, family, or household use 
from a lien encumbering such property by paying to the secured creditor the value of its 
secured claim (under § 506(a)), provided that there is no value in the property for the estate). 
In effect, the debtor is given a right, not available under state law, to cash out the lien by 
paying the value of the collateral rather than the amount of the debt. Section 722, of course, 
does not apply to real property. 
261. Reaffirmation entails a voluntary agreement between the debtor and a creditor 
under which the debtor's personal liability on an otherwise dischargeable debt is renegoti­
ated and reaffirmed or simply reaffirmed. See 11 U.S.C. § 524 {1994). 
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vides for nor permits installment redemptions,262 the Seventh 
Circuit,263 later joined by the Eleventh,264 held that section 521(2) is 
mandatory in the sense that a debtor who neither redeems nor 
reaffirms must surrender the property to the secured creditor.26s 
Most recently, the Fifth Circuit has joined in the view that a debtor 
may not retain collateral securing a consumer obligation without 
either redeeming the property or reaffirming the debt.266 The 
Fourth Circuit,261 by contrast, relying on authority from the Tenth 
Circuit,268 has ruled that a debtor who is not in default, and who 
gives proper notice of the debtor's intention to retain the property 
and continue paying the debt, without formally reaffirming or 
redeeming, has fully complied with section 521(2).269 
262. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bell (In re Bell), 700 F.2d 1053, 1056-58 
(6th Cir. 1983). Note that Bell was decided before the enactment of § 521(2). 
263. See In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383 (7th Cir. 1990). 
264. See Taylor v. AGE Fed. Credit Union (In re Taylor), 3 F.3d 1512 (11th Cir. 1993). 
265. See Taylor, 3 F.3d at 1514-16 (noting that the plain language of the section pennits 
only three options: retain and reaffirm, retain and redeem, or surrender); see also First Natl. 
Bank v. Parlato, Civil No. 3:95cv2056 (AVC), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16066 (D. Conn. Sept. 
24, 1996) (refusing to permit a chapter 7 debtor, even though current on his automobile 
installment loan payments and in compliance with other loan terms, from retaining the auto­
mobile after discharge without either redeeming or reaffirming); In re Gregg, 199 B.R. 404, 
407-09 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1996) (providing that the secured creditor has standing to enforce 
the debtor's obligation to perform in accordance with their stated intention under § 521(2) 
when the debtors fail to perform). 
266. See Johnson v. Sun Fm. Co. (In re Johnson), 89 F.3d 249, 252 (5th Cir. 1996) (per 
curiam). But see In re Castillo, 209 B.R. 59, 75 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1997) (questioning the 
scope of the holding in Sun Fin.). 
267. See Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Belanger (In re Belanger), 962 F.2d 345 
(4th Cir. 1992). 
268. See Lowry Fed. Credit Union v. West, 882 F.2d 1543 (10th Cir. 1989). 
269. See Belanger, 962 F.2d at 346. Belanger suggests that courts that have adopted the 
mandatory view have failed to give proper weight to § 521(2)(C), which provides that subsec­
tions (A) and (B) are not meant to alter the rights of debtors in regard to the property, and 
to the legislative history, which reveals that Congress rejected a proposal that would have 
provided for lifting of the automatic stay if the debtor retained the property and failed to 
timely redeem or reaffirm. See also Mayton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (In re Mayton), 208 
B.R. 61 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1997); Capital Communications Fed. Credit Union v. Boodrow, 197 
B.R. 409, 411-12 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (affirming the bankruptcy court's detennination that the 
plain language of the statute supports the position taken in Belanger); Sears Roebuck & Co. 
v. Lamirande, 199 B.R. 221, 224 (D. Mass. 1996) (holding that the options stated under 
§ 521(2) are not exclusive); cf. In re Irvine, 192 B.R. 920, 922 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding 
that the creditor is entitled to have stay lifted if the debtor fails to comply with § 521(2)). If 
the debtor is not in default on the underlying obligation with respect to which he has failed to 
state his intention, vacation of the stay would not create any immediate remedies for the 
creditor. See In re Weir, 173 B.R. 682, 692 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1994). The court in Weir 
declined to comment on the enforceability of an ipso facto in the underlying note and secur­
ity instrument under these circumstances since the issue was not presented on the facts of the 
case. See 173 B.R. at 692 n.24. However, the court did affirmatively reject the creditor's 
suggestion that other remedies might include denial of discharge or contempt. See 173 B.R. 
at 690-91; see also Beneficial N.Y., Inc. v. Bushey (In re Bushey), 204 B.R. 661 (Bankr. 
N.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding only that a debtor not current on a secured obligation has a 
mandatory obligation to do something in respect of the debt). For a good discussion of the 
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The rule in the Fourth and the Tenth Circuits, in addition to its 
consistency with the language of the statute and generally accepted 
principles of statutory construction,210 seems truer to the general 
goal of the Code and the spirit of fresh start that animates the 
Code's consumer bankruptcy provisions.211 For example, a 
mandatory interpretation of section 521(2) leads inevitably to the 
conclusion that a debtor cannot reaffirm. just one of several debts 
secured by the same property even though the junior liens are 
wholly or partially under water.272 On the other hand, were 
Dewsnup to be overruled, a permissive interpretation of section 
521(2) arguably threatens to affect the terms of the secured loan in 
a manner that is not only inconsistent with the theory of the rights 
of secured creditors in bankruptcy that we have advanced in this 
work, but that may pose constitutional infirmities as we11.213 
split in the interpretation of § 521(2) and the implications that follow from the various posi­
tions that have been staked out, see David Gray Carlson, Redemption and Reinstatement in 
Chapter 7 Cases, 4 ABI INST. L. REv. 289, 319-22 (1996). 
270. See Mayton, 208 B.R. at 66 ("Amazingly, courts restricting the debtor to redemption 
or reaffirmation refer not at all to subparagraph (C) [of § 521(2)]." (internal quotation marks 
omitted} (quoting In re Ogando, 203 B.R. 14, 16 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996))); Belanger, 962 F.2d 
at 347-48 (pointing out that to give full effect to the words of the statute, "if applicable" as 
used in § 521(2)(A) must apply to redemption or reaffirmation). 
271. See, e.g., Capital Communications, 197 B.R. at 412 (contending that allowing debtors 
this "fourth option" fairly balances the "rights of secured creditors vis-a-vis debtors"); First 
N. Am. Natl. Bank v. Doss (In re Doss}, 203 B.R. 57 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1996) (finding that 
§ 521(2) essentially serves a notice requirement, and that the election to redeem or reaffirm 
is therefore not mandatory); cf. Ogando, 203 B.R. at 15-16 (finding that § 521(2} imposes a 
mandatory requirement that the debtor file a statement of his intention either to retain or 
surrender the collateral, but does not otherwise infringe on the debtor's rights with respect to 
the debt or the collateral). For a particularly well-reasoned analysis of the issue based on the 
applicable legislative history, see Castillo, 209 B.R. 59. 
272. See In re Greer, 189 B.R. 219 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995}. In this case, the creditor was 
owed three debts, all secured, pursuant to a cross-collateralization clause, by the debtor's car. 
The value of the car was less than the amount of the senior claim (the original automobile 
loan). Thus, the debtor proposed to reaffirm that debt only, and the creditor objected. Cit­
ing Taylor, the court held that all three debts had to be reaffirmed if the debtor wanted to 
keep the car. See 189 B.R. at 221. Because, as even the court noted, the creditor's objection 
made no economic sense given that the creditor was better off with a partial reaffirmation 
than either a redemption or surrender of the car (which had a value less than the first lien), it 
is obvious that the objection was intended to extract an even greater repayment from the 
debtor by exploiting the advantage resulting from the debtor's simultaneous desire to keep 
her car and inability to fund a cash-out redemption. This is precisely the reason why the 
permissive approach to § 521(2) facilitates fresh start, and not "head start," the latter repre­
senting a catchphrase frequently employed by th� courts inclined toward constraining the 
debtor's options in an effort to justify their position. See, e.g., Taylor v. AGE Fed. Credit 
Union (In re Taylor), 3 F.3d 1512, 1516 (11th Cir. 1993). 
273. It will be recalled that the real problem the Supreme Court had with the legislation 
before it in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935), was that the 
original provisions of the Frazier-Lemke Act of 1934 permitted not only reduction of the 
indebtedness to the value of the property, but payment of such value in the form of deferred 
payments. See 295 U.S. at 591-93. The Act also had retroactivity problems, much like the 
problem with § 522(t)(2) when applied to pre-Code security interests. See United States v. 
Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982). Because of the fact that the payout in these cir-
2304 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 95:2234 
In some instances, it is fair to assume that a debtor who pro­
poses to continue payments as originally scheduled in order to 
retain the property subject to the lien does so to protect an exempt 
equity position that the debtor has built up in the property. That is 
to say, purely from a financial standpoint, the creditor will be over­
secured, and the excess value is exempt from administration. There 
is little reason for a debtor to employ this strategy when the amount 
of the debt is greater than the· value of the collateral, particularly 
when redemption under section 722 is an option. If, however, the 
debtor is first able to use section 506( d) to reduce the undersecured 
loan to the value of the collateral, there is much more incentive to 
retain the property because of either its sentimental value or the 
cost and inconvenience of replacing it.274 In essence, the stripped­
down creditor is forced into the position of having made a nonre­
course loan without an equity cushion, so that the debtor enjoys the 
benefit of any appreciation in the property while the creditor bears 
the entire risk of a decline in value. 
While defining a secured creditor's interest with reference to the 
value of the collateral at filing does no violence to the preban­
kruptcy bargain of the parties,275 it is another kettle of fish entirely 
to defer payment of that value and to put at risk the creditor's abil­
ity to recover its claim from the property.276 Therefore, in the inter-
cumstances would presumably include compensation for the deferral based on the contract 
rate of interest, it is not clear that the issues entailed in the combination of strip down, dis­
charge, and extension would rise to the level of constitutional infirmity. See Lindsey v. Fed­
eral Land Bank (In re Lindsey), 823 F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1987) (a pre-Dewsnup case involving a 
debtor's effort to amortize payments on a stripped-down lien over time). There are, how­
ever, other reasons short of constitutional requirements not to put the stripped-down mortga­
gee in this position with respect to its secured claim, including the fact that it is inconsistent 
with the conceptualization of a security interest in bankruptcy advanced in this work. See 
also infra note 276. 
274. Given the rationale that a debtor who is not in default might simply continue making 
regular payments, the total amount of each payment would presumably have to stay at the 
same amount designated in the original note - that is, the amount necessary to amortize the 
original principal balance and accrued interest over the life of the note. Obviously, however, 
because of the reduction in principal, the allocation of each payment to principal and interest 
would change and the obligation would pay out sooner than the maturity date contemplated 
in the note. Conceivably, if no value were assigned to the increased risk imposed on the 
mortgagee, the lender might be better off with a fair valuation and imposition of this arrange­
ment than it would be with its ordinary state-law remedy of seizure and immediate 
foreclosure. 
275. See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text. 
276. Because the indebtedness would be equal to exactly the value of the property and 
essentially be nonrecourse on account of the discharge, in the event of a subsequent decrease 
in value an economically rationale debtor simply would cease paying the note and leave the 
creditor with its rights against the property. Moreover, the same circumstances might create 
a disincentive for the debtor adequately to maintain or insure the property until market 
appreciation operated to give the debtor something to protect. Some of these concerns easily 
could be ameliorated with proper covenants in the loan documentation and broad definition 
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ests of consistency and evenhandedness,277 it seems that any 
proposal calling for the repeal of Dewsnup must also address this 
issue. Logically, the issue can be resolved by explicitly malting reaf­
firmation of the stripped portion of the debt mandatory where the 
debtor proposes to retain and to continue to make regular pay­
ments.278 This approach would protect the secured creditor from 
effectively having its lien stripped down twice, in contravention of 
the spirit of section 72'1(a)(8), in circumstances in which the debtor 
late-decides to cease making payments following a decline in the 
value of the property. In addition, it would have the further inci­
dental advantage of clarifying that, in any other situations, the 
debtor is not required by section 521(2) to choose redemption, reaf­
firmation, or surrender of the property to the exclusion of other 
non-Code alternatives. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court's holding in Dewsnup transgresses most of 
the traditional principles of statutory construction. Indeed, given 
the approach the Court has taken to other bankruptcy issues,279 its 
existence may be explicable only as a kind of involuntary judicial 
reaction to the perceived opportunity that section 506(a) creates to 
"arbitrage between the bankruptcy court's low valuation and the 
higher price a buyer pays at a later sale."28° In any event, justifica­
tions for Justice Blackmun's tortured reading of section 506( d) 
of the events of default to include the breach of such covenants. Further, in many instances, 
the debtor might have a noneconomic-based attachment to and interest in the property. See 
supra note 182. This fact, coupled with the unlikelihood that the debtor could obtain the 
financing to secure replacement property, provides some assurance to the lender of the 
debtor's incentive to stay current on payments and maintain the property so that the lender 
eventually will receive the full value of its secured claim. Nevertheless, in a liquidation pro­
ceeding in which the creditors are to be denied any participation in the debtor's future, they 
should not be required to endure both the avoidance of their undersecured claim and defer­
ral in the payment of their secured claim. 
277. Ironically, the bargain metaphor could lead to just the opposite conclusion. If, how­
ever, as we have advanced, it is appropriate to imagine the security interest as simply a prior­
ity "claim," rather than as a continuing property interest, it is appropriate to pay that claim at 
the same time it is adjusted to value and not to subject the creditor to an even less favorable 
result in the future. 
278. We have far less sympathy for the proposal in circumstances in which the creditor 
effectively requires the continuance of regular payments by exercising its state-law contract 
rights to block any attempt to cash out the property. See supra note 82 and accompanying 
text. 
279. See supra note 11. 
280. Carlson, Undersecured Claims, supra note 6, at 254 (referring to the practice 
whereby the trustee is able to obtain a low judicial valuation and then sell the property at a 
high price, effectively extracting a subsidy for general creditors at the expense of the secured 
creditor). Exactly how serious a threat to secured creditors this practice represents is an 
open question. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text. 
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couched in terms of bargain metaphors and nondefeasible property 
rights are noble sounding, but ultimately empty, rhetorical ruses. In 
fact, as we have seen, the most articulate defense of Dewsnup has 
forthrightly acknowledged that the real issue is distrust over judicial 
valuations that are too conservative.281 There are no sovereign or 
inalienable principles at stake. Instead, the issue boils down to a 
political exercise of balancing fresh-start policy against the compet­
ing commercial policies served by maintaining a stable environment 
for asset-based financing. 
Collateral valuations are mere predictions and, as such, are 
inherently uncertain.282 Moreover, while it is unclear to us that this 
uncertainty necessarily produces low valuations - particularly 
since judicial valuations typically do not factor selling and delay 
costs into the analysis283 - even conceding the point does not 
diminish the case for overruling Dewsnup. We make this assertion 
based on our observation that the fresh-start objectives of the con­
sumer bankruptcy system are attained by recognizing that the filing 
of the petition changes fundamentally the nature of the debtor's 
relationships with his creditors, both secured and unsecured. An 
essential aspect of this closure of the debtor's prepetition life is 
achieved by liquidating secured creditors' claims in relation to the 
then-extant value of their collateral. The filing of the petition 
serves to construct a nearly impenetrable barrier separating the 
debtor's pre- and postpetition lives. A property-based heuristic for 
understanding security provides a convenient method for structur­
ing the discussion about the rights and entitlements of secured par­
ties in a nonbankruptcy context. It loses its viability, however, as 
soon as the bankruptcy curtain is drawn. The very act of filing 
extinguishes the secured creditor's default rights against the debtor 
and repossessory rights in and to the property. This is no less true 
for secured claims than it is for any other kinds of claims against the 
debtor or assets of the estate. This judgment is not only intuitive; it 
also finds support in a number of other Code provisions, ranging 
from the new statutory definition of "impairment"284 to the nega­
tive implications drawn from �e explicit provision in chapter 11 of 
a mechanism for secured creditors to hedge against low valuations 
281. See supra text accompanying notes 58-61. 
282. See supra note 66. 
283. See supra note 65. 
284. See supra note 15. 
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or a temporarily depressed market.285 It also coheres with the reha­
bilitative goals of the consumer bankruptcy system no less than it 
does with the rehabilitative objectives of the various chapter 
proceedings. 
Despite its interference with the Code's fresh-start policy, 
Dewsnup has proved tenacious. In large measure, we believe that it 
has been difficult to eradicate because it hangs on a false concep­
tion of bankruptcy and, in particular, an appealing but ultimately 
inaccurate conception of the nature of security in bankruptcy. 
However, once the misconception is understood, we can :finally snip 
the slender vine from which the rule in Dewsnup hangs. At bottom, 
unlike the leaf that sustained Johnsy in her time of need, we really 
could have done quite nicely without it all along. 
285. Section llll(b) permits a secured creditor to elect to have its entire debt treated as 
secured rather than bifurcated under § 506(a). This provision was, in large measure, a con­
gressional reaction to a case under chapter XII of the Act in which the court held that a 
secured creditor that had disapproved of the debtor's plan of arrangement could be cashed 
out on a nonrecourse debt for the appraised value of its collateral in lieu of return of the 
property. See In re Pine Gate Assocs., 2 Banlcr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1478 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 
1976); see also Carlson, Unsecured Claims, supra note 6, at 255 (discussing the origins of 
§ llll(b)). However, as earlier noted, in terms of the economic value of the payment 
received by the electing creditor under chapter 11, the debtor-in-possession usually can 
achieve the same result as if the creditor had not elected by extending the payout period. 
This is a function of the fact that § llll(b) only requires that the sum of the payments aggre­
gate to the amount of the secured claim, not that they have a present value of such amount as 
of the date of confirmation. Despite this, § llll(b) still affords some protection in the event 
the debtor fails to make the payments called for by the plan or if the value of the property is 
temporarily depressed. See supra note 24. Nevertheless, the absence of any sort of similar 
provision in chapter 7 is some indication that the drafters did not intend to preclude strip 
down under § 506(d) in individual liquidation cases. 
